Probate Law & Motion
Advisements
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Tentative Rulings
April 16, 2026, at 3:00 p.m.
- Matter of Frank Busterna and Kathryn Busterna Trust
24PR00713
Motion for Damages for Breaches of Trust, Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duties as Trustee, Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duties as Trustee, for Surcharge for Penalties and Interest Charged Against the Trust for Respondent’s Failure to File and Pay State and Federal Trust Income Taxes, and for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Tentative Ruling: The motion is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED, as set forth below.
I. Attorney fees are GRANTED as prayed
“… [B]ased on the probate court's equitable powers alone, it has been held that beneficiaries who have incurred attorney fees, either to vindicate their position as a beneficiary (Wells Fargo Bank v. Marshall (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 447, 458, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 507) or for the benefit the trust (Estate of Reade (1948) 31 Cal.2d 669, 672, 191 P.2d 745), are entitled to have those fees paid by the trust.” Rudnick v. Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1336 fn. 2. Also see California Probate Code (“Prob C”) §§15002 and 17206. Additionally, as the fees incurred here were a direct result of the respondent’s breaches of trust (i.e. his inaction, misuse of trust assets, and failure to perform the duties of trustee,) Prob C §16420(a)(3) is an additional basis for the fee award. Prob C §16440 does not limit the application of Prob C §16420(a)(3) here. See Prob C §16442.
The Court awards $30,584.50 to the petitioner, which it finds to be supported by the evidence and a reasonable amount. The fees may be paid by the respondent personally within 60 days, or it may be made a charge against his beneficial interest in the trust.
II. Costs of suit are DENIED without prejudice
The request for costs of suit is DENIED without prejudice. In order to claim costs the petitioner must follow the procedure set forth in the Court’s February 14, 2025 ruling, which states that costs of suit may be claimed pursuant to a memorandum of costs filed with the court and subject to a motion to tax at the conclusion of the matter. See Rule of Court 3.1700.
III. Damages for breach of trust
APPEARANCES REQUIRED. The Court wishes to discuss to what extent the respondent may contest the amounts sought despite his failure to file an objection to the underlying trust petition. As an analogy, the Court points to the structure in civil cases for damages following a default. There, the amount of damages that may be awarded are limited by the allegations of the complaint, even where a statement of damages is served prior to entry of default. As discussed in the case of Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267:
We begin with the basic guidelines for analyzing the legal effect of a default. “Substantively, ‘[t]he judgment by default is said to “confess” the material facts alleged by the plaintiff, i.e., the defendant's failure to answer has the same effect as an express admission of the matters well pleaded in the complaint.” (Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 823, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, second italics added.) The “well-pleaded allegations” of a complaint refer to “ ‘ “all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” ’ ” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 205, 129 P.3d 394, quoting Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241.)
Because the default confesses those properly pleaded facts, a plaintiff has no responsibility to provide the court with sufficient evidence to prove them—they are treated as true for purposes of obtaining a default judgment. (Ostling v. Loring (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1746, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 391.) But that is all the default does. There is no penalty for defaulting. “A defendant has the right to elect not to answer the complaint. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 829 [231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295].) Although this may have been a tactical move by defendant, it is a permissible tactic.” (Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 325, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.)
And if the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do not state any proper cause of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff's favor cannot stand. On appeal from the default judgment, “[a]n objection that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action may be considered.” see (Martin v. Lawrence (1909) 156 Cal. 191, 103 P. 913; Bristol Convalescent Hosp. v. Stone (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 848, 859, 66 Cal.Rptr. 404.)
Id. at 281–282 (italics in original). Damages following a default are generally limited to those demanded in the complaint:
[Plaintiff’s] complaint also fails to set forth any clear demand for damages, let alone one which would support the enormous judgment he obtained from the trial court. As this court has iterated and then reiterated, Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint. [Citations omitted.]
Moreover, we have also made it clear that a statement of damages cannot be relied upon to establish a plaintiff's monetary damages, except in cases of personal injury or wrongful death. “Statements of damages are used only in personal injury and wrongful death....[Citation.] In all other cases, when recovering damages in a default judgment, the plaintiff is limited to the damages specified in the complaint. [Citations.]” (Sole Energy Co. v. Hodges, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 206, fn. 4, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 823….)
Id. at 286.
While this is not a civil action, the concern the Court has touches on the same issues discussed above. That is that here the damages now claimed are not necessarily apparent from the allegations of the petition. Rather, the basis for the damages appears to have been developed following the production of the accounting. It is therefore not apparent that the respondent had notice that a judgment against him for the specific damages claimed would result from his failure to object to the petition. This presents a fundamental due process obstacle to the Court now treating the application solely as a default prove-up. Instead, the Court’s view is that while the respondent may not contest any of the allegations of the petition, he is entitled to be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument responsive to the claim for damages now raised. The parties are invited to present argument and legal authority on this point. However, should the Court’s position not change, the Court would then be inclined to continue this matter as to this claim for damages so that the parties can meet and confer prior to any evidentiary hearing.
- Estate of Ramona Louise Crinella
SPR097852
Motion to Stay Pending Appeal
Tentative Ruling: The motion is DENIED. The movant seeks to stay all distributions, asset sales, or other non-administrative actions by the administrator pending appeal. The movant relies on California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §918 in support of the motion. “Section 918 authorizes the trial court to temporarily stay the enforcement of a judgment or order.” Sarkany v. West (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 801, 809. Even when the statutes do not call for an automatic stay on appeal, the trial and appellate courts both have the power to issue discretionary stays. Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1039 [citing CCP §§918, 923.] Here, the denial of the motion to vacate does not require any enforcement, and there is no enforcement to be stayed. The same can be said for the underlying judgment of nonsuit. These are negative orders denying requests for relief. There is no “enforcement” to be stayed. Therefore, CCP §918 does not support the motion, and the Court finds no legal basis to stay all distributions, asset sales, or other non-administrative actions by the administrator pending appeal.
***End of Tentative Rulings***