Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 23

The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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1. 24FL00020, Guerrero Chavarria Dissolution

Motion to Bifurcate Marital Status requires appearances.

            On 5/13/26 Respondent filed this Petition to Bifurcate Marital Status for Separate Trial. This motion is unopposed by Petitioner who received Notice of this request pursuant to the Proof of Service filed by Respondent on 6/23/26.

            The Court shall Grant Respondent’s request to Bifurcate for Separate Trial the issue of Marital Status which is not opposed by Petitioner. Appearances by the parties are required to obtain jurisdictional facts and identification of all reserved issues.

            It is SO ORDERED.

2.         24FL00044, Smith v Lambert

With respect to whether Respondent’s Request for Order and Motion for Monetary Sanctions against Mother pursuant to Family Code Section 3027.1 is barred as a result of the prior ruling on the oral motion at the hearing of February 25, 2026, the court makes the following determinations:

1. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply and do not bar this motion.
2. The motion is not subject to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1008 because there is no indication that the ruling on the prior was on the substantive merits of the motion.  The prior motion suffered from procedural defects and the court gave no indication of the basis for the prior ruling.
3. The motion also is not subject to CCP section 1008 because this motion is procedurally and substantively different from the prior motion.

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action on January 5, 2024 to establish Respondent’s parental relationship with, and rights and obligations regarding a minor child (the “Child”), one of her three minor children (collectively, the “Children”).

            Previously, on October 9, 2023, Petitioner had filed an action for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) protecting herself and the Children and restraining Respondent, case number 23FL00267 (the “DV Action”).  The court issued a DVRO in that action. 

            At a hearing in the DV Action on February 25, 2026 (the “February Hearing”), the court heard issues regarding Family Court Services (“FCS”) recommendations on parenting and issued various orders.  The parties entered into several stipulations regarding custody and visitation at the hearing.  Respondent, through his attorney, also orally requested monetary sanctions of $1,000 against Petitioner (the “Oral Motion”).  The court denied that request.  The minute orders from that hearing state, in pertinent part,

Counsel Vivian requests that $1,000.00 in sanctions be imposed to Mother.

Counsel Levy opposes the request.

The parties provide arguments.

Upon conclusion, the Court ORDERS the following:

The Court ADOPTS the parties’ agreement.

The Court ADOPTS the FCS recommendation in its entirety.

The Court DENIES the request for sanctions.

…

The Court VACATES the previous orders regarding Father having supervised visits and using Soberlink.

These orders resulting in, among other things, removal of the requirement that Respondent's visitation with the Child be supervised. 

            On May 5, 2026, the court entered its written Findings and Order After Hearing for the February Hearing.  This sets forth the various orders made at the hearing but makes no mention of the Oral Motion or the denial thereof. 

            Respondent then filed a Request for Order and Motion for Monetary Sanctions against Mother pursuant to Family Code Section 3027.1 (the “New Motion”) in the DV Action on May 6, 2026.  In the New Motion, Respondent makes several different requests.  He seeks changes to custody, asking the court to award him sole legal and physical custody of the Child while giving Petitioner reasonable visitation rights based on Family Code section 3027.5.  He also seeks a cease and desist order directing Petitioner to cease making allegations of abuse against him absent objective, substantiated evidence.  He requests an award of sanctions, including monetary sanctions of $28,820 for his attorney’s fees and costs based on the assertion that Petitioner made knowingly false claims of child sexual abuse against him at the court hearing on February 26, 2026 and at other times. 

            On July 2, 2026, the court ordered this and the DV Action to be consolidated with this as the lead case.  The court accordingly rescheduled the New Motion and other pending matters.

            At a hearing on July 15, 2026 (the “July Hearing”), the court conducted review of several issues, including Respondent’s New Motion.  Petitioner claimed that the ruling on the Oral Motion barred the New Motion.  The court continued the motion to allow briefing and consideration regarding Petitioner’s argument at the hearing that the New Motion is barred because it seeks sanctions for the same conduct which formed the basis for the Oral Motion denied at the February Hearing. 

Motion

            At issue before the court is whether the New Motion is barred because it seeks sanctions for the same conduct on which Respondent based the Oral Motion.  Pursuant to the court’s order at the July Hearing, both sides have submitted additional briefing on this issue.  Petitioner argues that the motion fails to satisfy the requirements for reconsideration or a renewed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008

            Respondent argues that the New Motion is broader than the Oral Motion, seeking different relief and additional sanctions, and is based on new and different information and facts. 

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

Reconsideration and Renewal: CCP section 1008

A renewal or renewed motion, under CCP section 1008(b), is similar to a motion for reconsideration, except that it must be brought by the original moving party and lacks the 10-day deadline applicable to reconsideration.  A party bringing a renewed motion must, as with reconsideration, demonstrate new facts, law, or circumstances and must show what application the party made before, when and to what judge, and what the ruling was.  A motion for reconsideration is similar, but any party can bring it and it includes a 10-day deadline following entry of the order.  CCP section 1008.  Because the moving party is the same, the rules for a renewed motion may apply here.  Section 1008(b) states, in full,

A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

A party seeking reconsideration or a renewed motion must first demonstrate new facts, law, or circumstances that were not previously considered.  CCP section1008; Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 692.  The moving party must also provide an adequate explanation why the new information was not provided earlier.  Garcia, supra; Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500;.  The need for an explanation is a requirement for due diligence.  Gilberd.       
Mere lack of a chance to make oral argument is not a valid basis for a motion for reconsideration.  Garcia, 691; Gilberd, 1500.  In addition, decisions such as Film Packages, Inc. v. Brandywine Film Productions, Ltd. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 824, at 829, and Pender v. Radin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1807, at 1811-1812, ruled that evidence was “new” since it was since obtained through discovery and could not reasonably have been provided earlier.

Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration must be heard by the “same judge or court” that made the original order.  CCP section 1008.  Although normally a trial judge may not reconsider and overturn another trial judge’s order, “an exception to this rule applies where the judge who made the initial ruling is unavailable.”  Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4^th 449, 454-455; see also Davcon, Inc. v. Roberts & Morgan (2003) 110 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1362, and International Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4^th 784, 786.

The purposes of the rules in section 1008 is to conserve court resources by preventing repeated, duplicative motions on issues already decided.  See, e.g., Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 277; UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hospital (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357.

 Section 1008 does not limit the court’s inherent power to reexamine its interim rulings on its own motion and enter a new and different order prior to entry of judgment.  LeFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107; Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156-1157.  The court must act sua sponte, but this can be on its own motion or as the result of a party’s request.  LeFrancois, supra, 1108.  Such a request can be informal.  Ibid.

In the event a party brings a noticed motion requesting such reconsideration, the court need not rule on it, as it is ineffective as a noticed motion.  Ibid.  The opposing party also need not respond.  Ibid.  In LeFrancois, supra, a party brought a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied.  The party brought the motion again over a year later, on the same law, and evidence, and the court granted it.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions upholding this, stating that the trial court heard and granted an improper motion and that when a trial court believes that its ruling may be in error, it should notify the parties, request briefing on the point, and hold a hearing.  Ibid.  It expressly stated that “a party may not file a written motion that has procedural significance if it does not satisfy the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008.”  Ibid.

Finally, for purposes of this matter, CCP section 1008 adds additional provisions helping to guide the application of the doctrines and procedures at issue here.  Subdivision (g) expressly states, “[a]n order denying a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to subdivision (a) is not separately appealable. However, if the order that was the subject of a motion for reconsideration is appealable, the denial of the motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal from that order.”  Subdivision (h) adds that section 1008 “applies to all applications for interim orders.”

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

            The doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigating certain matters which have been resolved in a prior proceeding under certain circumstances, giving conclusive effect to a former judgment in later litigation.  Brinton v. Banker’s Pension Services, Inc. (1999) 76 Cal. App.4th 550, 556; CCP section 1908; 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, sections 361-362. 

            In new litigation on the same cause of action, the prior judgment is a complete bar.  Edmonds v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist. (1933) 217 Cal.436, 445; see also 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, sections 430, 436.

            More specifically, res judicata itself, or claim preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, are different aspects of the same doctrine and have the same prerequisites, only varying depending on whether one is addressing the application to a cause of action or an issue.  Brinton, supra, 76 Cal. App.4th 550, 556; 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, sections 361-362.  They apply when “(1) a claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” Brinton, supra.

The circumstances in which collateral estoppel specifically applies can actually be broken down further into five elements: 1) the issue is identical to one decided in another proceeding; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the other proceeding; 3) the issue must have been necessarily decided in the other proceeding; 4) the decision in the other proceeding is a final ruling on the merits; and 5) the party against whom preclusion is sought is the same as, or in privity with, the party in the other proceeding.  Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4^th 501, 511. 

To qualify for res judicata or collateral estoppel, the prior judgment must be a final judgment on the merits.  See Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 51; see also 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, sections 390, et seq.  Because the doctrine only applies to final judgments, it applies “only to judgments and orders that are final in the sense that no further judicial act remains to be done to end the litigation” and does not apply to “[i]ntermediate determinations, such as rulings on motions and interlocutory orders, [which] are not conclusive.”  7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, section 390.  For example, the court in Mills v. Facility Solutions Group (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035, at 1048 ruled that the doctrine was not applicable to an order granting motion to compel arbitration, because it was not a final adjudication on merits and had no preclusive effect.  The order was not appealable but it could be reviewed after eventual judgment on the award.  Similarly, in Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, at 532, the court found that the doctrine did not apply to a ruling on a motion to intervene in a will contest because it was not final judgment on merits and had no preclusive effect.

In addition, for a judgment to be a “final judgment” subject to the doctrine, the judgment must be one “rendered on the merits.”  7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, section 397.  As stated in Beverly Hills Nat.Bank v. Glynn (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 274, at 286, quoting Witkin, a judgment is “on the merits if the substance of the claim is tried and determined, no matter how wrongly it is decided. In other words a judgment is binding and conclusive against collateral attack though it is harsh and unjust, contrary to the evidence, or based upon errors of law. [Citations.]”  “In general… rulings of law, divorced from the specific facts to which they were applied, are not binding under principles of res judicata.”  Chern v. Bank of America (1973) 15 Cal.3d 866, 872; see also Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1962) 57 Cal.2d 749, 804.  Similarly, the court in People v. Conley (2004) 116 Cal.App.4^th 566, at 570-571, rejected an argument that res judicata barred the litigation in that action because of a previous purely legal determination, specifically a prior decision holding a statute to be unconstitutional.  The court explained that the party making it “cites no authority that prior purely legal determinations by a trial court are accorded collateral estoppel effect in later proceedings.”  A judgment based on an order sustaining a demurrer, for example, may be a judgment on the merits, if the demurrer was a general demurrer, but it may not be found to be a judgment on the merits of the demurrer had been on other grounds.  Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52; Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 321, 323; Olds v. Peebler (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 76; see Keidatz v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 828; see also 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, section 402.  An order sustaining a special demurrer on other defects is not on the merits because it only tests the sufficiency of the pleadings on technical grounds or grounds other than those going to the validity of the claims.  Goddard, supra; 7 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Judgment, section 402. 

A “cause of action” is defined by the “primary right” at issue.  “[T]he nature of the right sued upon, not... the form of the action or the relief” determines the actual cause of action and thus the applicable statutes of limitations.  Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 411.

Appealable Orders

            Analysis of the issues which the parties raises also requires consideration of which orders are appealable and what that may mean in this context.  CCP section 904.1 provides a list of those orders which are appealable.  It states, in pertinent part,

(a) An appeal… may be taken from any of the following:

(1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11), or a judgment of contempt that is made final and conclusive by Section 1222.

(2) From an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1).

(3) From an order granting a motion to quash service of summons or granting a motion to stay the action on the ground of inconvenient forum, or from a written order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order granting a motion to dismiss…on the ground of inconvenient forum.

(4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

(5) From an order [regarding] attachment or… a right to attach order.

(6) From an order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction.

(7) From an order appointing a receiver.

(8) From an interlocutory judgment, order, or decree… in an action to redeem real or personal property from a mortgage thereof, or a lien thereon, determining the right to redeem and directing an accounting.

(9) From an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the rights and interests of the respective parties and directing partition to be made.

(10) From an order made appealable by the Probate Code or the Family Code.

(11) From an interlocutory judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars….

(12) From an order directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars….

(13) From an order granting or denying a special motion to strike….

(14) From a final order or judgment in a bifurcated proceeding regarding child custody or visitation rights.

(b) Sanction orders or judgments of five thousand dollars… or less against a party or an attorney… may be reviewed on an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition for an extraordinary writ.

Sanctions Pursuant to Fam. Code section 3027.1

Fam. Code section 3027.1 governs penalties for false accusations of child abuse or neglect during child custody proceedings.  It states, in full,

(a) If a court determines, based on the investigation described in Section 3027 or other evidence presented to it, that an accusation of child abuse or neglect made during a child custody proceeding is false and the person making the accusation knew it to be false at the time the accusation was made, the court may impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed all costs incurred by the party accused as a direct result of defending the accusation, and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in recovering the sanctions, against the person making the accusation. For the purposes of this section, “person” includes a witness, a party, or a party's attorney.

(b) On motion by any person requesting sanctions under this section, the court shall issue its order to show cause why the requested sanctions should not be imposed. The order to show cause shall be served on the person against whom the sanctions are sought and a hearing thereon shall be scheduled by the court to be conducted at least 15 days after the order is served.

(c) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy provided by law.

            The court in In re Marriage of Dupre (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1517 found a denial of a sanctions motion pursuant to Fam. Code section 3027.1 to be appealable.  In part, it found, at 1524, that the order was appealable because it was not “preliminary to a later judgment” and would not become appealable later after entry of a judgment.  The court based its reasoning on the treatment of a sanctions motion based on CCP section 128.5 for frivolous and delaying litigation tactics. 

Continuing Jurisdiction to Revisit Determinations of

Child Custody, Visitation, and Child Support

            In contrast to other issues or other types of litigation, rulings, even judgments, in family law proceedings, are not “final” and do not have res judicata effect as to child custody, visitation, or support because by law such orders are modifiable at any time during the minority of the children.  Marriage of Goodarzirad (1986) 185 Cal.App. 3d 1020, 1027; Marriage of Kreiss (2004) 122 Cal.App. 4th 1082, 1084-1085; Anne H. v. Michael B. (2016) 1 Cal.App. 5th 488, 492, 497-498.  According to Fam. Code section 3022, “[t]he court may, during the pendency of a proceeding or at any time thereafter, make an order for the custody of a child during minority that seems necessary or proper.”  Emphasis added.  This allows a court to modify such an order at any time, including after judgment, even a default judgment.  Marriage of Olson (2015) 238 Cal.App. 4th 1458, 1460.  CRC 5.92 also expressly provides for motions to terminate or alter custody, support, or visitation orders, including “permanent” ones.  Similarly, the court in Marriage of Wells (1988) 206 Cal.App. 3d 1434, at 1439, explained that courts may alter support awards based on changed circumstances and that, trial courts may sua sponte reserve jurisdiction over spousal support in a default case even though support was not requested in the petition).  This is seen also in actions under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), in which Fam. Code section 3422 governs continuing jurisdiction of the courts of this state.  It expressly states that a court which has made a child-custody determination retains continuing jurisdiction over that determination until it determines that the child and a parent no longer have a significant connection with this state, along with other factors, or the child and parents no longer reside in the state. 

Discussion

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

            Petitioner contends that issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars the New Motion because it is a relitigation of an issue already conclusively determined, but this argument is not persuasive. 

            First, as explained above, that doctrine truly only applies to final judgment on a litigation, not to rulings on motions in the context of ongoing litigation which do not result in a final judgment.  Petitioner correctly notes, as set forth above, that the court in In re Marriage of Dupre, found that a ruling on a motion for sanctions under section 3027.1 is appealable.  This does, not however, mean that the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel applies to this situation.  The mere fact that a ruling on a motion may be appealable does not invoke res judicata or collateral estoppel as to that motion during litigation.  As explained above, both the doctrine as articulated and its underlying reasoning do not apply to rulings on motions within the context of still ongoing litigation.  Moreover, as noted above, orders on many motions, including a motion for sanctions under CCP section 128.5, are appealable, but that does not invoke collateral estoppel.  As the parties acknowledge, and as set forth above, the Code of Civil Procedure has its own specific mechanisms governing repeated motions through reconsideration or renewal under CCP section 1008, which itself expressly states that it applies both to all interim orders and also to appealable orders.  A ruling on a motion such as one for sanctions under Fam. Code section 3027.1 will invoke CCP section 1008, not collateral estoppel, as a limit on future repetition of the issues in the motion.  Accordingly, while CCP section 1008 may limit or prohibit a subsequent motion on a matter already addressed in a prior motion in the same action, collateral estoppel will not.    

            Second, as Respondent correctly argues, the doctrine only applies where the original decision was actually on the merits.  Here, Respondent accurately notes that the court’s ruling on the Oral Motion, as set forth above, was unclear and did not indicate the grounds for the denial, or otherwise reflect an actual determination on the merits.  Finally, as explained above, to the extent that the New Motion seeks changes regarding custody, visitation, and child support, res judicata and collateral estoppel expressly do not apply to those issues; the court and parties may revisit them at any time.

            The court finds that res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply and do not bar the New Motion, and that should the New Motion be a repeat of the Oral Motion, any possible limitation on it is solely to be found in the application of CCP section 1008.

Renewed Motion under CCP section1008

            With respect to CCP section 1008, this court preliminarily notes that if this motion is in fact a renewed motion subject to CCP section 1008, the matter must be continued to allow the “same judge” to hear the motion.  That judge is currently sitting in a different assignment but is not “unavailable.” 

            Respondent contends that he need not meet the requirements for renewal under section 1008 because the current New Motion goes beyond the scope of the prior Oral Motion and seeks other relief as well as monetary sanctions.  According to Respondent’s attorney, Christopher Vivian (“Vivian”), in the Oral Motion he sought $1,000 in sanctions regarding Petitioner’s statement to the child custody recommending counselor, Hilary Finch (“Finch”) that Petitioner that she had “worries” that Respondent had abused his own daughter (“Respondent’s Child”) from a different relationship.   He points out that Finch specifically wrote that Petitioner “states that she had worries” that Respondent had “sexually abused” his child.  He also notes that Finch had investigated the concern and found there to be no basis for it, recommending to the court at the February Hearing that the requirement for supervision of his visitation be lifted.  He explains that he informed the court that he felt that the accusation had been made with malice and resulted in additional litigation for Respondent, and that he planned to bring a formal sanctions motion but that he had mentioned the matter orally at that hearing because he wanted to raise it as soon as possible to avoid claims that he should not have waited until after the hearing.  He does not remember if he specifically based the Oral Motion on section 3027.1, or whether the court made any finding regarding the substance of his claim that Petitioner had knowingly made a false claim of abuse. 

            Vivian also explains that Respondent’s New Motion is based in part on new evidence since then, including statements obtained through discovery after the February Hearing.  Respondent filed a declaration in support of the New Motion on July 7, 2026 with some of the new information supporting the motion.  He states in this declaration that Petitioner has never reported any abuse or misconduct and has continued to allow visitation with Respondent while Respondent’s Child was also present.  He also points out that since the February Hearing, despite the above information indicating no abuse by him, Petitioner, in written Confidential Parent Questionnaires in March through July 2026, has continued claims that Respondent suffers from alcoholism and drug use and that the Child tested positive for methadone after a visit to him, all of which he denies.   In the briefing on the issue of res judicata, Vivian also explains that the new information being raised in support of the New Motion includes Petitioner’s discovery responses of July 9, 2026, showing that she admitted that she had never seen any of the alleged conduct, Respondent’s Child had never mentioned such conduct, nobody told her that they had seen such conduct, and that she was not aware of any records or reports indicating that such conduct had occurred or that anyone had ever reported such conduct.  The responses also include her denials of having told Finch about the alleged abuse.  He notes that Finch specifically recorded Petitioner’s claim that Respondent had abused his child and that he does not recall Petitioner previously claiming that she never made the abuse assertion.  He now relies on the fact that her new discovery responses conflict with that.   

            Petitioner offers no other explanation in support of her argument that the New Motion is simply a repeat of the Oral Motion aside from pointing out that at the February Hearing, Respondent made the Oral Argument for sanctions based on the claim that Petitioner had knowingly made a false accusation of abuse, and the court denied it.

            Petitioner also contends that the New Motion must still comply with section 1008 even if the court denied the Oral Motion because it was defective when brought orally without notice or legal or other support. 

            The court finds that the New Motion is fundamentally a new motion, procedurally and substantively different from the Oral Motion.  The New Motion seeks very different, and much broader, remedies, as set forth above.   The New Motion is based on specific statutory grounds which were not set forth as the grounds for the Oral Motion.  The New Motion is procedurally different because it is a noticed motion, whereas the Oral Motion was an impromptu request raised orally without notice at the hearing, and not presented as a noticed motion.  These differences are not merely technical.  They change the nature of the request and the procedural posture of the motion and they remove this situation from the policies underlying section 1008, aimed at preventing endless repetition of identical motions. 

            Additionally, Petitioner’s argument that CCP section 1008 applies to the New Motion is not persuasive because there is no indication of the basis for the court’s denial of the Oral Motion.  The court merely denied the unnoticed request and the record indicates that there were questions of its procedural propriety.  The court disagrees with Petitioner’s argument that Respondent must still satisfy section 1008 even if the Oral Motion had been denied merely because it was procedurally defective.  Respondent shows that he had indicated that he would make a formal written motion while neither the requirements for satisfying section 1008 nor the policy purposes behind it apply where a court denies a motion simply because it was procedurally defective or was improperly raised orally without notice, instead of in a noticed motion.  In such a situation, the court has not in fact ruled on the merits of the motion and court frequently deny motions on such grounds but allow parties to bring the motions in a proper procedural manner.

            Finally, even assuming that section 1008 does apply, the court finds that the motion satisfies the requirement that it be based on new facts, law, or circumstances.  Respondent has detailed the new facts and circumstances, as explained above, which support the motion in addition to the original assertions.  These facts and circumstances arose after the February Hearing and thus could not have been presented at the time. 

             Conclusion

            For the reasons stated above, the New Motion is not a renewed motion subject to CCP section 1008, and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar the New Motion.  The “New Motion” litigation may proceed.

            It is SO ORDERED.

3.         25FL01980, Maier v Gray

Motion to Set Aside Order for Child Support & Attorney Fees Entered 1/28/26 GRANTED.

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action on September 16, 2025, to determine that Respondent is the father of her minor child (the “Child”), along with related orders regarding custody, visitation, and support.  Petitioner filed a proof of service for the summons and petition, along with related initial documents, on October 9, 2025.  Little occurred in this action, and Respondent had not yet made an appearance, before Petitioner filed a stipulation between the parties regarding custody and visitation on November 14, 2025.

            On December 18, 2025, Petitioner filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) for child support, property control, and attorney’s fees and costs based on need and income disparity.  Respondent still had made no appearance and filed no papers before the January 28, 2026, hearing on that RFO.  At the hearing (the “January Hearing”), Respondent also failed to appear, so the court granted the RFO, setting child support at $4,000 a month and ordering Respondent to pay the requested $15,000 in attorney’s fees (the “January Order”). 

            Respondent filed an RFO and Motion to Set Aside Order for Child Support & Attorney Fees Entered 1/28/26.  At the original hearing of July 17, 2026, the court continued the matter in order to allow the moving party to provide a proposed response to the petition.  Respondent subsequently filed a reply with a proposed response.

Motion

            Respondent in his RFO and Motion to Set Aside Order for Child Support & Attorney Fees Entered 1/28/26 moves the court to set aside the January Order pursuant to CCP section 473(b) based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  He contends that about a week before the January Hearing, he retained attorney Ana Voloshko (“Voloshko”) to represent him, expecting her to file any necessary papers and appear on his behalf, but she failed to do so before the hearing, resulting in his non-appearance and the of all the orders sought in Petitioner’s RFO.  

            Petitioner opposes the motion.  She contends that the motion is defective since it lacks a proposed responsive pleading and that the proffered explanation fails to satisfy the requirements of CCP section 473(b) since Respondent had sufficient notice more than a month before the January Hearing. 

            Following the original hearing, Respondent filed a reply document containing his proposed responsive pleading. 

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).          

            Relief from support orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691.  In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911; see also CRC 5.2(d) (provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided).  

            CCP section 473(b) allows parties to set aside dismissals or defaults, or the functional equivalent thereof, based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  CCP § 473(b).  “[D]iscretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.”  English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 149; see also Las Vegas Land & Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, at 1092-1093 (quoting and relying on English).  The motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed… otherwise the application shall not be granted….”  CCP section 473(b). 

An order setting aside the default is discretionary whereas based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  CCP § 473(b).

There is also a policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits and the motion to vacate should be granted if the moving party shows a credible, excusable explanation.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227.  The provision of this section authorizing court to relieve party from a judgment or order resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is remedial in its nature and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their merits.  Ramsey Trucking Co. v. Mitchell (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862.

“Surprise” is “some condition or situation in which a party... is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”  Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Calif. v. National Independent Business Alliance  (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173.

“Excusable neglect” comes down to whether the moving party has shown a reasonable excuse for the default.  Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.  The moving party must show that the default would not have been avoided through ordinary care.  Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513.  The test ultimately is thus one of reasonable diligence.  Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58.  A showing that the defendant was unable to understand what he was served with is sufficient to justify relief.  Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208.  Another valid basis is if the defendant mislaid or misfiled the papers and as a result failed to obtain an attorney in time.  Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686.  Simply forgetting about the lawsuit or being too “busy” is not adequate.  Andrews v. Jacoby (1919) 39 Cal.App. 382, 383-384.  Excusable neglect by attorneys includes situations where, despite reasonable supervision, an attorney’s secretary misfiled papers or failed to enter an appearance date.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234; Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273.

Significant health problems or family tragedies may be sufficient to support a showing of  mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4^th 1128 (death of a son is sufficient excuse); Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208; Fink & Schindler Co. v. Gavros (1925) 72 Cal.App.688 (illness sufficient excuse where party had tried to hire attorney before falling ill).

A judgment may be set aside where void pursuant to CCP section 473(d).  Such an order may apply where there is lack of actual or constructive notice and no valid service.     Lovato v. Santa Fe Int’l Corp. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 549, 553 (void for lack of notice where discovery requests served only on defendant’s attorney, who had been suspended by state bar and lacked authority to represent party); Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 295, 313 (lack of proper service renders judgment void).  Where the judgment is void, the moving party need not show a meritorious defense.  CCP section 473(d); Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 86-87.  However, where the motion is based on lack of, or improper, service, where there has been actual notice, substantial compliance with the service requirements will defeat a motion to vacate.  Gibble, supra.

            In addition to relief based on CCP section 473, a court may set aside a judgment adjudicating support or the division of property in accord with Family code section 2120, et seq., and 3691.  Family Code sections 2120, 2121; see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (Fam. Code section 2122 governs relief from judgment while Fam. Code section 3691 governs relief from support orders other than judgment); see also In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620. 

CCP section 473(b) states that “the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, or neglect, vacate” any resulting default or, default judgment, or dismissal.  Emphasis added.  The provision is clear that this is mandatory “unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”  Ibid.  On granting a motion based upon an attorney affidavit of fault, the “court shall… direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”  CCP section 473(b).  The court also may impose sanctions.  CCP section 473(c)(1).  However, relief from default may not be conditional on payment of the fees, costs, or sanctions.  CCP section 473(c)(2).

The attorney’s neglect, as the statute indicates, need not be excusable.  Billings v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256.  In fact, the court is not concerned with the reasons for the attorney’s error.  Ibid.  This rule also applies to orders “equivalent” to a default where, for example, a plaintiff seeks to set aside a dismissal.  Graham v. Beers (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660.

This relief is available even where the attorney’s negligence was only one factor.  Milton v. Perceptual Develop. Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 861, 867.  However, courts are split on whether the provision applies only where the client is completely innocent, or if it can apply where both the client and attorney caused the default, etc.  See Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1248 (relief mandatory only where client totally innocent); Benedict v. Danner Press (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 923, 930-932 (relief mandatory where client and attorney partly at fault but client only negligent).

The only exception to the obligation to set aside thus seems to be where the court finds that the attorney was not in fact at fault, such as where the attorney is covering up for the client.  See Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 986, 991; see also Weil&Brown, sections 5:292 and 5:301. 

In Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, at 1140-1141, the court found that relief based on an attorney affidavit of fault was appropriate, but discretionary relief for excusable error was not, where a new attorney failed to properly complete and submit a substitution form, resulting in failure to oppose demurrers.  The plaintiffs were not entitled to relief based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect where “dismissal resulted from plaintiffs' newly retained attorney's failure to oppose the demurrers and timely file an amended complaint” but the plaintiffs were entitled to relief based on an attorney affidavit of fault.  Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1140-1141.  The court pointed out that the new attorney received the substitution form from the plaintiffs’ prior attorney

but “forgot” to sign it or “got distracted,” even though opposing counsel refused to discuss the case with him until he filed and served the substitution form. As for not knowing about the demurrers, Wass conclusory claimed his office presumably “missed” them. He admits that he later learned of the court's ruling on the demurrers but does not explain how or in what manner he discovered this information.

The court found that the attorney’s conduct showed lack of diligence.  The court, at 1146-1147, quoted and relied on the explanation in Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, at 230, that ‘“[t]he inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.” ’ ”’

            Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, at 682, explained that  the court must determine “whether [an] attorney's mistake or inadvertence was excusable….”  The court in Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, relying on and quoting Garcia, supra, in upholding this court’s decision to grant relief from judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, also explained that theses bases, specifically including inadvertence, must be “excusable.”  

Discussion

            The motion is persuasive.  Respondent shows that he hired Voloshko to represent him about one week before the January Hearing.  He attaches a copy of the signed retainer agreement and electronic “Dropbox Sign” record showing that it was sent to him on January 21, 2026, and executed by him the following day.  He credibly states that he reasonably expected her to take necessary actions to represent him but, for whatever reason, she failed to do so prior to the hearing.  Voloshko did not file an attorney substitution form or make any appearance in paper or at the hearing.  There is no attorney affidavit of fault and no other explanation for the failure, but regardless of the reasons, his explanation is sufficient and reasonable on its face. 

            Respondent had originally failed to submit a proposed responsive pleading. Petitioner correctly pointed out that, as noted above, Respondent was required to do so.  The court continued the motion at the original hearing in order to allow Respondent to correct this.  He has now filed a proposed response with his reply, and this is sufficient. 

Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED as set forth above.  The proposed response submitted with the reply is deemed to be the response to the underlying matter and the court deems it filed as of the date of this order.  Respondent must submit an identical copy to be filed as the response.

The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

4.         SFL088816, Madigan Dissolution

Motion for an Order to Enforce Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Cal. Code Civil Proc. §664.6 DENIED without prejudice to Respondent bringing such a motion based on a proper and persuasive demonstration that Petitioner has failed to comply with the Memorandum of Understanding.  As detailed below, with the exception of the single issue of the equalizing payment, Respondent has failed to demonstrate that Petitioner has in fact failed to comply, or how.  Petitioner also appears to the court to be attempting to comply, resolve the issues, and finalize the settlement.   

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor children (the “Children”) on July 6, 2021.  He also seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to Family Code section 271. 

            Both parties agree that on January 29, 2026, the parties, with their attorneys and the court-appointed minors’ counsel, entered into a written Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) which expressly states that it is “to resolve their matter in its entirety.”  Among other things, the MOU requires all retirement accounts to be divided by qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) where necessary except for those three identified as separate property; requires Petitioner to make an equalizing payment (the “Equalizing Payment” to Respondent in the amount of $5,612.62;

            It adds that it is “a binding settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure §664.6 and shall be admissible and enforceable in the action.  The parties intend that the court may enter judgment on these terms or incorporate them into a final Judgment of Dissolution.” 

Motion

            Respondent moves the court to enforce MOU and enter judgment thereon, on the grounds that Petitioner has failed to comply with the MOU terms by refusing to cooperate to finish the QDRO; pay Respondent his equalizing payment; give Respondent the name of her therapist; sign the final Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”); and sign a Stipulation and Order to Establish or Modify Child Support Order (the “Support Stip”), which was agreed to go into effect beginning February 1, 2026.

            Petitioner opposes the motion.  She argues that she does not understand how she is not cooperating to finish the QDRO because she does not have the information needed for her to do anything and asserts that she will do whatever is necessary.  Regarding the Equalizing Payment, she claims that she has asked to reduce what she owes by the amount of child support arrears which Respondent owes her, but he has not agreed.  She contends that the parties were both working on revisions and she delayed finalizing the MSA because she was concerned about certain financial implications which she felt might warrant vacating the MOU.  She notes that those concerns have been resolved so she is again willing to finalize the MSA, but she has not heard a response since her final submission of the proposed MSA to Respondent.  She also claims that she had discovered that Respondent failed to disclose another child by another woman and that this raised concerns which led to delaying execution of the MSA.  As for the therapist, she assets that she has no obligation to provide the identity of her therapist.  Finally, she claims that she signed the Support Stipulation once aware of it. 

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

Obligations imposed under a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) which has not been “merged” or “incorporated” into the judgment remain enforceable by ordinary contract remedies and provisions for enforcement of settlement agreements. See Fam.Code section 2128(b); Marriage of Lane (1985) 165 Cal.App. 3d 1143, 1147-1149 (breach of warranty action available to enforce MSA warranties because there was no merger); see also Marriage of Armato (2001) 88 Cal.App. 4th 1030, 1045-1047 (signed written agreement increasing child support enforceable by motion pursuant to CCP section 664.6).

When a party seeks to enforce a stipulated settlement entered in writing or orally before the court, the court “may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  CCP section 664.6.  This gives the court discretion.  In addition, when ruling on a CCP section 664.6 motion, the court is a trier of fact and its ruling will be upheld if based on “substantial evidence.”  Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566.   As explained in Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4^th 1174, at 112, “[t]he court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement under the statute even after a dismissal, but only if the parties requested such a retention of jurisdiction before the dismissal. (Citation) Such a request must be made either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court.”     

The court in Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4^th 793, at 797 emphasized that before “judgment can be entered, two key prerequisites must be satisfied.”  These are contract formation and a writing signed by the parties with the material terms.  Id.  As with other contracts, if there is no meeting of the minds on the material terms, then no contract has been formed.  Id., 797.  Absent such a contract, there is no settlement agreement which the court may enforce.  Id.  Section 664.6 only applies to agreements made in writing and signed by the parties, or orally before the court.  If the agreement does not meet these requirements, the party cannot enforce it under section 664.6.  Weddington, supra, 809-810.

The modern trend is in favor of carrying out the parties’ intentions by enforcing contracts, and it disfavors finding contracts unenforceable due to uncertainty.  See Larwin-Southern California, Inc. v. JGB Investment Co. (1979) 101 Cal.App.3^d 626, at 641.  The court in Larwin-Southern stated that neither law nor equity requires every term and condition to be set forth in the contract and that the court may look to “the usual and reasonable terms found in similar contracts” and it may infer unexpressed provisions from the writing, the circumstances, custom, and usage, as long as they do not alter the terms of the agreement.  Id.  “At bottom,” the court said, “if the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filing of some gaps the parties have left.”  Id.    

            The court generally may not simply alter the terms of a stipulated judgment, as when entering judgment upon a stipulation pursuant to CCP section 664.6.  Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 267; Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374-1375.  As the court explained in Leeman,

While the court may interpret the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, “nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.”  [Citations.]

…

While the court has the authority to refuse to issue the requested consent judgment, what the court could not do in considering approval of a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 was to add to or modify an express term of the settlement.

The court in Ironbridge added, however, that courts have authority to fashion orders to enforce compliance with a stipulated judgment, stating,

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows the court to enter a stipulated judgment in settlement of a case, and to retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Moreover, section 128, subdivision (a)(4) provides that the court has the power to “compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending therein.” These provisions, together, give the court authority to fashion orders to enforce compliance with a stipulated judgment.

In addition, CCP §128 gives the court the power to control the proceedings before it, preserve and enforce order, compel obedience to judgments, orders, etc.; and make orders and process “conform to law and justice.”  The court in Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Ass'n v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, at 679, explained,

The inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued is well established [Citations]; the court may make discretionary orders with reasonable conditions; and even make subsequent limitations and modifications of prior orders in order to achieve justice [Citation]….” 

Courts therefore have inherent power to control judicial proceedings in order to insure orderly administration of justice and to see to it that all persons indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct administration of justice.  People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 897.

Discussion

            Respondent identifies the ways in which he claims Petitioner has failed to comply with the MOU but with one exception his motion is unpersuasive.  He offers no explanation or detailed evidence showing how she has in fact failed to comply with the MOU in the ways asserted. 

            Respondent asserts that Petitioner has failed to comply with the MOU terms by refusing to cooperate to finish the QDRO but he does not provide evidence or explanation clarifying how she has failed to do this, or what she has specifically failed to do.  Petitioner responds that she is ready and willing to do what is needed but has not received the necessary information from Respondent and does not know what Respondent means.  She adds that she has attempted to communicate about the issue.  The court DENIES the motion on this point.

            Respondent also states that Petitioner has failed to pay Respondent his equalizing payment.  Despite no other details, this at least is a clear statement of what Petitioner has not done.  The MOU is also very clear, as noted above, that Petitioner must pay Respondent this equalizing payment and the deadline for doing which the MOU specifies so has passed.  Petitioner also admits that she has not made the payment and in this instance claims that she has simply tried to negotiate with Respondent to reduce the payment by the amount Respondent owes her for child support.  Although Respondent owes Petitioner the required child support, the MOU does not link the two and does not allow reduction of either payment based on the relative amounts each parties owes.  Respondent has obligations to pay child support but this does not affect his entitlement to the Equalizing Payment.  Petitioner simply must give Respondent the Equalizing Payment and the deadline which the MOU sets forth for doing so has passed, so Petitioner has an obligation to make the payment now.  If Respondent still owes arrears of unpaid child support. That is a separate issue, and Petitioner may seek enforcement of that payment but must do so on a proper noticed motion with supporting evidence.  Respondent is thus persuasive regarding this issue.  This could be a basis for granting the motion but, given the other issues and uncertainties, at this time the court will not grant the motion based on this one point.  The court at this time finds that Petitioner must make the Equalizing Payment to Respondent, regardless of other issues or other payment obligations which Respondent owes to Petitioner.  Given the disputes, the uncertainties over the status of the MOU and MSA, Petitioner’s apparent willingness to comply and finalize the MSA, and Respondent’s resulting failure to prevail on the other issues, the court at this time leaves the matter at that with the addition that Respondent may bring a future motion to enforce if Petitioner still has not complied.   

            Respondent next contends that Petitioner has failed to give Respondent the name of her therapist but he does not explain why she must do so.  Petitioner contends that although she must go to a therapist and needs to demonstrate that she is doing so, there is no obligation that she give Respondent the name of her therapist.  The MOU contains no such obligation. The court DENIES the motion on this point.

            Respondent states that Petitioner has failed to sign the final Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) but again provides no other explanation or evidence.  Petitioner counters that the parties were both working on revisions and she delayed finalizing the MSA because she was concerned about certain financial implications which she felt might warrant vacating the MOU.  She notes that those concerns have been resolved so she is again willing to finalize the MSA, and she sent a new proposed version but she has not heard a response since her final submission of the proposed MSA to Respondent.  The court DENIES the motion on this point.

            Finally, Respondent contends that Petitioner has refused to sign the Support Stip, which was agreed to go into effect beginning February 1, 2026.  Once again, Respondent merely states that Petitioner has not done this, without providing any details or other explanation.  Petitioner contends that she was not aware of a “new” stipulation at first but once she learned of it, she signed it, resolving this issue.  The court DENIES the motion on this point.  

Conclusion

            At this time, the court DENIES the motion without prejudice to Respondent again seeking a motion to enforce should Respondent demonstrate sufficient grounds for doing so.  As noted above, Respondent has demonstrated that Petitioner must make the Equalizing Payment and has not done so, but Respondent has failed to demonstrate a basis for the request order on all other issues.  Under the circumstances explained above, the court therefore finds no basis for the requested order at this time.  

            Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.          

5.         SFL090525, Wong-Bigel/Bigel Dissolution

Attorney for Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

            On January 3, 2025, Attorney for Respondent filed this Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel. Petitioner and Respondent were properly noticed of this request. (Declaration of Attorney).  This motion is unopposed by Petitioner.

             Accordingly, the Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel is GRANTED.  Moving party is ordered  to submit completed proposed order (MC-053) for court's review and signature. 

             It is SO ORDERED.

6.         SFL090617, Mills Dissolution

Attorney for Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

            On June 11, 2026 Attorney for Respondent filed this Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel. Petitioner and Respondent were properly noticed of this request. (Declaration of Attorney).  This motion is unopposed by Petitioner.

            Accordingly, the Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel is GRANTED.  Moving party is ordered  to submit completed proposed order (MC-053) for court's review and signature. 

             It is SO ORDERED.

           

**This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.***