Family Law Tentative Rulings

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

PLEASE NOTE: If argument is requested in this matter you may appear in person or remotely via Zoom. To appear via Zoom please see the Zoom information below. 

To join online,

• https://sonomacourt-org.zoomgov.com/j/1613120396
• Enter the Meeting ID: 161 312 0396
•  Password: 219644

To join Zoom by phone,

• Please dial 1 669 254 5252 shortly before the start time of your scheduled hearing
• Enter the Meeting ID: 161 312 0396  Password: 219644

1-SFL 090388 RODAS DE LEON DISSOLUTION

Per the Court’s Own Motion this matter is being continued to February 27, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 22.

2-24FL01789 CHINA/BAUERMEISTER DISSOLUTION

Per the Court’s Own Motion this matter is being continued to February 13, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 22.

3-SFL 091365 CRAWFORD DISSOLUTION

Motion Continued to February 13, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 22.  There is no proof of service showing service on any part of the moving papers or notice of the hearing. 

4-25FL01861 DUPRE DISSOLUTION

Per the Court’s Own Motion this matter is being continued to February 27, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 22.

5-24FL02577 ABERCROMBIE V. HABER

TENTATIVE RULING:

Both parties’ requests for sanctions are DENIED.

Facts

Petitioner commenced this matter regarding domestic violence without minor children when she filed a Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) against Respondent on December 20, 2024.  Respondent, with attorney James Carroll (“Carroll”) representing her, filed a response on January 10, 2025.  

The court denied the request for temporary DVRO and subsequently held an evidentiary hearing on the request on June 12, 2025, at which both parties and their respective attorneys were present, presented evidence, conducted witness examination, and presented arguments.  The respective attorneys for both parties acted on behalf of their clients throughout the hearing.  Following the hearing, the court granted the request and issued a three-year DVRO protecting Petitioner and restraining Respondent. 

Respondent, acting on her own as a self-represented litigant, filed an appeal on June 16, 2025.  Attorney Caroll filed a substitution of attorney on June 20, 2025, showing that Respondent and he had agreed to him withdrawing from the representation, leaving Respondent self-represented.  The form shows that Carroll and Respondent had signed it on June 19, 2025.  The court of appeal issued a notice of default on the appeal on July 17, 2025. 

Again acting as a self-represented litigant, Respondent also filed two ex parte applications challenging the DVRO, one on June 30, 2025 and the second on July 10, 2025.  This court denied the ex parte applications to terminate the DVRO.  In the first, the court denied the request on the ground that Respondent failed to state a sufficient basis for relief and that the basis of the request, essentially a claim that her prior attorney, Carroll, had failed to handle the proceedings properly, was better suited for the appeal which was at that time still pending.  In the order denying the second request, the court set the matter for a hearing on Respondent’s motion to reconsider the DVRO.  Respondent filed the relevant motion on July 11, 2025.  The court in its order setting the hearing expressly explained that Respondent, the moving party, “must file a memorandum of points and authorities upon which she relies” to give notice to the court and other party “of the nature and substance of the present request.”

On August 21, 2025, attorney Stephanie Ransom (“Ransom”) filed a notice of limited scope representation on behalf of Respondent.  The following day, Ransom filed a substitution of attorney on behalf of Respondent by which she substituted into this action as Respondent’s attorney.  

At the hearing of August 22, 2025, on Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the DVRO, both parties appeared with their attorneys.  The court denied Respondent’s motion, adopting the tentative ruling which noted that Respondent failed to present a timely memorandum of points and authorities or explanation of the legal grounds for relief and that the motion was in any case unpersuasive because Respondent presented no  facts supporting either reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1008 or relief pursuant to CCP section 473.   

Motion to Find Respondent to be a Vexatious Litigant

Petitioner filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Find Respondent as Vexatious Litigant and Sanctions Under 128.5 in which she moved the court to declare Respondent to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 391(b)(5), subject to a prefiling order, and to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5.  The court conducted a hearing on that motion on September 12, 2025.  It denied the motion as to finding Respondent to be a vexatious litigant but continued the matter to October 20, 2025, to consider further briefing regarding the issue of sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5.  The parties filed their supplemental papers on October 3 through 7, 2025 but prior to the hearing the matter was continued to December 19, 2025, pursuant to a stipulation.  Following the stipulation, Petitioner filed a reply on December 12, 2025, and Respondent filed an objection to evidence in the reply on December 17, 2025.  At the December 19, 2025, hearing, the parties appeared but, upon discussion with the parties, the court continued the matter again.  In continuing it, the court stated that no further briefing was permitted.

Motion

            In the continued Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Find Respondent as Vexatious Litigant and Sanctions Under 128.5, Petitioner moves the court to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5.  The court has already decided the portion regarding the vexatious-litigant determination, as noted above.  Petitioner asserts that Respondent has repeatedly attempted to relitigate the validity of the DVRO determination with unmeritorious papers and inadmissible exhibits.

            Respondent opposes this motion.  She contends that her motions and ex parte applications were not meritless, she simply availed herself of proper statutory procedures to challenge orders, and the motion was premature because filed before court rulings on two of the matters referenced in the motion.  She also requests monetary sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5 on the basis that this motion is itself frivolous and devoid of merit. 

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family  proceedings).

Respondent’s Objection to the Reply

Respondent filed an objection to the evidence in Petitioner’s reply papers.  She argues that the evidence is inadmissible because it lacks foundation or indicia of personal knowledge, and the document is not signed under penalty of perjury.

 Respondent is correct that the reply brief is not signed under penalty of perjury and is merely a reply, not a declaration.  It therefore contains no evidence, although it does make some factual assertions and it refers to a study.  The court finds the objection unnecessary because there is no actual evidence in the reply but, to the extent that Petitioner intends the factual assertions in the reply to be considered as evidence, the court SUSTAINS the objections for the reasons which Respondent sets forth.  The court notes that neither the factual assertions in the reply nor the objections have any effect on the court’s analysis or the outcome of this motion. 

Substantive Analysis

Both parties request monetary sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5.  CCP section 128.5 gives the court discretion to order a party and/or attorney to pay “reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.”  CCP section 128.5(a).  According to subdivision (b)(2), “Frivolous” “means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.”  Emphasis added.

These two bases for finding conduct to be “frivolous” have different standards, one objective and one subjective.  Weisman v. Bower (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1236; Wallis v. PHL Associates, Inc. (App. 3 Dist. 2008) 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 168 Cal.App.4th 882, 893 (quoting and relying on Weisman); see also In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649 (in the context of sanctions on appeal but relied on in Weisman). As explained in Weisman, whether conduct was “totally and completely without merit” is “measured by the objective, ‘reasonable attorney’ standard,” while whether the conduct was “motivated solely by an intention to harass or cause unnecessary delay” is “measured by a subjective standard.”  At the same time, the court added,

“[w]hether sanctions are warranted depends on an evaluation of all the circumstances surrounding the questioned action.”  Quoting Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, at 878–879, the court in Wallis, at 893, added that the determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a court of appeal reviewing that exercise of discretion is ‘“informed by ‘several policy guidelines: (a) an action that is simply without merit is not by itself sufficient to incur sanctions; (b) an action involving issues that are arguably correct, but extremely unlikely to prevail, should not incur sanctions; and (c) sanctions should be used sparingly in the clearest of cases to deter the most egregious conduct.’ [Citations.]”’

The court in Llamas v. Diaz (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1043, at 1047-1048, further explained that even where the court must determine if an action or tactic is frivolous by an objective standard, the court must still find subjective bad faith in order to justify an award of sanctions.  The court affirmed a trial court’s order denying a motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5 because, although the trial court find that the conduct at issue had been objectively frivolous, the trial court also found insufficient basis to determine that the conduct was subjectively in bad faith.  The court noted, at 1046-1047 and footnote 8, that the trial court found the conduct at issue to be frivolous on its face because it, “as presented, was utterly meritless,” but this involved “confused, incoherent… evidence” and that nonetheless, it “might have had merit had it been done properly.”  

Under the circumstances here, the court finds neither party to have engaged in frivolous conduct which is wholly devoid of merit or intended to harass.  As explained above, Respondent’s filings, although unpersuasive on not on their face necessary wholly devoid of merit while this court finds no indication that they were intended to harass.  This court has the impression that Respondent in fact felt there to be a valid basis for her efforts challenging the DVRO.  Similarly, this court finds there to be some basis for this motion so that it is not frivolous and does not in any way appear designed to harass. 

In the supplemental papers, Petitioner unpersuasively argues that the court should impose sanctions because whether a motion is frivolous is measured by an objective standard as presented, even if it might have had merit, and the court should infer bad faith.  Petitioner, relying on Llamas, supra, is correct that the court must determine if a motion is frivolous based on an objective standard and based on the motion as presented.  Therefore, as this court previously noted, Respondent has engaged in objectively frivolous conduct, filing facially meritless papers.  However, the court must also find subjective bad faith.  Just as in Llamas, Respondent’s papers were meritless as presented, but the defects in them mean that the court could find that they were inherently meritless and they may have been based on some possible validity.  This court has, moreover, already found that although Respondent’s conduct was frivolous and her papers lacked merit, it appeared to the court that she acted in subjective good faith.  This is the crux of Respondent’s own arguments and evidence presented in her opposition, including her supplemental opposition papers.  She asserts that she did her “best to navigate the court system and access relief” which was appropriate and this court believes her.  The court may infer bad faith in some circumstances, as Petitioner contends, but the court here does not find a sufficient basis for doing so.   

Similarly, Respondent is unpersuasive in her continued assertion that Petitioner engaged in any bad-faith or frivolous conduct.  Although Petitioner’s motion us ultimately unpersuasive, it is not wholly meritless on the face of it, and clearly has some valid basis for the sanctions request at least.  As explained above, Petitioner’s motion is persuasive in the key, fundamental assertion that Respondent’s conduct was meritless and frivolous.  Petitioner is simply not persuasive that Respondent acted in subjective bad faith or with any improper motive or purpose.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Petitioner acted in bad faith or with any intent to cause unnecessary delay or to harass. 

The court DENIES both parties’ requests for sanctions. 

Conclusion

The court DENIES all requests for sanctions.  Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

6-24FL02085 GRAHAM V. ELLIOTT

 TENTATIVE RULING

Motion Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum (T-Mobile Records) GRANTED.

Motion to Compel Production of Subpoenaed Discovery & Records DENIED.

Motion for Birth Certificate, Access to Records, Child’s Surname DENIED.

Facts

Petitioner filed this action to establish his parental relationship with Respondent’s minor child (the “Child”) on October 14, 2024.  He filed an amended petition on February 24, 2025.  Among other things, Petitioner seeks a determination that he is the Child’s father and he seeks joint custody and related rights regarding the Child.  After several months of inconclusive litigation and abortive hearings, in August 2025 a paternity test determined that Petitioner is the biological father of the Child.  Both parties have sought a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) against the other and they are continuing to litigate over those requests as well as all of the other issues aside from paternity.

Petitioner’s Discovery

Petitioner sent Respondent several e-mails from September 17, 2025 through October 30, 2025 asking Respondent to provide copies of all recordings and documents which Respondent intends to produce at trial or which she obtained through subpoenas.  Declaration of Michael Graham in Support of Motion to Compel.  The e-mails included a “formal demand for complete disclosure of all subpoenas issued” and all documents produced in response to those subpoenas.  Petitioner in particular sought law-enforcement records related to the DVRO issues, but he received no response after Respondent’s attorney informed him that she had already provided all of the records which she has and intends to use. 

Respondent’s discovery

In October 2025, Respondent served T-Mobile with a subpoena (the “Subpoena”) seeking some of Petitioner’s cellular telephone (“cell phone”) records, specifically all incoming or outgoing calls and all text or multimedia messages placed or received from April 1, 2025 to the date of production.  On October 20, 2025, Petitioner served Respondent and T-Mobile with a written objection to the subpoena. 

Discovery Motions

Petitioner filed three discovery-related motions which were all set for a hearing of January 9, 2026.  The court issued a tentative ruling continuing the motions to January 23, 2026, and no party appeared or requested appearance. 

Motions

In a Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum (T-Mobile Records), Petitioner moves the court to quash the Subpoena served on T-Mobile on the grounds that Respondent improperly seeks irrelevant, private information without good cause.  He also complains that the Subpoena is defective because it incorrectly identifies Respondent as the petitioner in the action.  There is no opposition to this motion.

Petitioner has also filed an RFO and Motion to Compel Production of Subpoenaed Discovery & Records, Petitioner moves the court to compel Respondent to provide the documents requested in his demands for records.  He contends that he is allowed to conduct relevant discovery and that the documents and information are necessary for him to prepare a defense to Respondent’s DVRO request.  There is no opposition to this motion. 

In an RFO and Motion for Birth Certificate, Access to Records, Child’s Surname, Petitioner moves the court to amend the Child’s birth certificate to reflect Petitioner as his father, change the surname to reflect both parties as his parents, and to give Petitioner equal access to all of the Child’s medical, educational, and identifying records so he may, among other things, add the Child to this insurance. 

Respondent opposes this last motion but her opposition consists solely of the FL-320 form responsive declaration stating only that Respondent does not consent to the order requested and that she has obtained a DVRO.  The opposition contains no other information, argument, authority, or analysis.  She did file, on August 14, 2025, a more detailed declaration and opposition in response to a prior request seeking similar orders, but that also provides no legal analysis or authority and merely focuses on the DVRO and domestic violence issues. 

The court notes that, shortly before the original hearing of January 9, 2026, on January 2, 2026, Respondent filed a “Supplemental Declaration for All Issues on Calendar for January 9th, 2026 Hearing” (“Respondent’ Supplemental Declaration”).  In this, she asserts that she believes that some of the discovery issues have been resolved, reiterates her opposition to the motion regarding the Child’s surname and records and asks the court to reserve these issues until later, and contends that she needs Petitioner’s telephone records in order to demonstrate his harassing conduct.  The court notes that this is not a timely, proper, or official opposition to any of the motions. 

Petitioner filed, also on January 2, 2026, a declaration regarding “procedural status” of these three motions and, on January 6, 2026, a supplemental declaration in response to Respondent’s Supplemental Declaration.”

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022.

Motion to Quash Subpoena

A party, witness, consumer, or employee may bring a motion to quash, condition, or modify a subpoena requiring attendance or production of items before a court, at trial, or a deposition.  CCP section 1987.1.  The court may also on such a motion make an order “as appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands….”  Ibid.    See also CCP sections 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f).

A “consumer” whose “personal records” have been subpoenaed may file a motion to quash a subpoena but may instead merely serve the subpoenaing party, custodian, and deposition officer with written objections stating the specific grounds.  Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) sections 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f), 1987.1; see also Monarch Healthcare v. Sup.Ct. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1290.

Where the party seeking the discovery has received objections to the subpoena, that party may bring a motion under CCP section 1987.1 to enforce the subpoena.  CCP sections 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).  The motion must be brought within 20 days of service of the written objection and must include a declaration showing a good-faith effort to resolve the matter informally.

The protection based on the right to privacy is rooted in Cal. Const., Art.1, section 1, which states, in full, “[a]ll people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”  See Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, at 790-791; Britt v. Sup.Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, at 852-856.  This privacy protection applies to discovery.  Roberts, supra; Britt, supra.

When a “consumer” has served such objections, the party seeking the information has the burden of moving the court to enforce the subpoena.  CCP sections 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).  The party must file and serve the motion within 20 days of service of the written objections and must make an effort to resolve the matter informally.  CCP sections 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4). 

The right of privacy protects various types of personal, confidential information such as employment, financial, or medical records but the protection is not absolute.  See Cobb v. Sup.Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup.Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 658.  Britt v. Sup.Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862; Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley v. Sup.Ct. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 595-596; Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 239.  Even very personal, confidential matters may need to be disclosed if “essential to a fair determination of the lawsuit.”  Morales v. Sup.Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283, 288. 

The burden thus rests on the party seeking discovery to show that it is “directly” relevant, or essential, to the lawsuit.   Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 859-862.  If the information can be obtained in less intrusive means, the court should not allow discovery of the private matters.  Allen v. Sup.Ct. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.   “[G]iven the private nature of a confidential settlement of a lawsuit, the burden rests on the proponents of discovery of this information… to justify compelling production of this material. They must do more than show the possibility it may lead to relevant information. Instead they must show a compelling and opposing state interest.”  Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 239 [disapproved on other grounds by Williams v. Sup. Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531, 557 & fn. 8].

The court must balance the interests, weighing the privacy right at issue against the public interest in obtaining just results.  Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup.Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.  The court should consider 1) the purpose of the information sought; 2) the effect that disclosure will have on the parties and the trial; 3) the nature of the objections to disclosure; 4) whether the court may make an alternative order granting partial disclosure, disclosure in another form, or disclosure only if the party seeking the information undertakes certain appropriate burdens.  Valley Bank of Nevada, supra, 15 Cal.3d 658.      

Petitioner’s motion is persuasive.  Preliminarily, he shows that he served a written objection, specifying grounds for objection, on October 20, 2025, shifting the burden to Respondent to bring a motion to compel compliance.  Moreover, the discovery is exceedingly broad and also potentially includes private, confidential information.  There is no apparent basis for such broad discovery of cell phone records here and nothing indicating sufficient relevance for discovery purposes, especially of private information, while on the face the discovery encompasses a broad range of likely irrelevant information. 

Finally, there is no timely or proper opposition explaining the basis for this discovery and Respondent’s assertions in her untimely supplemental declaration are, in any case, unpersuasive.  As noted, she did not file a timely opposition and instead only filed her untimely supplemental declaration.  In that, she contends that she needs the telephone records to show that Petitioner has been contacting her and harassing her in a manner violated her requested DVRO.  However, the court can find no need for these records in order for her to show that he has been contacting her via his telephone.  If, in fact, he has done so, then Respondent should herself have records of these contacts on her telephone account or accounts.  She also should not have any need for the entirety of Petitioner’s telephone records, which will, on the face of matters, include much information wholly unrelated to this, such as records of calling or messaging others who have no involvement in this litigation.  Even if this court were inclined to allow discovery of such records, and it is not at this time, Respondent must pinpoint specific times or dates to narrow the discovery, or explain why this is not possible.     

Conclusion: Motion to Quash

The Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

Motion to Compel

Where a party seeks to compel responses to a demand for inspection or production under CCP section 2031.300, the moving party need only demonstrate that the discovery was served, the time to respond has expired, and the responding party failed to provide a timely response.  See Leach v. Sup.Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411. Failure to provide a timely response waives all objections.  CCP section 2031.300.  Where a party has failed to respond on time to a request for production, the first step is not to compel production but, as with interrogatories, to compel a response.  CCP section 2031.300.

A party has no duty to provide information “equally available to the propounding party.”  CCP section 2030.220(c).  This means that a party need not search matters of public record or interview independent witnesses in order to answer interrogatories.  Bunnell v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 720, 723-724; Holguin v. Sup.Ct. (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 812, 821.

Petitioner’s motion to compel production of various records and documents appears to be essentially a motion to compel production, but it is defective.  Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he served any formal discovery requests, despite the term “formal” in one of his e-mails to Respondent, he fails to indicate whether there was a response, he fails to indicate that Respondent agreed to produce documents, and he fails to explain any basis for compelling production of all the requested records.  The right to the requested production is particularly unclear given the request for documents which Respondent intends to use at trial and the fact that Respondent apparently already provided all documents which she intends to use at trial.  Petitioner also fails to explain why Respondent is required to provide documents which she obtained via subpoenas from law-enforcement agencies when Petitioner apparently could obtain the records himself form those agencies.  As noted above, a party has no obligation to provide records, such as those obtained through a subpoena or in public records, which are equally available to the requesting party.  Petitioner may have a valid basis for obtaining such documents which Respondent intends to use at trial in order to determine what she intends to use, but she has apparently already done that and Petitioner appears to admit as much, arguing that he has a right to production of those documents which Respondent has obtained form public agencies but does not intend to use.  He fails to explain the basis for this argument or the need specifically to obtain such documents.  

Conclusion: Motion to Compel

The Motion to Compel is DENIED without prejudice.

The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.        

Motion for Birth Certificate, Access to Records, Child’s Surname

In the final motion, Petitioner moves the court to amend the Child’s birth certificate to reflect Petitioner as his father, change the surname to reflect both parties as his parents, and to give Petitioner equal access to all of the Child’s medical, educational, and identifying records.  However, he provides no authority or analysis whatsoever, and instead merely relies on the fact that he has now been determined to be the Child’s father. 

Birth Certificate

Fam.Code section 7630 governs actions to determine the existence or nonexistence of a parent-child relationship.  At subdivision (a), it allows, among others, a person seeking to be adjudicated a child’s parent to bring an action to determine the parent-child relationship.  

According to Fam.Code section 7639, “[i]f the judgment or order of the court is at variance with the child's birth certificate, the court shall order that a new birth certificate be issued as prescribed in Article 2 (commencing with Section 102725) of Chapter 5 of Part 1 of Division 102 of the Health and Safety Code.”

Health & Safety (“H&S”) Code section 102725 governs the establishment of a new birth certificate upon any adjudication of the fact of parentage.  It states, in full,

Whenever the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship has been determined by a court of this state or a court of another state, and upon receipt of a certified copy of the court order, application, and payment of the required fee, the State Registrar shall establish a new birth certificate for the child in the manner prescribed in Article 1 (commencing with Section 102625), if the original record of birth is on file in the office of the State Registrar.

As noted above, a paternity test has now determined that Petitioner is the father of the Child.  Respondent has, in documents filed in this action following that determination, acknowledged that Petitioner is the father as demonstrated in the test.  Judgment finding Petitioner to be the father is therefore appropriate and upon entry of that judgment, a new birth certificate must be established for the Child.  At this time, however, judgment has not yet been entered and the parties have not addressed that issue. 

Child’s Records

Petitioner may have a right, ultimately, to access to some or all of the Child’s records which he requests, but at this time it is not clear that he has such a right to any of the records and, if so, which ones. 

Fam.Code section 3025 provides a basic standard that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental, and school records, shall not be denied to a parent because that parent is not the child's custodial parent.” 

This does not give a right to such access but merely states that a non-custodial parent may not be denied such access merely because that parent is not custodial.  As the court explained in In re Daniel C. H. (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 814, at 827, “parents may have some rights, because of the parent-child relationship, to obtain information concerning the medical treatment or condition of their minor children, we believe that disclosure is not required in all cases.”  It further explained that although by statute parents are not to be deprived the right to a child’s records simply because that parent is not a custodial parent, that does not give the parent a right to such records and access to such records may be denied based on issues such as allegations of child abuse or psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The court held that the father in that case had no right to demand disclosure of the child’s confidential communications to the child’s therapist, where there were allegations of child abuse. 

At this point, there is no basis for ordering Petitioner to have access of any such records.  There has been no determination of any issues in this proceeding, aside from the test finding Petitioner to be the father, and there are pending DVRO issues and allegations of domestic violence.  Petitioner has provided no law, evidence, or analysis supporting this request at this time.  Petitioner may eventually be able to obtain such access to some or all of the records but not at this time.

Name Change

Petitioner provides no authority for his request to change the Child’s name and fails to address the procedures and standards for doing so.   The court notes that there is no clear right to have the Child’s name changed to reflect Petitioner’s own.  The Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Schiffman (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 640 stated that “the rule giving the father, as against the mother, a primary right to have his child bear his surname” is abolished and that “[h]enceforth, as in parental custody disputes, the sole consideration when parents contest a surname should be the child's best interest.”  It explained, at 642, it was rejecting “the traditional rule that the father has a ‘primary right’ or ‘protectible interest’ in having the minor child bear his surname even after the mother is awarded custody.”

Conclusion: Motion for Birth Certificate, Access to Records, Child’s Surname

The Motion for Birth Certificate, Access to Records, Child’s Surname is DENIED without prejudice.

The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.        

End of Tentative Rulings.