Jan 22, 2021
A A A
TENTATIVE RULINGS                    
LAW & MOTION CALENDAR
Friday, January 22, 2021, 3:00 p.m.
Courtroom 19 – Hon. Gary Nadler via Zoom
3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa
 
In accordance with the Addendum to First Amended Omnibus Order of the Presiding Judge issued May 27, 2020, only those persons with court hearings in criminal actions shall enter a Sonoma County Superior Court facility. Until further notice, all matters set for hearing in this courtroom shall be heard remotely through Zoom. No party or representative of a party may appear personally in Courtroom 19. CourtCall is not permitted for this calendar.
 
If the tentative ruling is accepted, no appearance is necessary via Zoom unless otherwise indicated.
 
TO JOIN ZOOM ONLINE:
 
Department 19 Hearings
MeetingID: 857-0848-8569
Password: 410765
 
TO JOIN ZOOM BY PHONE:  
By Phone (same meeting ID and password as listed for each calendar):
+1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose)
 
The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, YOU MUST notify the Court by telephone at (707) 521-6602, and all other opposing parties of your intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. today, Thursday, January 21, 2021. Parties in motions for claims of exemption are exempt from this requirement.
 
PLEASE NOTE: The Court WILL provide a Court Reporter for this calendar. If there are any concerns, please contact the Court at the number provided above.
 
 
 1.        MCV-205043, Citibank South Dakota v. Brisco
 
Appearance required.
 
 
 
2.       SCV-264327, Paulsen v. MidPen Housing Corporation
 
The Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories and Waiver of Objections to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents is GRANTED in full. Sanctions of $2,208 are awarded to the moving party as more fully discussed below.
 
On July 6, 2020, Defendant SONOMA COUNTY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION (“Defendant”) moved to compel Plaintiffs John Paulsen, Roseland Village, and Paulsen Land Company (“Plaintiffs”) to “provide full and complete, verified responses” to Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, served on each of the Plaintiffs. The notice of motion asserts that no responses had been received as of the time the motion was filed, and it sought an order that all objections to the discovery have been waived. The notice did not seek imposition of sanctions. The motion was set to be heard on October 21, 2020.
 
In support of the motion, Deputy County Counsel Kara Abelson testified that the discovery was served on January 23, 2020; that on February 19, 2020 she granted Plaintiffs’ request to extend the response deadline to March 28, 2020; and that on March 17, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 emergency, that the responses would be due on May 27, 2020. Having received no responses, on June 4, 2020, she wrote to Plaintiffs’ counsel via email seeking an update. That same day, she received a response from attorney Robert Nellessen, advising that he had neared completion “substantively” prior to the Court’s endemic restrictions; that his office was temporarily inaccessible due to the protests; and that in two weeks he hoped to have an understanding of when the responses could be completed.
 
Ms. Abelson, on June 8, 2020, extended the response time to no later than June 22, 2020. She also advised that the “court holiday related to the COVID-19 emergency expired on April 15, 2020” and advised that the responses were untimely, and objections waived. In response to this, counsel for plaintiffs asserted that he had been unable to staff his office due to the pandemic; that the court’s pandemic related orders were valid through June 1, and that he could not provide a timeline for responses. Mr. Nellessen explained on June 10 that the responses were ‘abandoned at the lockdown commencement’; that his paralegal had been working remotely; and that she would be able to go to the office to determine the status of the responses. Counsel further stated that “he did not know how to access the computer where the responses were stored” and that he would provide an update by June 17, 2020. No such update was provided, prompting yet another communication from Ms. Abelson on June 29, 2020. Still, Mr. Nellessen did not provide a firm date for service of the verified responses, and that the responsive documents “are in a locked paralegal office”.
 
In response to the motion to compel, Robert Nellessen provided a declaration. He first noted that he had sent discovery requests to the County of Sonoma, providing as many extensions to respond as was requested. He correctly notes that the discovery in question had been served on November 15, 2019, prior to the March 18, 2020 Sonoma County Mandatory Shelter in Place orders. More to the point, he testified that: (1) his office was located downtown and was under a mandatory lockdown with barricades in June; (2) and that he was able to remotely advise County Counsel that verified responses would be provided within 60 days of the date of the communication on June 29, 2020. Verified responses to the special interrogatories were provided on July 15, 2020. He further provided that on August 3, 2020, responses to the requests for production were provided.
 
Mr. Nellessen’s paralegal, Lori J. Paul, testified by declaration that she was required to shelter in place as she was the “primary caregiver for an eight (8) -year-old medically challenged and COVID susceptible child with Autism”; that another part-time legal assistant sheltered in place due to “significant, historical health issues”; and that office personnel that she had hired with children advised of their inability to leave home.
 
The discovery facilitator appointed to resolve the original motion to compel responses filed a report and recommendation on October 8, 2020. However, the Commission then withdrew the motion, as Plaintiffs had by then served their responses.
 
Presently before this court is a motion by Defendant to compel Plaintiffs to provide further verified responses to specified discovery, and for monetary sanctions to be paid by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $3,312.00.
 
Plaintiffs seek judicial notice of the facilitator’s report for the original motion to compel, and of the moving papers which plaintiff filed for their motion for relief from the waiver of objections. Request for judicial notice is granted, except as to the facilitator’s report.
 
The Commission moves the Court to compel further responses to the special interrogatories and requests for production (“RFP”). It asks the Court to require Plaintiffs to provide further responses without objections on the basis that Plaintiffs waived the objections when they failed to respond by the extended deadline. It also seeks further substantive responses from Paulsen to interrogatories 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 31, 40, and 42-45; and from both Paulsen Land and Village as to interrogatories 10-12, 19-23, 26-30, 32, 33, and 35.  
           
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They argue that the problems occurring through spring and summer 2020, including the COVID-19 crisis, caused significant delays in Plaintiffs’ ability to respond to discovery and handle this litigation generally and that they filed a related motion for relief from the waivers which is now set for February 3, 2020.
 
When a propounding party is dissatisfied with responses to interrogatories or production requests, that party may move to compel further responses. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) sections 2030.300, 2031.310. The moving party must make adequate attempts to meet and confer. Ibid. Generally, once a timely, proper motion to compel further responses has been made, the responding party has the burden to justify objections or incomplete answers. Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221. 
 
A party moving to compel further responses to a production request must demonstrate “good cause" for seeking the items. CCP section 2031.310(b)(1). This requires a showing that the items are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and a showing of specific facts justifying discovery. Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117. Whether there is an alternative source for the information is relevant though not dispositive. Associated Brewers Distrib. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 588. Once the moving party demonstrates good cause, the responding party must justify its objections. See Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168. Requests must identify the documents sought by describing a category with “reasonable particularity.” CCP section 2031.030(c)(1). This description must be particularized from the point of view of the person on whom the demand is made, such as by describing categories which bear some relationship to the manner in which the documents are kept. See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 222.
 
A party has a duty to provide “complete” responses and to make them as straightforward as possible. CCP sections 2030.220; 2031.210-2031.230. Requests must be answered to the extent possible and an answer that contains only part of the information requested or which evades a meaningful response is improper. Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783. 
 
It is not proper to respond by simply referring to other documents such as a deposition transcript. Deyo, supra. If a party does refer to other documents, it should generally also specify the source and summarize the information to make the response itself complete. Ibid. A responding party also has a duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested information and if it is unable to comply, it must state that it made a reasonable and diligent search. CCP sections 2030.220 2031.230; Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 783. 
 
As to the issue of waiver of objections, Plaintiffs’ primary argument is that their failure to respond on time was due to circumstances beyond their control and which support relief from waiver of objections. 
 
The actual opposition memorandum filed in response to this motion is terse and contains little information or explanation. In any case, Plaintiffs rely on the papers filed for their motion for relief from waiver, particularly the declaration of Plaintiffs’ attorney, Robert Nellessen (“Nellessen”), for that motion. They assert that the circumstances relating to COVID-19, and later the protests in downtown Santa Rosa, impaired their ability to respond to the discovery.
 
Plaintiffs point out that the parties on July 1, 2020 filed a stipulation to continue the trial date and allow resolution of the pending discovery disputes, including the discovery at issue in this motion, and that the stipulation re-set all dates based on the new trial date and did not set a date for responding to the outstanding discovery. They are correct, but this stipulation does not address the issue of waiver of these objections. By the time of the stipulation, Plaintiffs’ discovery responses were long overdue and Plaintiffs had long since missed the deadline, which the Commission had already twice extended for Plaintiffs, once because of problems related to COVID-19. The stipulation does not address the discovery other than stating that the parties need more time to resolve the dispute. It does not eliminate the already expired deadline or otherwise address Plaintiffs’ untimely responses in any other way. No other document shows that the Commission at any time agreed to give Plaintiffs more time to respond again with objections or otherwise relieved Plaintiffs of the waiver. Indeed, at all points the Commission was clear in insisting that Plaintiffs had missed the final extended deadline for responding and had thus waived objections. 
           
            Even the Nellessen declaration filed for the motion for relief from waiver fails itself to include any clear explanation for the failure but instead merely refers to its Exhibit E, purporting to set forth a timeline of events. This simply shows that the statewide emergency was declared and court operations were temporarily halted, with hearings on May 5, 2020 being ordered conducted remotely. Mr. Nellessen then states for May 27, 2020, the date on which he was supposed to have responded to the discovery, “Nellessen no staff [sic], Building Locked, Downtown Santa Rosa protests and Riots (streets blocked, etc.)” with no other information. It is possible that Nellessen may have a valid basis for claiming that the COVID-19 situation and the protests could have interfered with his ability to respond by the deadline but he provides no actual evidence or explanation for this. The timeline itself is of no real help. The fact that there was an emergency closure of the courts does not impair the attorneys’ ability to handle litigation outside of court proceedings and Mr. Nellessen provides no evidence or explanation as to why his work would have been impaired. The protests downtown, he claims, only caused a problem on the very day that he was supposed to have responded; he does not indicate that this interfered with the work earlier. In fact, he does not even explain how or why the protests downtown actually would have prevented him from responding.   It is also significant that the Commission had, as noted above, already twice extended the deadline for discovery, the original deadline having been in the end of February 2020 while the Commission provided the second extension specifically to allow Plaintiffs more time as a result of the COVID-19 situation. This means that Plaintiffs had an additional three months beyond the original deadline in which to prepare responses and that they had already been given a two-month extension specifically to allow for problems relating to COVID-19, the primary basis Plaintiffs raise for the delay. Moreover, Plaintiffs at no point appear to have contacted the Commission and asked for another extension or explained that they were having problems and they fail to explain why they could not have done so. 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that they provided the responses and documents by the deadlines which the Commission set, but ignore the fact that these were after Plaintiffs had already missed the deadline for responding. A stipulation extending the time to “respond” applies to any form of response, including objections. CCP section 2030.270(c). However, the deadlines to which Plaintiffs refer were set later during the meet-and-confer efforts to resolve the situation and avoid a motion. At no point did the Commission indicate that these were new, extended deadlines which would allow objections and it at all times had it clear that its position was that Plaintiffs had waived objections by failing to respond by the May 27, 2020 deadline. 
           
Plaintiffs fail to show any basis for relief from waiver. As a result, Plaintiffs have waived the right to object and the court GRANTS the motion as to compelling further responses without objections.
 
Further deficiencies exist in the provided responses. The Commission argues that, the objections aside, the substantive responses to some items are deficient and Plaintiffs must provide further responses as follows: further substantive responses from Paulsen to interrogatories 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 31, 40, and 42-45; and from both Paulsen Land and Village as to interrogatories 10-12, 19-23, 26-30, 32, 33, and 35. The responses to these interrogatories are clearly incomplete. They fail to provide or address the full information sought and offer no explanation for the failure to do so. Plaintiffs, moreover, fail to address any of these responses or these issues in their opposition and they do not respond in any way to the separate statement of items in issue. 
           
The court GRANTS the motion as to all of these responses.
 
Both parties seek monetary sanctions of $3,312. For compelling further responses, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust. CCP sections 2023.030, 2030.300, 2031.310. In order to obtain sanctions, the moving party must state in the notice of motion that he is seeking sanctions, identify against whom he seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions. CCP section 2023.040. The sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion. Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.
           
The Commission is entitled to sanctions. The Civil Discovery Act provides that the court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of the sanction unjust. As discussed above, Plaintiffs waived their right to object and fail to support any basis for relief from waiver. The substantive responses at issue are clearly inadequate. Plaintiffs therefore have no substantial justification for their position.
           
The sanctions sought are reasonable. The Commission seeks sanctions for 8 hours spent and 4 anticipated, at $276 an hour. Abelson Dec., ¶26. These are reasonable amounts and Plaintiffs themselves seek the same amount of sanctions, stating that in fact the time they incurred is much more, so they have no basis for claiming that the Commission’s amount is unreasonably high. However, the Commission may only recover sanctions for the amount incurred thus far, 8 hours. The Court awards sanctions in the amount of $2,208.
 
The prevailing party shall, within five days of the date of this ruling, submit a proposed conforming order for approval on each other party or parties to the action. The proposed order shall then be submitted to this court after a five day review period, or following written approval as to form, in conformance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
 
 
 
3.        SCV-266342, County of Sonoma v. Major
 
            This matter is on calendar for the Order to Show Cause Re: Confirmation of Appointment of Receiver, and for Issuance of Permanent Injunction. The Court CONFIRMS the appointment of the receiver and issues the requested injunction.
 
            Plaintiff here seeks confirmation of the appointment of the receiver and imposition of a permanent injunction. The County alleges that Defendant has created and maintained code violations and the use of the real property, which include an unpermitted retaining wall, dangerous building (lack of water supply), unpermitted construction, unpermitted grading and fill, and junkyard conditions in Violation of Sonoma County Code (“SCC”), Chapters 7 (Building), 11 (Construction, Draining, Grading), and 26 (Zoning). Defendant has not complied with the Decision and Administrative Order dated May 13, 2019, (“2019 ORDER”), which compelled abatement of the violations within certain timelines.
 
The property at issue, located at 18550 Highway 116, Guerneville, California, (“the Property”) was transferred to Defendant via a Grant Deed recorded on February 2, 2015. (Gomez decl., ¶3.) On May 13, 2019, Administrative Hearing Officer Ira Lowenthal rendered his Summary of Decision (“Administrative Order”) regarding the existence of code violations on the Property. (Id. at ¶4, Exhibit B.) The Administrative Order required Defendant to abate the unpermitted construction, dangerous building, unpermitted grading and fill, and junkyard conditions by applying for permits to legalize or remove the dangerous retaining wall, unpermitted fill, and dangerous building within sixty (60) days of the date of the Administrative Order. (Id. at ¶5.) The Administrative Order required Defendant to schedule a site inspection with Permit Sonoma to verify the use of the Property for junkyard conditions had ceased, within 30 days of the date of the Administrative Order. (Id. at ¶6.) He failed to do either. (Id. at ¶¶5, 6.) The Administrative Order provided that if Defendant failed to correct all violations within the time frames, then daily civil penalties would be applied as follows: a) VBU15-0260 at the rate of $60.00 per day; b) VBU14-0230 at the rate of $35.00 per day; c) VGR15-OO40 at the rate of $35.00 per day; and d) VPL18-0141 at the rate of $50.00 per day. (Id. at ¶7.) Defendant did not abate any of the violations or obtain final Permit Sonoma approval as ordered. (Id. at ¶8.) Defendant did not file a writ or an appeal to the Administrative Order within ninety days of the Administrative Order. (Id. at ¶10; see Civ. Code of Procedure § 1094.6(b).) Defendant did not abate the violations or pay any of the costs and penalties as directed in the Administrative Order. (Id. at ¶11.)
 
The procedural history is complicated. Defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on June 9, 2020. Defendant failed to file an answer. On July 24, 2020, the County requested, and the court clerk entered, Defendant’s default.
 
            Plaintiff on August 7, 2020 filed a motion for entry of default judgment and permanent injunction, set for October 7, 2020. At the original hearing, the Court continued the matter to December 2, 2020 in order to allow Plaintiff to file a CIV-100 form requesting default judgment, a memorandum of costs and disbursements, or a declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant.  
 
            At the hearing on December 2, 2020, the Court noted that Plaintiff had filed the memorandum and declaration of nonmilitary status and had filed a CIV-100 form the default but had still failed to file a CIV-100 form for the default judgment. The court accordingly continued the motion again, to January 27, 2021, to allow Plaintiff to file this form.
 
            Meanwhile, on November 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a petition to appoint receiver and an ex parte application for an Order Appointing Receiver and For an Order to Show Cause Re: Confirmation of Appointment of Receiver, and for Issuance of Permanent Injunction (“OSC”). That day, the Court granted the ex parte application and the OSC, setting the hearing on the OSC for January 22, 2021. On November 24, 2020, the Court advanced the OSC hearing to December 9, 2020.
 
            At the hearing on December 9, 2020, the Court continued the OSC to December 16, 2020 because Plaintiff had filed no proof of service for the OSC or order granting appointment of receiver. It directed Plaintiff to prepare a new OSC and to file the proof of service by December 11, 2020 at 5:00 p.m.
 
            At the December 16, 2020 hearing, the Court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion without prejudice because Plaintiff had failed to file the required new OSC. Plaintiff argued that the failure was the result of a scheduling error and asked the Court to continue the motion to allow Plaintiff to cure the defect. The Court did so, continuing the motion to January 6, 2021.
 
            At the hearing of January 6, 2021, both parties appeared. The Court noted that Plaintiff took 12 days to serve Defendant, instead of doing so in the 5 days ordered. The Defendant requested additional time to prepare an opposition so the Court continued the motion to January 22, 2021. Plaintiff filed proof of service, and Defendant was present at the last hearing during which the Court set this hearing. As such, the defects in notice have been resolved and the Court may address the substantive merits of this motion. 
 
Defendant filed a late opposition. Papers opposing a motion must be served and filed at least 9 court days before the hearing, unless the court orders otherwise. Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1005(b); California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 3.1300(a). Defendant filed the opposition only 6 court days before the hearing and the Court did not set a different deadline for filing an opposition. However, the Court will consider the opposition.
 
Defendant asserts that the violations are on two separate properties and he is attempting to determine how to fix the violations. He offers no other information on these plans or efforts aside from stating that various factors indicate that it will be at least 6 months or more for him to finalize the plans, with no timeline for implementing them thereafter. He provides no other information.
 
Defendant has not filed anything, despite the fact that the Court continued the matter specifically at his request to allow time to prepare a response.
 
Local agencies may take actions to order a property owner to correct substandard conditions of real property and, when the owner fails to comply, bring a court action to remedy the problems. Health & Safety (“H&S”) Code sections 17980.6, 17980.7.   H&S Code section 17980.6 allows enforcement agencies to issue notices and orders to repair or remedy substandard conditions when “any building is maintained in a manner that violates any provisions of this part, the building standards published in the State Building Standards Code relating to the provisions of this part, any other rule or regulation adopted pursuant to the provisions of this part, or any provision in a local ordinance that is similar to a provision in this part, and the violations are so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of residents or the public is substantially endangered….”
 
H&S Code section 17980.7 allows an enforcement agency to seek various remedies, including appointment of a receiver, when a property owner fails to comply with such abatement orders within a reasonable time. Subdivision (c) governs the appointment of a receiver. It states, in pertinent part,
 
“The enforcement agency… may seek and the court may order, the appointment of a receiver for the substandard building…. In its petition…, the enforcement agency… shall include proof that notice of the petition was posted in a prominent place on the substandard building and mailed first-class mail to all persons with a recorded interest in the real property upon which the substandard building exists not less than three days prior to filing the petition. The petition shall be served on the owner pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 415.10) of Chapter 4 of Title 5 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(1) In appointing a receiver, the court shall consider whether the owner has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions cited in the notice of violation.
(2) The court shall not appoint any person as a receiver unless the person has demonstrated to the court their capacity and expertise to develop and supervise a viable financial and construction plan for the satisfactory rehabilitation of the building….”
 
A party may, if showing the requisite emergency circumstances, obtain an appointment of a receiver upon an ex parte application. CRC 3.1175. However, the court must then make the matter returnable on the earliest date the court will allow on an order to show cause why the appointment should not be confirmed. CRC 3.1176. CRC 3.1175(a)(1) states that, in addition to demonstrating the other factors for appointment of a receiver, the moving party must demonstrate the nature of the emergency and the reasons irreparable injury would be suffered pending a hearing on a noticed application.
 
Here, the Administrative Order assessed civil abatement costs against Defendant of $4,683.32. (Gomez decl., ¶20.) Those costs have not been paid. (Ibid.) Ms. Gomez states that the County has incurred costs of $416.50; and attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,036.00 as of July 23, 2020, and that attorney fees will continue to accrue until the abatement of all violations has been completed. (Id. at ¶21.) Attorney fees are charged at a rate of $276. (Ibid.) The accrued penalties, calculated through the date of the filing total $100,395.00. (Id. at ¶¶23.) Sonoma County Code Section 1-7 provides that a continuing violation of the County Code is a public nuisance. Sonoma County Code, Chapter 1, General Provisions, section 1-7(e), states “A violation is a public nuisance.” A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent or the annoyance or damage... may be unequal. Civil Code [“CC”] section 3480. CC section 3491 expressly authorizes civil actions for abatement of public nuisances and CC section 3494 expressly states that any authorized “public body or officer” may abate a public nuisance. Courts have also found there to be a threat of irreparable injury, and thus basis for injunction, where a party alleged conduct that could create safety or health risks or which otherwise amounts to a public nuisance. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1108-1109; see also Byington v. Sup.Ct. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 68, 72; In re Donovan (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 399, 400. As the Supreme Court stated in Acuna, supra, at 1108-1109, “[a]cts or conduct which qualify as public nuisances are enjoinable as civil wrongs or prosecutable as criminal misdemeanors….” This includes nuisances endangering health or safety in violation of local codes. People v. Wheeler (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 282, 294.
 
In this case, Plaintiff demonstrates through several declarations that the property contains numerous code violations, and that Defendant has failed to remedy the code violations or otherwise comply with the May 13, 2019 Administrative Order.  Gomez Dec.; Crawford Dec.; Peacock Dec.  These declarations show that the Property contains hazardous and substandard electrical, hazardous and substandard structures, and substandard buildings, all of which pose a danger to health and safety. For example, the roof collapsed in the home, the interior walls are buckling, there is no proper, functioning sanitation improvement, and there is black mold throughout the home. These conditions violate H&S Code section 17920.3(a), (b), and (j). Illegal occupants continue to reside on the Property in knowing violation of the “Dangerous – Do Not Occupy” notices on the Property. Thus, the Court finds that the Property is in a condition which substantially endangers the health and safety of residents, surrounding neighbors and community, and pursuant to Health and Safety code Section 17980.6. The receiver, as this Court previously determined, is qualified. Keena Declaration, Gomez Declaration.
 
Defendant has had ample time and notice to comply with County’s notices and correct the violations, yet has refused to, or has been unable to do so within a reasonable time. The County contacted Defendant numerous times attempting to get him to comply with the County’s orders. He is either unable or unwilling to comply. Due to the dire situation the property is in and the Defendant’s failure to act, a receivership is the only possible remedy to abate the violations. Plaintiff has shown a clear basis for imposing the injunction and appointing the receiver as this court ordered upon the ex parte application. There is no basis for refusing to confirm the appointment.
 
            The prevailing party shall, within five days of the date of this ruling, submit a proposed conforming order for approval on each other party or parties to the action. The proposed order shall then be submitted to this Court after a five day review period, or following written approval as to form, in conformance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
 
 
 
4.        SCV-266794, Franck v. Sonomaidence Opco, LLC
 
The motion to withdraw is continued to February 19, 2021 at 3:00 p.m. in Courtroom 19, due to lack of a proof of service. Movant must file proof of service showing notice of the new hearing date.
 
 
 
***This is the end of these tentative rulings.***
© 2021 Superior Court of Sonoma County