Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 22

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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TENTATIVE RULINGS

LAW & MOTION CALENDAR

Monday, April 10, 2026,  9:30 a.m.

Courtroom 22 –Hon. Robert M. LaForge

3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

1. SFL089305 HARPEL

Motion to Set Aside Order Entered January 7, 2026, and Sanctions and Motion to Enter Parties Agreement as an Order Under 664.6 DENIED as explained herein.  Nonetheless, the court does order two limited changes to be made to the Final Order After Trial as explained and detailed in this order. 

Facts

Petitioner filed this action for legal separation with two minor children (the “Children”) on September 16, 2021.  There has since been significant litigation over Respondent’s requests for Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) against Petitioner, Petitioner’s efforts to obtain a DVRO against Respondent, child support custody, and visitation. 

During at least part of this litigation, Petitioner has been in a relationship with one Anna Casmey (“Anna”) while Respondent has been in a relationship with one Chris Waddoup (“Chris”).  Although Anna and Chris are not parties to this litigation, the parties have been, among other things, litigating disputes regarding the involvement and conduct of both Anna and Chris.   

The court held a trial regarding the parties’ competing DVRO requests on four days in late October 2025 through November 21, 2025.  At the last day of the trial, the parties announced that they had reached an agreement, which they put on the record orally before the court (the “Agreement”).  They set forth the terms on the record, as reflected in the minutes of November 21, 2025. 

On January 7, 2026, the court entered a Final Order After Trial (the “FOAT”).

Motion

In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Order Entered January 7, 2026, and Sanctions, Respondent moves the court to set aside the January FOAT pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663 on the basis that it is incorrect, including terms which differ form the Agreement.  She asserts that Petitioner’s attorney knew that there was a pending motion to enter an order based on the Agreement but knowingly provided the January FOAT to the court with new terms to which the parties did not agree and leaving out terms that were part of the Agreement. 

In a related RFO and Motion to Enter Parties’ Agreement as an Order Under 664.6, Respondent moves the court to enter an order based on the terms of the Agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Petitioner opposes the two motions.  He argues that any terms which differ from the exact terms which the parties presented to the court on the record only differ because the court made those modifications on the record as the parties were setting the terms on the record.  He also notes that the partiers accepted these.  In addition, he asserts that after the trial, he provided the proposed FOAT to Respondent,, resulting in disagreements over some of the FOAT wording.  The parties were in the process of trying to resolve those, and had resolved many, when Respondent filed her initial motion to enter an order on the Agreement with different terms and language. 

The court in this order addresses both motions together.  The two have different authority but they seek related relief and involve the same fundamental bases and arguments.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically motions to vacate pursuant to CCP section 473 or proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473).

When a party seeks to enforce a stipulated settlement entered in writing or orally before the court, the court “may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  CCP section 664.6.  This gives the court discretion.  In addition, when ruling on a CCP section 664.6 motion, the court is a trier of fact and its ruling will be upheld if based on “substantial evidence.”  Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566.   As explained in Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, at 112, “[t]he court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement under the statute even after a dismissal, but only if the parties requested such a retention of jurisdiction before the dismissal. (Citation) Such a request must be made either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court.”     

The court in Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, at 797 emphasized that before “judgment can be entered, two key prerequisites must be satisfied.”  These are contract formation and a writing signed by the parties with the material terms.  Id.  As with other contracts, if there is no meeting of the minds on the material terms, then no contract has been formed.  Id., 797.  Absent such a contract, there is no settlement agreement which the court may enforce.  Id.  Section 664.6 only applies to agreements made in writing and signed by the parties, or orally before the court.  If the agreement does not meet these requirements, the party cannot enforce it under section 664.6.  Weddington, supra, 809-810.

The current approach favors carrying out the parties’ intentions by enforcing contracts and disfavors finding contracts unenforceable due to uncertainty.  See Larwin-Southern California, Inc. v. JGB Investment Co. (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 626, at 641.  The court in Larwin-Southern stated that neither law nor equity requires every term and condition to be set forth in the contract and that the court may look to “the usual and reasonable terms found in similar contracts” and it may infer unexpressed provisions from the writing, the circumstances, custom, and usage, as long as they do not alter the terms of the agreement.  Id.  “At bottom,” the court said, “if the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filing of some gaps the parties have left.”  Id.   

A party may move the court to vacate the judgment and enter a new or different judgment.  CCP section 663.  CCP section 663 allows a party to move the court to vacate a judgment and enter another, different judgment because either an “[i]ncorrect or erroneous legal basis… not consistent with or not supported by the facts” or a “judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict” has “materially” affected the party’s “substantial rights.”  See also 9 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (6th Ed.2021, March 2026 Update) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, section 142.  CCP section 663 states, in full,

A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment:

1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected.

2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.

The Agreement

The court minutes for the trial  when the parties put the Agreement on the record state that Petitioner’s attorney, Brian Lanz (“Lanz”), recited the Agreement for the record.  It also sets forth the terms as recited, stating, in full,

Both Mother and Father will drop their mutual requests for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order with prejudice to all events before today's hearing.

Father will drop his request for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order against Chris Waddoup if Chris also agrees to drop his request against Father.

Each party is responsible for their own attorney’s fees to date.

Parties will have a review hearing regarding child custody and visitation within three to four months and will consider obtaining a Parent Coordinator in that time.

Mother and Father shall make good faith efforts to uphold the child custody and visitation schedule and shall consult with their co-parent counselor for any issues.

Parties are awarded joint legal and physical custody, with Mother having final veto power on issues where no agreement can be reached after meet and confer.

The custodial schedule will proceed as follows:

Father shall have the first, third and fifth weekends of each month. First weekend of the month is considered the first weekend that contains a Saturday. Parenting time will commence on Fridays after school until Mondays school drop off.

Father shall have every Wednesday of the month for an overnight visit starting at school pick up and ending Thursday at school drop off.

Neither party shall annoy, threaten or harm each other. Parties can be present in the same room but may not approach each other with the intent to annoy, threaten or harm the other.

Exchanges shall take place at school during drop off and pick up or at 9:00 a.m. at the Santa Rosa FoodMaxx if there is no school.

If Monday is a holiday, the visits extend until Tuesday morning school drop off.

Anna Casmey and Chris Waddoup shall not be present at any exchanges.

Mother shall provide proof of compliance with the anger management classes and co-parent counseling.

Mother shall share Cole Harpel's driving permit with Father within five (5) days. If Cole has not been issued a driving permit, Father may work with the child to help obtain one.

Chris Waddoup shall not be the disciplinarian for the children.

Chris Waddoup is not to participate in disciplining the children or have an discussion regarding the court case or minor s counsel with them.

For Thanksgiving 2025, children shall be with Father from Thursday morning at 10:00 a.m. until Monday morning school drop off.

For Christmas 2025, Dad shall have the children from Christmas Eve 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. Christmas day. Exchange shall be at FoodMaxx in Santa Rosa.

Children shall spend Mother's Day and Mother's birthday with Mother.

Children shall spend Father's Day and Father's birthday with Father.

Anna Casmey shall not have either a key to Father's residence or the digital door lock code while the children are with Father. If there is no digital door lock, Anna Casmey shall surrender her key to Father before the children arrive at his residence and the key can be returned to her after the children have left.

If the children wish to see Anna Casmey, they may request so through Minors' Counsel.

Children may request to change visits with either parent.

In addition to these minutes, there was a reporter for the hearing who prepared a transcript.  Both parties refer to this transcript, attached to the Declaration of Robin M. Estes in Support of Request for Order to Set Aside FOAH from January 7, 2026 (“Estes Dec.”) as Ex. A.

Analysis

The court first notes that Respondent’s discussion of the language at issue is somewhat unclear and inconsistent.  She refers repeatedly to a “proposed” order, rather than the actual filed FOAT.  Her discussion, as seen more below, also references portions of the “proposed” order which differ from the FOAT which the court signed and entered.  For some language, she quotes the specific language while for others she simply refers to the page and lines or paragraphs, without actually setting forth the language at issue, and this makes it impossible to determine exactly what language she is discussing.  Finally, she several times addresses paragraphs by number but for some of these she appears to be referring to numbered paragraphs as numbered in the order while for others she inconsistently appears to be referring to the paragraphs without numbers by their order on the page, reducing the clarity if what she is discussing.  As indicated below, the court at this time does not consider these problems insurmountable but this causes difficulties in understanding what Respondent is actually discussing, leads to possible confusion, and means that there is a possibility that what the court believes Respondent to be addressing is different from the language she actually intends to address.  This accordingly qualifies the court’s analysis.

 Respondent first challenges “Moving to Alternate Weeks” located at page 1, ¶9 and page 9, ¶17 of the “proposed” order.  The court notes that the FOAT entered and filed does not contain the second of these while the first is simply stating the issues to be considered at a further hearing scheduled for February 18, 2026.  This is not part of the terms presented in the FOAT and accordingly Respondent is objecting to language which is not actually in the FOAT. 

Respondent next raises the “proposed first and second paragraph, lines 4-18 on page 6,” claiming that these do not exist in the transcript.  She provides no further clarity or discussion but she appears to mean two prefatory paragraphs, rather than the paragraphs actually numbered 1 and 2.  This is not only somewhat unclear but is also inconsistent with her other paragraph references. 

Of the two prefatory paragraphs which this court believes Respondent to be discussing, the first merely states the context and subject of the trial and who was present.  It is accurate and correct and includes no terms of the order. 

The second of the two prefatory paragraphs states that on the second day of the trial the court advised the parties about the court’s view of evidence for the restraining orders and that the parties subsequently took part in the settlement negotiations which resulted in the Agreement.  Specifically, it states,

At the onset of this second day of trial, the court advised the parties that based on the evidence presented during the first day, there are grounds to order a restraining order against both parties and the court wanted to know if the parties wanted to consider that and have further settlement talks.

It is correct that this is not in the transcript for the day of the Agreement, which was the fourth day of trial, but that is not itself dispositive.  This is also not a term of the order.  No party provides a transcript for the second day, so it is impossible to determine the accuracy of the first part of the paragraph.  At the same time, the language of the first part is not necessary and, since it is not a term of the Agreement, absent evidence supporting its inclusion, the court finds it appropriate to strike it from the order.  The last sentence of the paragraph merely states, “The parties subsequently participated in settlement negotiations with the assistance of the court and came to the following agreement,” and the court finds this to be both accurate and proper language to include in the order.  The court does not strike this sentence. 

 She next attacks the statement, “This order supersedes all prior orders” at page 9, ¶16.  Again, she appears to be addressing a proposed order rather than the FOAT which Petitioner provided to the court and which the court actually entered.  The exact language is not in the FOAT and instead there is a similar, albeit different, term.  It also is at page 4 of the FOAT attachment, i.e. page 10 of the full document, and at numbered ¶17.  The actual language in the FOAT states, “The above-stated orders shall supersede any and all other custody and visitation order in this case.”  Despite these differences, what Respondent objects to is language stating that the Agreement or order “supersedes” prior orders, which is in the language in the FOAT.  Confusingly, Respondent shows that she herself included almost identical language in the version of the order which she herself proposed to Petitioner and apparently wants the court to enter now.  Estes Dec., Ex.J. (e-mail from Respondent’s attorney to Petitioner with Respondent’s proposed order attached); Declaration of Robin Estes in Support of Request for Order to Enter the Stipulations Reached by the Parties on the Record (“Estes Dec.2”), Ex.H.  This states, at numbered ¶18 on the penultimate page, “These orders shall supersede all prior custody and visitation orders.”  With her RFO to enter the stipulations as an order, Respondent provided a proposed order which states that she provided the proposed Stipulations and Order to Petitioner, and this is evidently the version attached to the two Estes declarations noted above.  In wording, Respondent’s language is almost identical to the language to which she objects in the FOAT.  In substance, it is effectively identical.  Moreover, the basic import of the language is logical and appears necessary to avoid conflict with different prior orders.  The court finds no basis for Respondent’s position on this point and DENIES the motion as to this language. 

 Finally, Respondent argues that the FOAT lacks language which is in the transcript and intended to be in the terms.  According to Respondent, the missing language is as follows:

a. Chris and Chad were to immediately drop their restraining order

requests for all events prior to November 21, 2025, with prejudice. (Please see

Transcript page 18, lines 2-8.

b. His paragraph 3, on page 6, did not include necessary language about the

non-CLETS conduct orders from the Transcript at page 18, lines 14-19.

c. His proposed order did not have the language related to Anna giving up

her key if any.   

 With respect to the first portion, Respondent is correct that the cited portion of the transcript states that the parties agree to drop the restraining order requests against each other and that this “includes the… restraining order requests between Chad Harpel and Chris Waddoups.  Each will immediately drop their restraining order requests against the other with prejudice.”  The court minutes, quoted above, include similar, but slightly different, language about Petitioner and Chris Waddoups (“Chris”), in a relationship with Respondent, dropping their restraining order requests.  The signed FOAT, however, is not actually missing this language.  It includes language which is very similar and to the same basic effect.  It is slightly different from the transcript, but presents the same basic effect and is actually closer to the terms set forth in the court’s minute order.  The FOAT language states, “Father, conditioned upon Chris Waddoups agreeing to vacate his Request for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order will work with Mr. Waddoups to vacate their mutual Requests for Civil Harassment Restraining Orders with prejudice.”  FOAT page 7 (Attachment, page 1) ¶2.   The court finds no basis for Respondent’s position on this point.     

 With respect to the second part, Respondent’s contention that FOAT “paragraph 3, on page 6, did not include necessary language about the non-CLETS conduct orders from the Transcript at page 18, lines 14-19,” it is again not clear exactly which portion of the FOAT she is discussing.  It is not clear if she actually means page 6 of the entire document, which is simply part of the FOAT form order and not part of the attachment which actually includes the terms of the Agreement.  That page contains numbered paragraphs, but not one numbered ¶3.  It instead includes paragraphs, or sections, 12-16.  It is also not clear if she means numbered ¶3, which is on page 8 of the full document and page 2 of the attachment, or if she means the third paragraph on whichever page she is discussing. 

That said, ¶3 on page 8 of the full document and page 2 of the attachment is similar to the language at the cited portion of the transcript.  It effectively says the same thing as the transcript language, in slightly different wording.  It also reflects the terms set forth in the minutes on this point, which also differ slightly in wording from the description of the term in the transcript.  The cited portion of the transcript says,

With the intentionally annoy, threaten or harm, annoy would include being within close proximity to each other with the intent to annoy.  However, both parties may be in the same room, say at Back to School Night, but they shall not approach the other.  This shall not be used as a sword by either party.

The similar language in the minutes, already quoted above, states,  

Neither party shall annoy, threaten or harm each other. Parties can be present in the same room but may not approach each other with the intent to annoy, threaten or harm the other.

The FOAT at numbered ¶3 on page 2 of the attachment states,

Neither Mother nor Father will intentionally annoy, threaten or harm the other, nor will they be in close proximity with the intent to annoy the other. 

Oddly, the court notes that Petitioner’s proposed order, which Respondent is apparently discussing, also contains effectively the same term and similar language, albeit at numbered ¶4, and that this actually is much closer to the language which Respondent’s attorney used as set forth in the transcript.  In fact, the language in the proposed order is almost identical to the transcript language which Respondent claims is missing, while the actual filed FOAT contains a variation that is somewhat closer to the version in the minutes. 

The court does find that there are variations between the minutes, the transcript language, and the FOAT but that they all say mostly the same thing.  Ultimately, the court finds that Respondent has a valid point but only to a limited degree about language which is relatively minor.  The court accordingly orders the FOAT modified to include the above-quoted language from the minutes.   

 Regarding the last point, that the order must include language stating that Anna must give up her key, the FOAT does in fact include such language.  It states, at numbered ¶16,

Father shall ensure that Anna Casmey does not have a key to his home during his custodial time periods or if his landlord will allow him to, have an electronic keypad installed for the front door and Anna’s code shall not be active when the boys are at Father’s home.  Anna shall give her key to Father at the beginning of the visit and may have it back at the end of the visit.

This is largely the same as the language on this issue set forth in the court minutes which, as set forth above, state,

Anna Casmey shall not have either a key to Father's residence or the digital door lock code while the children are with Father. If there is no digital door lock, Anna Casmey shall surrender her key to Father before the children arrive at his residence and the key can be returned to her after the children have left.

The language in the transcript on this point is at 19:1-14.  It states,

Father shall ensure that Anna Casmey, as per the prior order, does not have a key to his home during the time when the children are present, or he shall have an electronic keypad installed for the front door.  If it is an electronic keypad, Anna's code shall not be active while the children are at Father's home. If Father cannot get permission from his landlord to have the electronic keypad, then it would be that the key would be in the possession of Father. Anna's key would be in the possession of Father during the children's time at Father's home.  Anna shall surrender her key to Father before, at a time with him commences [sic] with the children, and he can then return it back to Anna after that custodial time ends.

The result is that the FOAT in fact does contain a term regarding Anna’s key or access to Petitioner’s home and the term is consistent with both the term set forth in the minutes and the language as stated in the transcript.  The court finds no material difference.  

Sanctions

At this time, the court finds insufficient basis to award monetary sanctions to either party.  It therefore denies such requests.

Conclusion

 The court finds Respondent’s motions to be almost wholly without support.  Aside from the lack of clarity in the motions, she appears to be addressing only a prior proposed version of the order and not the final FOAT which Petitioner actually provided to the court and which the court entered.  This not only makes the motion unclear but to a large degree defeats the substantive validity of the motion and indicates that Respondent in fact never took the time to make sure what the signed FOAT actually states.  Moreover, in the end almost all of the language in fact is consistent with the terms as set forth on the record, as reflect in both the court minutes and the transcript.  The terms also are almost identical to the terms which Respondent herself wishes to be included in the order which she wants entered instead.   Absent a showing that it should be included, the court strikes from the FOAT the language at FOAT attachment page 1:13-16 stating,

At the onset of this second day of trial, the court advised the parties that based on the evidence presented during the first day, there are grounds to order a restraining order against both parties and the court wanted to know if the parties wanted to consider that and have further settlement talks.

The court also replaces the language at numbered ¶3 on page 2 of the FOAT attachment stating “Neither Mother nor Father will intentionally annoy, threaten or harm the other, nor will they be in close proximity with the intent to annoy the other,” to be replaced with the following: Neither party shall annoy, threaten or harm each other. Parties can be present in the same room but may not approach each other with the intent to annoy, threaten or harm the other.”  In all other respects, the court finds the FOAT to be an accurate and correct representation of the Agreement entered into orally before the court and orders the FOAT to remain unchanged.  The court orders the two changes noted above and accordingly DENIES both motions.

Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter, along with a new version of the FOAT modified as set forth in this order.  Regarding both this order and the new FOAT, Respondent shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.