Tentative Rulings

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6732 by 4:00 p.m., April 3, 2014. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear. 

     

    

Sonecko v. Fox  SFL-53917

 

            The motion to enforce judgment is GRANTED.  Petitioner is ordered to pay to Respondent $570.83 plus court filing fees for this motion no later than April 10, 2014.  If Petitioner fails to pay as Ordered, then Respondent may attach Petitioner’s wages by garnishment for payment in full.

 

IRMO Miller SFL-64517

 

            The Motion is GRANTED.  Respondent is ordered to deliver her Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure no later than April 10, 2014.  Attorney fees are awarded to Petitioner in the amount of $660 and costs in the amount of $90.   

 

Tufts v. Fabrizi SFL-65401

 

            The Request for Order: Nullity is GRANTED.  There is sufficient evidence to support a Nullity and there is a declaration from the attorney in fact for Mr. Fabrizi waiving the right to file a Response, and giving consent to proceed for a nullification of the marriage.  The nullification shall be effective immediately upon entry of Judgment. 

 

Hale v. Miller SFL-65413

 

            Motion to Quash.  The Motion to Quash is DENIED.   The adequacy of process, or service of process, may be challenged by a motion to quash service of summons (CCP § 418.10). Respondent has not provided any facts which indicate that there was defective process or defective service of process in this case.  

 

            Request for Transfer of Venue. The request to transfer this case to Mendocino County is DENIED.  The petition in this action seeks to establish a parental relationship pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act. As applicable here, Fam. Code § 7620(b) provides that an action under the Uniform Parentage Act must be brought the county in which the child resides or is found. Respondent Jenna Miller has filed a motion which indicates that the court designated in the petition is not the proper court and alleges that the minor child lives in Mendocino County. However, Mr. Hale has filed a Responsive Declaration indicating that custody is shared, the child was born in Sonoma County, and the child has lived in Mr. Hale’s home regularly since birth.  Further, his declaration indicates that the child has attended head start and other programs in Sonoma County, and is now attending Lytton Springs First Steps Pre-School in Sonoma County.  Mr. Hale’s declaration shows that the child does not live exclusively in Mendocino County, but has always lived in Sonoma County, with a very recent move part time with mother to Mendocino County.  Thus, “the child resides or is found” in Sonoma County as much as she is in Mendocino County.  Accordingly, Respondent’s motion requesting the transfer of this action to Mendocino County is denied. 

           

Ferrera v. Crump SFL-65463

 

            The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.  The moving party has failed to satisfy the requirements of CCP §1008(a) to explain why he did not present the declaration of Mr. John Wade at the February 4, 2014 hearing.  There is no indication that Mr. Wade was not available to testify at the hearing on February 4, 2014.  The moving party has not indicated that his declaration, or the declaration of Mr. Wade, contains evidence newly discovered after the hearing.  The evidence was known and available prior to the hearing.  Mr. Crump was personally served on January 13, 2014, with the Temporary Restraining Order, and the Notice of Hearing for February 4, 2014, among other documents.  This gave him time to prepare his defense.  He has not indicated in his declaration that this was not enough time to prepare, or that he had difficulty finding Mr. Wade to testify, for instance.  Mr. Crump did not indicate to the Court that a continuance was needed for the testimony of witnesses, he did not request a trial or postponement of the hearing, and he did not make an offer of proof to the court to support a continuance for appearance of witnesses.