Probate Law & Motion

Advisements

If the tentative ruling is accepted, no appearance by Zoom is necessary unless otherwise indicated. You must notify the probate clerk at (707) 521-6893 if you wish to be heard in response to the tentative ruling. You must inform the clerk concerning your appearance choice: Zoom or in person. Any interested party who wishes to be heard in opposition to a petition must notify all other parties of the intent to appear. Both notifications must be completed no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day immediately preceding the day of the hearing.

Unless notification to the probate clerk has been given as provided above, the tentative rulings shall become the rulings of the court at 3:15 p.m. on the day of the hearing. 

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1. In re The Lawrence and Doris Peterson Trust; The Estate of Doris Peterson; and The Doris M. Peterson Trust
   SPR097108
   Petitioner Brian Edward Williams’ Motion to Strike or Tax Respondent’s (Prevailing Party’s) Cost Memo. 

Tentative Ruling:  On October 28, 2022, petitioner Stephanie May Johnson filed a Trust petition alleging numerous claims/causes of action for relief.  The petition primarily alleged the trust is invalid on the grounds of lack of capacity and undue influence.  The petition also alleged several other claims/causes of action, including claims against respondent (Heidi Diamantini) for financial elder abuse, fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, receipt of stolen property, imposition of constructive trusts, for court approved accounting, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy.

            The petition was later joined by petitioner Brian Williams.  Petitioners Johnson and Williams are two of Doris M. Peterson’s grandchildren.  Both are represented by attorney Steven Kuhn.

            The case proceeded to a court trial on November 18-19, 2025.  At trial, the case presented by petitioner focused on challenging the Doris M. Peterson Trust on the grounds of undue influence and lack of capacity, and raised allegations that respondent physically and financial abused Doris Peterson.

            Notably, petitioners did not allege in the petition that respondent breached her fiduciary duty as the trustee of Trust B by failing to provide notice of a change in trustee pursuant to Probate Code section 16061.7.

 During trial, and after petitioners rested their case, respondent made a CCP section 631.8 motion for judgment in her favor on the grounds that petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof on the claims.  Both sides presented oral argument and the Court took the matter under submission to issue a decision.  On December 1, 2025, this Court granted the CCP section 631.8 motion for judgment in favor of respondent.  Although the order for judgment primarily focused on the claims regarding undue influence and capacity (as those were the claims primarily addressed at the court trial), the order for judgment disposed of all of petitioners’ claims in favor of respondent and against petitioners.  A formal judgment was subsequently filed on December 16, 2025.  Both the CCP section 631.8 order for judgment and the subsequent judgment identified respondent as the prevailing party, and indicated that, to the extent respondent seeks attorney fees or costs, respondent must comply with the requirements of a memorandum of costs procedures. 

            On February 10, 2026, counsel for respondent filed a timely memorandum of costs, seeking costs from petitioners Stephanie Johnson and Brian Williams in the amount of $10,186.  The cost memo identifies the costs as being for filing and motion fees, deposition costs, and costs for preparing exhibit binders. 

Petitioner Williams’ Motion to Strike or Tax Costs

            Petitioner Brian Williams moves to strike or tax all costs claimed by respondent on the grounds that: (1) costs in probate are discretionary under Probate Code section 1002; (2) the cost memorandum was not properly served on petitioner (because the copy mailed to petitioner was unsigned, undated and does not bear declarant’s name); (3) Probate Code section 16061.9 makes respondent liable for all costs caused by her failure to serve the notice (regarding change in trustee) required by Probate Code section 16061.7; and (4) the individual cost items are not recoverable for various reasons.

            The Court notes that petitioner Stephanie Johnson (who is also represented by attorney Stephen Kuhn) has neither joined Williams’ motion to strike/tax costs, nor filed her own motion to strike/tax costs. 

            In opposition, respondent acknowledges that an award of costs is discretionary, but argues that petitioner fails to cogently explain why the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse to allow respondent to recover the requested costs.  More specifically, respondent argues: (1) the cost memorandum was properly electronically served on petitioner, as the proof of service was filed with the Court after the cost memo was served (because it would have been improper to attest to service before the document was actually served); (2) petitioner produced no evidence or argument at trial of any nexus between respondent’s failure to serve a Probate Code section 16061.7 notice concerning the “B Trust” in 2013 and the items of costs claimed; and petitioner’s argument in support of this assertion is misleading, confusing, and fails to identify what notification(s) he was entitled to; and (3) the individual cost items claimed are all recoverable, as they were reasonably necessary costs under the circumstances. 

            The opposition also points out that petitioner’s counsel cited to an unpublished case (Blanchard v. Blanchard) in violation of California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a) and asserted it was a published case and provided the wrong citation to that case.  Respondent requests the Court disregard the unpublished Blanchard case (and further argues that the Blanchard case is distinguishable).

            In reply, petitioner argues that: (1) the court should deny respondent’s request for costs in their entirety under Probate Code section 1002 because of petitioner’s seven-year noncompliance with Probate code section 16061.7(a)(2)’s “notice” requirement regarding a change in trustee; and (2) that respondent has not demonstrated that the cost memorandum was properly served on petitioner (and that respondent has not demonstrated otherwise in her opposition papers) and therefore the motion to strike should be granted due to lack of service of the cost memorandum.  Petitioner also apologizes for citing to an unpublished case (and providing an improper citation to that case) and withdraws the erroneous citation to the “Blanchard” case.

Motion to Strike/Tax Costs – General Principles

            The prevailing party is generally entitled to recover costs in any action or proceeding. See Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) §1032(b). A “prevailing party” is defined as “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.” CCP §1032(a)(4).

            However, in Probate Cases, Probate Code section 1002 provides that an award of costs is discretionary with the trial court.  Section 1002 states:

            “Unless it is otherwise provided by this code or by rules adopted by the Judicial Council, either the superior court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of the estate, as justice may require.” 

(Emphasis added.)  CRC Rule 3.1700(a)1) provides:

A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.

CRC Rule 3.1700(b) goes on to state:

(1) Striking and taxing costs
 

Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(3).
 

(2) Form of motion
 

Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.

Discussion:

            The motion to strike or tax costs is DENIED in its entirety.  The Court finds it to be a proper exercise of its discretion to award all requested costs to respondent and that the motion lacks merit for the following reasons.

            Service of Motion: Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the record demonstrates that respondent properly and timely served a copy of the cost memorandum on petitioner by EMAIL.  While it may be true that the proof of service that was enclosed with the mailed memorandum of costs did not attest to service, the subsequent February 10, 2026 proof of service filed with the court clearly demonstrates that service was properly and timely made BY WAY OF EMAIL.  As explained by respondent’s counsel, the “proof of service” cannot be attested to until service has been accomplished – which explains why the copy of the proof of service that was enclosed with the mailed cost memorandum was incomplete.  Petitioner fails to demonstrate that service by EMAIL was not an appropriate method of service.  While it may be true that the box on the proof of service form was checked stating that service was made by “MAIL,” this was understandable in light of the fact that there was no “box” to check stating that service was made by way of email.  The contents of the proof of service clearly indicate (and attest to) service by email.  Service was proper.  Moreover, there is no dispute that petitioner had timely actual notice of the cost memorandum and had ample opportunity to file the motion to strike or tax costs.  Therefore, to the extent petitioner argues that costs should not be awarded due to an alleged lack of proper service of the cost memorandum, the argument is without merit.

            Petitioner’s Probate Code 16061.7/16061.9 Argument for Striking/Taxing Costs:  Probate Code section 16061.7(a)(2) requires that a trustee shall serve a notification by the trustee whenever there is a change of trustee of an irrevocable trust.  Section 16061.7(b)(1) requires the notice to be served on each beneficiary of the irrevocable trust or irrevocable portion of the trust, subject to the limitations of Probate Code section 15804. Probate Code section 16061.9(a) provides that a trustee who fails to serve the notification by trustee as required by section 16061.7 on a beneficiary shall be responsible for all damages, attorney fees, and costs caused by the failure unless the trustee makes a reasonably diligent effort to comply with that section.  Respondent appears to concede that petitioners were entitled to get notice of the change in trustee for the “Trust B.”  The Court notes that section 16061.7 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the outgoing trustee or the incoming trustee (or both) is responsible for providing the section 16061.7 notice.  In any event, this Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s argument that the provision of Probate Code section 16061.9(a) (stating that a trustee who fails to comply with section 16061.7 “notice” requirements shall be responsible for all damages and costs caused by that failure) is a valid basis for moving to strike or tax the requested costs.  First, Petitioner never alleged in the operative petition that there was any breach of fiduciary duty with respect to section 16061.7 “notice” requirements.  Having never raised that issue during trial proceedings, this Court questions whether section 16061.9(a) can be invoked at this time.  Second, assuming arguendo that sections 16061.7 and 16061.9(a) can be invoked for the first time post-judgment, the Court is not persuaded that section 16061.9(a) is a basis for seeking to strike/tax costs claimed by the prevailing party.  Third, petitioner’s claim that there was a violation of the section 16061.7(a)(2) “notice requirement” is not supported by any evidence.  The mere fact that respondent’s counsel stated in a pleading that Doris told her attorney that she did not want her grandchildren to receive notice of the change of trustee does not demonstrate that no one (Doris or respondent) sent the requisite notice.  Fourth, petitioner’s argument that the alleged failure to comply with the section 16061.7(a)(2) notice requirement caused petitioner Williams damages, attorney fees, and/or costs is speculative at best.  The argument is also confusing and ignores the fact that respondent was identified in the judgment as the “prevailing party” to the entire action and that, as the prevailing party, respondent could seek costs by way of a cost memorandum.  Petitioner’s arguments in reply regarding the section 16061.7(a)(2)/16061.9(a) issue are not persuasive.  In sum, petitioner’s reliance on Probate Code sections 16061.7 and 16061.9 as grounds for denying respondent’s request for costs is not persuasive.

            Individual Cost Claims:  As an initial matter, the Court notes that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1700(b)(2) that the motion to strike or tax costs “must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs.”  Petitioner’s motion complains about specific items of costs, out of order, and without reference to numbers or sections of the cost memorandum.  Nonetheless, this Court will proceed to the merits of the individual cost claims and finds that all of the claimed costs were reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case.  Therefore, the Court declines to strike or tax any of the requested costs.

The deposition of Mel Duncan was justified given his unique knowledge of relevant issues in the case, and his significant health status (having been diagnosed with a disease that would result in his death if left untreated), even if Mr. Duncan was not on his deathbed.  Mr. Duncan was the only person known to respondent with knowledge of certain relevant information.  His deposition was reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and a deposition was appropriate in light of this and his health issues.

The Court further finds that the depositions of Dolph Green and Kristen Kurpinsky were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, particularly in light of the fact that their employer (Edward Jones) forbade them from voluntarily discussing certain information with respondent and her counsel.

The Court further finds that the videotaping costs for the deposition of petitioner Brian Williams was justified.  Respondent had a reasonable basis to believe that videotaping the deposition was justified based upon information suggesting that he might not appear at trial to testify.  Additionally, at the time of the videotaped deposition, respondent could not have anticipated that she would not need to present any evidence or witnesses because of petitioners’ failure to meet their initial burden of proof and the resulting CCP section 631.8 judgment.

The Court further finds that the costs for preparing exhibit binders (for the attorneys and the court) was reasonable, and respondent could not have anticipated that the court and witnesses would not need to use the binders she produced because petitioners failed to meet their initial burden of proof at trial.

Finally, the Court finds that all of respondent’s claimed filing fees were reasonably necessary, and that respondent has not “double billed” for any particular filing fee.

Conclusion

            Respondent is awarded costs of $10,186, jointly and severally against petitioners.

 

2. Estate of Lennice Katherine Ambrose-Gordon
   SPR097310
   Demurrer to Robert Gordon’s First Amended (and Supplement to) Petition to Appoint Fiduciary as Estate Administrator

Tentative Ruling:  The Demurrer is OVERRULED.  The request to surcharge Robert Gordon is DENIED.

Facts

            Tricia Marie Chandler (“Chandler”) commenced these proceedings when she filed a petition for letters of administration for, and authorization to administer, the Estate of Lennice Katherine Ambrose-Gordon (the “Estate”) on January 19, 2023.  The petition alleges that Decedent died intestate and was survived by a spouse, Robert Gordon (“Gordon”), Chandler, decedent’s natural daughter, and an adopted son, Carrington Anthony Ambrose (“Ambrose”).  Chandler is currently the administrator of the Estate.

            On September 10, 2025, Gordon filed a Petition to Appoint Fiduciary as Administrator (the “Petition”), petitioning the court to remove Chandler as administrator pursuant to Probate Code (“Prob. Code”) section 8502.  Petitioner alleged disputes and litigation between the parties; Chandler’s failure to pay an award of attorney fees to him over a discovery motion; his payment of taxes on the Estate’s real property at 127 Frey Road, Santa Rosa (the “House”); disputes over the handling of the Decedent’s stock in Edison International (the “Edison Stock”); Chandler’s refusal to reimburse him for his payments towards the House or other property of Decedent; and Chandler’s refusal to disclose her account information or current address for delivery of silver.

            Chandler demurred to the Petition on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  After the hearing on January 8, 2026, the Court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.  The Court found that no allegations showed removal to be necessary to protect the estate or interested persons, noting that the facts and history indicating only “a history of contentious litigation” between the parties, with numerous disputes, but that these disputes do not show that Chandler is taking a position adverse to the estate or its best interests.  The Court also rejected Gordon’s claim that Chandler’s dual role as administrator and beneficiary created a conflict of interest requiring removal.  It noted that the dual role created an “inherent” but “incidental potential conflict of interest” but nothing more.  It also noted that Chandler’s alleged conduct of failing to provide her address so Gordon could deliver silver, failing to provide account information for transfer of the Edison Stock, and failure to provide information about Decedent’s “tax obligations and tax issues” likewise were insufficient to justify removal.  The Court distinguished Guzzetta's Estate (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 169, where the personal representative took a position adverse to the estate or beneficiaries by trying to use litigation to take the entire estate for herself, and Estate of Hammer (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1621, in which the administrator not only engaged in litigation adverse to the estate but also engaged in other wrongful acts.  The Court gave Gordon leave to amend within 10 days of service of the notice of entry of the order.

            Gordon filed a First Amended and Verified Petition for Suspension of Powers and Replacement of Personal Representative with Fiduciary and for Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and for Denial of Compensation from Estate (the “FAP”) on January 14, 2026.  Gordon filed a Verified Supplement (the “Supplement”) to the Petition on February 19, 2026.  He again seeks to remove Chandler and replace her with a fiduciary pursuant to Prob. Code section 8502.  He alleges, generally with no other details, that Chandler has failed to inventory and administer the Estate in a timely fashion.  He also alleges that Chandler has failed to disclose her address in violation of Prob. Code section 8573, failed to accept Gordon’s offer to transfer the Edison Stock to an account for the Estate, rejected Gordon’s suggestion of selling the Stock; failed to file and serve an inventory and appraisal until Robert leaves the House and pays her back rent, refused to accept his offer to pay her for her interest in the House, and failed to reimburse him for his payments regarding the House.

            The Supplement adds some additional allegations.  It asserts that Gordon was served with an “untimely and partial Inventory & Appraisal” disclosing the sale of silver at below market value without a competitive bid process, causing harm to the Estate; another statement that Chandler has refused recommendations to sell the Edison Stock and failed to pay taxes on dividends or cooperate in transferring the stock to the estate; Gordon received an “untimely and partial Inventory & Appraisal” for the House which disputes Gordon’s claimed interests in the House; and a general statement that Chandler has refused to cooperate in the ways already described in the FAP and prior Petition. 

Demurrer

            Chandler demurs to the FAP and its Supplement on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action to remove her and appoint a third-party administrator.  She argues first that Gordon failed to file and serve the FAP within the 10 days that the Court gave in the order sustaining the prior demurrer.  She also contends that he still has not alleged any conduct which would support her removal.  She also seeks a surcharge against Gordon’s interest in the Estate pursuant to Prob. Code section 9614 on the basis that Gordon’s petition is unreasonable, in bad faith, and for the purposes of hindering the performance of her duties. 

            Gordon opposes the demurrer.  He argues that the FAP was timely and that his allegations are sufficient.

            Chandler replies, reiterating her arguments and claiming that the opposition refers to no new material allegations.

Applicable Authority

            In general, unless otherwise stated in the Probate Code, “the rules of practice applicable to civil actions, including discovery proceedings,” apply to matters under the Probate Code.  Prob. Code section 1000.

Prob. Code section 8500 governs petitions for removal of a personal representative.  Subdivision (a) states, in full,

(a) Any interested person may petition for removal of the personal representative from office. A petition for removal may be combined with a petition for appointment of a successor personal representative under Article 7 (commencing with Section 8520). The petition shall state facts showing cause for removal.

Section 8500 goes on to state that if the court has reason to believe from the court’s own knowledge, other credible information, or the petition, that there are grounds for removal, the court shall issue a citation to the personal representative to appear and show cause why the personal representative should not be removed. The court may suspend the powers of the personal representative and may make such orders as are necessary to deal with the property pending the hearing.  Any interested person may submit a declaration supporting or opposing removal.   Prob. Code section 8502 sets forth the grounds for removal.  These are,

(a) The personal representative has wasted, embezzled, mismanaged, or committed a fraud on the estate, or is about to do so.

(b) The personal representative is incapable of properly executing the duties of the office or is otherwise not qualified for appointment as personal representative.

(c) The personal representative has wrongfully neglected the estate, or has long neglected to perform any act as personal representative.

(d) Removal is otherwise necessary for protection of the estate or interested persons.

(e) Any other cause provided by statute.

According to Prob. Code section 8500(c), the personal representative may file a demurrer to a declaration seeking removal.  The court in Goebner v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1105, at 1113, stated, “we hold a demurrer to a petition brought under the Probate Code must be filed at or before the initial hearing.”

A demurrer can only challenge a defect appearing on the face of the complaint, exhibits thereto, and judicially noticeable matters.  CCP section 430.30; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.  The grounds for a demurrer are set forth in CCP section 430.10.  One of the grounds, in subdivision (e), is the general demurrer that the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is a general demurrer, which must fail if there is any valid cause of action.  CCP section 430.10(e); Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Steward Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39; Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4^th 1068, 1078.

Requests for Judicial Notice

            Both parties request judicial notice of documents.  Chandler requests judicial notice of various court records.  Documents 1 and 4-5 are court orders from this proceeding.  Document 2 is a Partial Inventory and Appraisals which she filed in this proceeding.  Document 3 is a court order in a separate, related action, Gordon v. Chandler, 25CV05194.  Gordon requests judicial notice of a declaration which Chandler filed in this action.

            These documents are judicially noticeable.  All are court records while 4 of them are court orders.  The Court may judicially notice the documents, their content, and any purported legal effect but may not judicially notice the truth of factual assertions in the inventory or declaration.  With this limitation, the Court GRANTS the requests.  

Timeliness of the Amended Petition

            Chandler contends that Gordon failed to file and serve the FAP within the deadline provided in the order sustaining the prior demurrer.  The Court expressly allowed Gordon to file and serve the amended petition within 10 days of service of the notice of entry of the order.  Chandler notes that she served the amended proposed order on January 20, 2026 and that although Gordon filed the FAP before that, on January 14, 2026, he did not serve it until February 9, 2026.  Gordon contends that his service of the FAP was timely because he was never served with notice of entry of the order before serving the FAP.

            Gordon is correct on this point.  No notice of entry of the order was served on him before he served his filed FAP.  The service of the proposed order, not yet signed or entered, and not itself a notice of entry of the order, did not trigger the 10-day deadline. 

Substantive Discussion

            The FAP contains some material new allegations.  As explained above, for the most part it does allege essentially the same conduct as alleged in the original Petition, and most of the new allegations merely add small details to the conduct already alleged in the original Petition or reference an additional example of similar conduct.  None of that transforms the alleged conduct into wrongdoing sufficient to support the relief which Gordon seeks.  However, Gordon does make some significant new allegations.

            In his opposition, Gordon contends that he now alleges that Chandler failed to take action to recover funds which she alleges were wrongfully taken from the Estate, but this argument is unpersuasive.  Gordon is referring to his own allegations in the FAP, ¶12, that Chandler has alleged in her own pleadings that Gordon himself wrongfully took Estate assets and that she is attempting to recover those assets.  His own allegations show that Chandler has in fact taken action to recover those assets. 

            Gordon also refers in his opposition to his allegation of selling Estate assets at below market value, in the Supplement ¶23.  This allegation may be sufficient to support the claim.  He alleges that Chandler sold silver at below market value without a competitive bidding process, causing harm to the Estate.  As noted above, wasting or mismanaging Estate assets may be a ground for removal.  Prob. Code section 8502(a).  Selling assets without a competitive bidding process and at below market value may amount to waste or mismanagement.  The allegation is thin and in the end Chandler may prevail on this at hearing, but that is not the standard for demurrer, where the demurring party must show that the allegations are insufficient on their face as a matter of law.  

            Gordon also now alleges that Chandler has failed to disclose her address in accordance with Prob. Code section 8573.  Gordon alleges that Chandler was or is a resident of either Oregon or Nevada, not California. 

            Prob. Code section 8573 requires a nonresident personal representative of an estate to sign and file a statement of permanent address.  It states, in full, “A nonresident personal representative shall sign and file with the court a statement of the permanent address of the nonresident personal representative. If the permanent address is changed, the nonresident personal representative shall promptly file in the same manner a statement of the change of address.”  According to Prob. Code section 8577(a), “Failure of a nonresident personal representative to comply with Section 8573 is cause for removal from office.” 

            Chandler contends that this Court previously found the address location to be insufficient to support the petition, and that Gordon’s own admissions reveal the claim to be false, but this argument is not persuasive.  The FAP does not state that Gordon was able to locate her address or deliver the silver and Chandler does not explain what Gordon actually admitted, or where or when he admitted it.  Moreover, the original Petition did not raise the failure to provide an address in violation of section 8573, but merely claimed that Chandler had not disclosed her current location for delivery to her of silver belonging to the Estate.  The current FAP reiterates the original allegation but now also claims that Chandler has violated section 8573.  Chandler does not refute the allegations, does not claim to be a resident of California, and does not state that she filed the required statement of address.  The Court has not been able to locate such a statement in the record and the Court’s own records indicate no known address for Chandler.  Gordon thus states a valid basis for removal from the position and the demurrer must be overruled. 

Surcharge Pursuant to Prob. Code section 9614

            At this time, even if the Court were to sustain the demurrer, the Court finds insufficient basis to order a surcharge of Gordon’s interest based on the FAP. 

            The court DENIES this request.

Conclusion

The demurrer is OVERRULED.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the Court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312. Chandler shall have 10 days from service of notice of entry of an order after hearing to file any response to the FAP.

            In light of the ruling on the demurrer, the hearing on the FAP is CONTINUED to July 16, 2026 at 3:00 p.m. in Dept. 12 on the Court’s law and motion calendar. Should this matter become contested, the parties are ordered to meet and confer and file statements of issues consistent with the local rules.

***End of Tentative Rulings***