Law & Motion Calendar

PLEASE NOTE: If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, YOU MUST notify the Court by telephone at (707) 521-6725  and all other opposing parties of your intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. the court day immediately before the day of the hearing.

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, YOU MUST notify the Court by telephone at (707) 521-6725 and all other opposing parties of your intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. the court day immediately before the day of the hearing. Parties in motions for claims of exemption are exempt from this requirement.

PLEASE NOTE: The Court’s Official Court Reporters are “not available” within the meaning of California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956, for court reporting of civil cases.

1.         24CV02519, Bohanan v. City of Santa Rosa

Defendant City of Santa Rosa’s (“the City”) motion for a protective order for Mr. Nick Vinh’s deposition is GRANTED for good cause shown. The City’s request for sanctions is DENIED for failure to comply with C.C.P. section 2023.010. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Procedural History

This action arises out of Plaintiff Lucas Bohanan’s (“Plaintiff”) employment with Defendant as a firefighter and paramedic and Defendant’s alleged employment discrimination and retaliation after Plaintiff suffered a workplace injury. (See Second Amended Complaint, filed November 7, 2025.) On June 11, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Paul Pfeilschiefter, noticed the deposition of the City’s witness, Mr. Nick Vinh, for a deposition occurring July 3, 2025. (Cleary Decl., ¶ 2) The first day of Mr. Vinh’s deposition occurred on July 3, 2025. (Cleary Decl., ¶ 3.) The second day of Mr. Vinh’s deposition occurred on August 7, 2025, which ended with Mr. Vinh needing to abruptly leave due to Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct. (Cleary Decl., ¶ 5.) The Parties met and conferred via email on August 7, 2025, but did not come to a resolution. (Cleary Decl., ¶ 8, Exhibit D.) On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff served a fifth amended notice of Mr. Vinh’s deposition for September 5, 2025. (Pfeilschiefter Decl., ¶ 7.) On August 26, 2025, the City filed the instant motion for a protective order for Mr. Vinh’s deposition. On December 17, 2025, the Court heard argument regarding this motion for a protective order. The Court continued the motion to January 7, 2026, solely to allow the City’s counsel to file a supplemental declaration to support her request for sanctions since she did not previously present facts in her declaration supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. Counsel failed to file a supplemental declaration.

Governing Law

Protective Orders for Depositions

The Discovery Act gives courts the power to enter protective orders to protect a party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (C.C.P. §§ 2016.010 et seq., 2030.090.) C.C.P. section 2025.420(a) provides that before, after, or during a deposition, a party, deponent, or other affected natural person or organization may move for a protective order, and that the motion shall be accompanied by a protective order. C.C.P. section 2025.420(b) provides that the Court, “for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.”

Sanctions

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (C.C.P. § 2025.420(h).) Requests for costs must be both reasonable and actual. (See Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 74.)

Analysis

Protective Order

The City’s counsel states that at the start of the deposition on July 3, 2025, she informed Mr. Pfeilschiefter that Mr. Vinh is sensitive to yelling or aggressive behavior and asked counsel to not engage in such behavior. Mr. Vinh wears a smart watch to monitor his heart rate because he has high blood pressure. (Vinh Decl., ¶ 3.) He is sensitive to loud, aggressive behavior and experiences acceleration of heart rate, nausea, loss of concentration, and feelings of overwhelm when he experiences such behavior. (Vinh Decl., ¶ 2.) The City maintains that Mr. Pfeilschiefter was asked several times to lower his voice during the two days of deposition, which caused Mr. Pfeilschiefter to become frustrated and argumentative. Mr. Pfeilschiefter had an outburst on the second day of the deposition, which is what led the City to file the instant motion for a protective order. The City requests for the Court to appoint a discovery referee to be present at Mr. Vinh’s deposition, to have the deposition proceed remotely, and requests monetary sanctions for costs to bring this motion as well as pay for the discovery referee.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion for sanctions was improperly noticed because it did not contain a hearing date and was delayed by 19 days, only being brought after Plaintiff served a fifth amended notice for Mr. Vinh’s deposition. Plaintiff further maintains that the City fails to show good cause as Plaintiff has previously offered accommodations sought in the City’s motion (including a remote deposition and have another attorney take Mr. Vinh’s deposition) which have been previously denied by the City. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s failure to attend Mr. Vinh’s deposition set for September 5, 2025, warrants sanctions against the City as it did not object to the notice of deposition.

In its Reply, the City stated that it shows good cause for the protective order and that Plaintiff mischaracterizes the Parties’ meet and confer efforts. The City contends that even if the moving papers did not have a hearing date, Plaintiff must show prejudice, which he fails to do. The City argues that it did not receive a copy of the file-stamped version of the motion from the Court but served the Court’s Notice of Informal Conference and Sanctions on Plaintiff on October 1, 2025, which contained the hearing date. (Cleary Reply Decl., ¶ 5.) Lastly, the City maintains that Plaintiff’s counsel must file a motion to compel and seek sanctions pursuant to a properly noticed motion.

Along with the moving papers, the Court has reviewed the deposition transcripts and the video of Mr. Vinh’s deposition. The Court notes that Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s declaration in support of his opposition was rejected by the Court but it was refiled on December 10, 2025. While the declaration is therefore untimely, the Court shall consider Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s declaration in its discretion in the interest of disposing of cases on their merits. However, Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s declaration references nine exhibits (one of which was lodged with the Court), but there are no other exhibits attached to the declaration.

The Civil Discovery Act of 1986’s central precept is that civil discovery should be essentially self-executing. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1281.) Counsel has failed to uphold this principle necessitating Court intervention. While City’s counsel’s interruptions asking for Mr. Pfeilschiefter to lower his voice, when it does not appear to have been at an excessive volume, may have been numerous, it is no excuse for Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s unprofessional outburst as exemplified in the deposition transcripts and video. Such conduct is unbecoming to the profession and will not be tolerated under any circumstance. Mr. Vinh’s testimony is necessary for the case and taking his deposition should not create an environment for him to feel uncomfortable or have a medical emergency given his condition.

While the City did not properly notice its motion by failing to provide an amended notice of motion with the hearing date once set by the Court, Plaintiff’s counsel fails to show any prejudice, especially since Plaintiff timely opposed the motion. Furthermore, the City filing the instant protective order two and a half weeks after the last deposition was held does not evidence delay. Given Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in the deposition and Mr. Vinh’s medical condition, the Court finds good cause to issue a protective order for Mr. Vinh’s deposition. The deposition shall be held remotely. The Court also finds that it is in the best interest of the Parties to have another attorney from Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s firm conduct the remaining days of Mr. Vinh’s testimony. Thus, the Court does not find a need to appoint a discovery referee for Mr. Vinh’s deposition. 

Sanctions

Pursuant to C.C.P. section 2025.420(h), the City is entitled to sanctions against Plaintiff/Plaintiff’s counsel. The City requests sanctions in the amount of $9,250 in attorney’s fees associated with the preparation of this motion. However, C.C.P. section 2023.010 requires that a request for sanctions to be accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. Ms. Cleary’s declaration does not state any facts justifying $9,250 in attorney’s fees, such as how many hours were spent in preparing the motion and her hourly rate or justification for such rate based on her experience. Therefore, the request for sanctions is deficient because it fails to provide facts supporting $9,250 in attorney’s fees for a protective order. Even though the Court previously continued this motion solely to allow the City’s counsel to file a supplemental declaration to support her request for sanctions, counsel failed to file a supplemental declaration. Accordingly, the City’s request is denied.

Additionally, Plaintiff requests sanctions against the City for failure to attend Mr. Vinh’s September 5, 2025, deposition in the amount of $6,500. While Plaintiff is correct, that C.C.P. section 2025.420 does not contain an automatic stay provision for depositions like section 2025.410 does, section 2025.420 only imposes monetary sanctions against any party, person or attorney, who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order. Therefore, the Court shall not award sanctions to Plaintiff under section 2025.420 as the City’s motion was successful. If Plaintiff seeks sanctions against the City for failure to attend or object to Mr. Vinh’s September 5, 2025, deposition, such relief is only proper under C.C.P. section 2025.450, which requires a successful motion to compel the deponent’s attendance and testimony. As Plaintiff did not file such motion, the Court will not issue sanctions as requested. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the City acted with substantial justification in not attending the September 5, 2025, deposition as it filed a protective order the day after it was noticed of the deposition and before the deposition was set to occur. Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for $6,500 in sanctions is not supported with facts as required by C.C.P. section 2023.010.

Conclusion

The City’s motion for a protective order for Mr. Nick Vinh’s deposition is GRANTED for good cause shown. The deposition shall occur remotely and another attorney from Mr. Pfeilschiefter’s firm shall conduct the remaining day(s) of Mr. Vinh’s testimony.

The City’s request for sanctions is DENIED for failure to comply with C.C.P. section 2023.010. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

The City shall submit a written order on its motion to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b). Additionally, the City shall lodge a revised proposed protective order conforming to this tentative ruling.

 

2.         24CV07519, Speakes, II v. Lopez

1.      ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Entry of Judgment

            Pursuant to CCP section 664.6, Plaintiff Randall Speakes II (“Plaintiff”) moves for entry of judgment pursuant to the written stipulation executed by the parties.

            In June and July 2025, the parties executed a written settlement agreement that called for payment by defendants in the sum of $29,193.52 no later than 30 days after the effective date of the agreement, which was June 26, 2025. (Jeffrey decl., ¶2, Exhibit A.) That sum has not been paid and defendants now claim it will take them six or more months to pay the amount owed. (Id., ¶2.)

            664.6 provides at subsection (a): “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

            The written settlement agreement was signed by all parties in the currently pending litigation. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered according to the terms of the settlement agreement.

            Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.

2.      Attorney Fees

            Plaintiff Randall Speakes II (“Plaintiff”) moves for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $1,040.00, plus costs of $120.00.

            Section 9 of the parties’ settlement agreement provides: “Attorneys' Fees for Enforcement. If legal action is taken to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing Party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.” (Jeffrey decl., Exhibit A.)

            In Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration, he states that he spent 2.6 hours preparing the motion for entry of judgment and this motion for attorney fees. (Jeffrey decl., ¶3.) His hourly rate is $400. (Ibid.) The two motions each cost $60 to file. Accordingly, attorney fees and costs are GRANTED in the amount of $1,160.00, for a total judgment of $30,353.52.

            Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.

 

3.         SCV-258776, Isetta v. Garcia

            ­­­­­­­­­­ Plaintiffs Lincoln Isetta and Christina Isetta (“Plaintiffs”) move for an order naming and adding Wine Country Garden Center, LLC, (“Garden Center”) as a defendant to the judgment as the alter ego of Defendant Erik Antonio Garcia (“Defendant”). The motion is GRANTED.

            This motion is brought pursuant to CCP section 187, which provides: “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.”

            Section 187 grants every court the power and authority to carry its jurisdiction into effect. (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280.)  This includes the authority to amend a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor and thereby make the additional judgment debtor liable on the judgment. (Ibid.)  Amending a judgment to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor “ ‘is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.’ ” (Ibid.)

            Section 187 contemplates amending a judgment by noticed motion. (Ibid.) The court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to amend a judgment but may rule on the motion based solely on declarations and other written evidence. (Ibid.)

            To prevail on the motion, the judgment creditor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the parties to be added as judgment debtors had control of the underlying litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the entity alone. (Ibid.)

            In determining whether there is a sufficient unity of interest and ownership, the court considers many factors, including the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other. (Id., at p. 280-281.) Inadequate capitalization of the original judgment debtor is another factor. (Id., at p. 281.) No single factor governs; courts must consider all of the circumstances of the case in determining whether it would be equitable to impose alter ego liability. (Ibid.)

            Alter ego “is an extreme remedy, sparingly used.” (Ibid., citing case.) “ ‘The standards for the application of alter ego principles are high, and the imposition of [alter ego] liability ... is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously.’ ” (Ibid.).) Still, “ ‘[t]he greatest liberality is to be encouraged’ ” in allowing judgments to be amended to add the “real defendant,” or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, “ ‘in order to see that justice is done.’ ” (Ibid.)

            The evidence in support of this motion is made by the declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel Arlen Moradi, who has conducted judgment debtor examinations of Defendant and his wife, Josephine Garcia (“Josephine”), and obtained their bank statements. (Moradi decl., ¶¶6-9.)

            At his September 30, 2024, deposition, Defendant testified that he, Josephine, and their children own the Garden Center. (Id., Exhibit 4.) When asked if the Garden Center files tax returns, he answered: “That’s what we do under our your [sic] personal tax returns.” … “It goes under ours since it’s an LLC.” (Id., p. 9.) He stated he has not had a bank account in a long time and that he and his wife only have the Garden Center bank account. (Id., p. 12-13.) He indicated he takes a paycheck from the Garden Center’s account. (Ibid.)

            On April 21, 2025, Josephine testified that they last filed taxes on behalf of the Garden Center in 2017. (Id., Exhibit 5, p. 38.) She stated that the Garden Center’s taxes were filed with their personal taxes. (Ibid.) She testified that no business meetings are held for the Garden Center, so no minutes or resolutions are kept for the business. (Id., p. 54.)

            The Garden Center’s bank account statements show personal expenditures unrelated to the Garden Center Business. For example, purchases were made to Beau Wine Tours; in Barcelona and Houston; at restaurants, bars, wineries, and hotels; at gas stations; and, to Uber. (Id., Exhibits 6-15.)

            The evidence presented establishes that the Garden Center is the alter ego of Defendant. He and his wife use the Garden Center’s bank account as if it were their personal bank account and file the Garden Center’s taxes as if they were their own. Plaintiffs obtained their original judgment against Defendant in 2016 and have yet to collect against it despite Defendant’s ability to pay, as shown through his leisurely lifestyle. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

            Plaintiffs’ counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.

 ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

4.         SCV-267521, The Design Build Company, LLC v. De Arkos

­­­­­­­­­­            The motion of cross-defendant The Design Build Company, LLC to tax costs claimed by defendant Eduardo De Arkos is DENIED as untimely.

            “Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3).” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

            De Arkos’s memorandum of costs was filed and served by mail on March 3, 2025. Therefore, any motion to tax costs must have been filed by Monday, March 24, 2025.

            DBC states in its memorandum that this court’s prior order on DBC’s first motion to tax costs was denied without prejudice in order allow DBC to file a renewed motion. This court’s use of the language “without prejudice” has no effect on statutory deadlines. Such language is used only to note that a motion may be made if it can be made in accordance with legal requirements.

            This court’s minute order will constitute the order of the court.

 

5.         SCV-272918, Duarte v. Packard Pacifica, Inc.

1.      Demurrer

            Defendant Big Poppy Holdings, Inc., dba Poppy Bank (“Poppy Bank”) demurrers to the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed by Plaintiff Kathy Duarte (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that the SAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Poppy Bank pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e), and that the SAC is uncertain pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(f). This demurrer is made on the grounds that the SAC fails to allege any facts establishing that Defendant Poppy Bank was Plaintiff's employer or had any employment relationship with Plaintiff, which is a prerequisite for all causes of action alleged against Poppy Bank.

            a.       SAC

            Plaintiff’s SAC alleges a representative action against Packard Pacifica, Inc. (“Packard”) and Poppy Bank. Plaintiff alleges various labor code violations.

            b.      Employment Relationship

            Poppy Bank argues that the SAC is devoid of any allegations showing an employment relationship between it and Plaintiff.

            The SAC collectively refers to Packard and Poppy Bank as Defendants. (SAC, ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges she worked for Defendants as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee from approximately October 2022 to approximately March 2023. (SAC, ¶8.) As such, the SAC directly alleges that she was employed by Poppy Bank.

            c.       PAGA cause of action

            Poppy Bank next argues that even if the allegations are sufficient to allege an employment relationship, Plaintiff’s PAGA cause of action should be dismissed.

                        i.                    Causes of Action

            Poppy Bank argues that each of Plaintiff’s causes of action based upon violations of the Labor Code fail because Plaintiff has not established that Poppy Bank was her employer. As noted above, the SAC alleges that Poppy Bank was her employer. (SAC, ¶8.)

            Poppy Bank next argues that Plaintiff’s minimum wage and overtime pay causes of action fail as they do not allege sufficient details, including Poppy Bank’s involvement in setting wages or payment decisions, the number of hours Plaintiff allegedly worked for Poppy Bank, the amount of money Plaintiff received from Poppy Bank, how often Poppy Bank allegedly failed to pay minimum wages or overtime, and/or how Plaintiff spent her time.

            Poppy Bank does not cite authority that an employee must allege all these evidentiary facts to state a valid cause of action. The complaint must be “liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (CCP § 452.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 872.) Here, the SAC sufficiently alleges an employment relationship and each factual element supporting each labor code violation. Plaintiff alleges she was employed by Poppy Bank and that Poppy Bank failed to pay minimum wages and overtime pay; to permit its employees to take mandated meal and rest breaks; to repay business expenditures; to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and, to timely pay wages due at termination. These ultimate facts are sufficiently alleged.

            d.      Conclusion and Order

            For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

            Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

2.      Motion to Strike

            Defendant Big Poppy Holdings, Inc., dba Poppy Bank (“Poppy Bank”) moves to strike certain portions of the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed by Plaintiff Kathy Duarte (“Plaintiff”). Specifically, Poppy Bank seeks to strike out allegations that refer to it by name or as Plaintiff’s employer as being irrelevant, false, improper, and not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state. Poppy Bank argues that no employment relationship existed between it and Plaintiff. These subject allegations are found in paragraphs 1, 4, 10(b), 13, 24-32 and the prayer for relief.

            Poppy Bank argues that the SAC does not contain any factual allegations showing Poppy Bank’s specific involvement in any employment decisions or violations, and that the allegations are conclusory.

            The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters which the court may judicially notice. (CCP § 437.) A motion to strike therefore cannot be based upon extrinsic evidence showing that the allegations are false. Where a moving party needs to introduce extrinsic evidence to show the pleading is false, the proper procedure is a motion for summary judgment.

            Poppy Bank has not pointed to any allegation within the SAC, or evidence that is subject to judicial notice, that definitively shows it was never Plaintiff’s employer. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

            Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

 

6.         SCV-273618, Sothebys International Realty, Inc. v. Kawana Meadows Development, LLC.

            ­­­­­­­­­­Pursuant to CCP section 473(d) and/or 473(b), specially appearing defendant Taylor Mountain Capital, LLC, (“Taylor”) moves for an order vacating the default entered on February 21, 2025, and any subsequent default judgment. Taylor also moves pursuant to CCP sections 418.10(a)(1) and (d) to quash the summons purportedly served on it. The motion is GRANTED.

1.      Service of Summons and Complaint

            Plaintiff Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed proof of service of summons (“POS”) on Taylor on February 17, 2025. The POS states that the amended summons, the first amended complaint, the amendment to the first amended complaint substituting Kawana Santa Rosa Holdings, LLC for Doe 1, the notice of trial, and trial orders were served on Taylor at 1010 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard #104, Kentfield, CA 94904, on January 10, 2025, at 1:57 p.m., by substituted service by leaving the documents with or in the presence of Gretchen Ise, who is referred to as a bookkeeper. (Request for Judicial Notice [“RJN”], Exhibit 2.) The documents were thereafter mailed to that same address c/o William Oswald as agent for service of process. (Ibid.)

            In support of this motion, Taylor has provided the declaration of William Oswald who was the manager and sole member of Taylor from its formation on March 14, 2026, until its dissolution on February 25, 2022. (Oswald Decl., ¶1.) Attached as Exhibit A to his declaration is a Certificate of Cancellation showing Taylor was dissolved on February 25, 2022. (Id., Exhibit A.) Taylor stopped doing business on that date. (Id., ¶4.) Mr. Oswald continues to do business at the 1010 Sir Francis Drake Blvd address as Contractor Manager, Inc., which was incorporated on January 8, 2009. (Id., ¶5.) Starting in July 2023, and continuing through June 20, 2025, Gretchen Ise was employed as a bookkeeper for Contractor Manager, Inc. (Id., ¶6.) She was never employed by Taylor, nor was she ever a manager, member, officer, or person having charge of Taylor’s assets. (Ibid.)

            “Summons or other process against a limited liability company may be served by delivering a copy thereof to a manager, member, officer, or person having charge of its assets or, if none of these persons can be found, to any agent upon whom process might be served at the time of dissolution. If none of those persons can be found with due diligence and it is so shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court, then the court may make an order that summons or other process be served upon the dissolved limited liability company by personally delivering a copy of the summons or other process, together with a copy of the order, to the Secretary of State or an assistant or Deputy Secretary of State. Service in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after delivery of the process to the Secretary of State. Upon receipt of process and the fee therefor, the Secretary of State shall give notice to the limited liability company as provided in Section 17701.16.” (Corp. Code, § 17707.07(b).)

            Here, Mr. Oswald’s declaration shows that Ms. Ise was not a manager, member, officer, or person having charge of Taylor’s assets, nor that she was an agent of Taylor at the time of service upon her. In addition, no declaration of diligence was provided along with the proof of service of summons by substituted service. Because Ms. Ise was not a proper person to receive service of summons on Taylor’s behalf, Taylor was not properly served, and the subsequent default taken against Taylor is void. The motion to quash service of summons is GRANTED.

2.      Doe Amendment

            Taylor was originally named as Doe 3 in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to the First Amended Complaint Substituting Taylor Mountain Capital, LLC, for Doe 3. (RJN, Exhibit 1.)

            “A party may amend its pleading once without leave of the court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike.” (CCP section 472(a).)

            Here, after defendant Kawana Meadows Development filed its demurrer and motion to strike, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on October 25, 2023. Therefore, all subsequent amendments required leave of court. The court’s file does not show that leave was obtained prior to Plaintiff filing the amendment substituting Taylor for Doe 3. While this unauthorized substitution is another basis for Taylor’s motion, it has not provided authority that an unauthorized Doe substitution makes any subsequent service of process or entry of default void.

            At page 11 of its memorandum, Taylor requests the Doe amendment be stricken. This request was not made in the Notice of Motion. In addition, Doe amendments are routinely granted ex parte, the trial date has been vacated, and Taylor will not suffer prejudice if the amendment is allowed to remain on file. Therefore, this request is denied.

3.      Conclusion and Order

            Pursuant to CCP section 473(d), the motion to vacate Taylor’s default is GRANTED. The default taken against Taylor on February 21, 2025, is hereby set aside as void.

            Taylor’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.