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Probate Law & Motion

Advisements

If the tentative ruling is accepted, no appearance by Zoom is necessary unless otherwise indicated. You must notify the probate clerk at (707) 521-6893 if you wish to be heard in response to the tentative ruling. You must inform the clerk concerning your appearance choice: Zoom or in person. Any interested party who wishes to be heard in opposition to a petition must notify all other parties of the intent to appear. Both notifications must be completed no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day immediately preceding the day of the hearing - BY 4:00 P.M. ON TUESDAY, NOV. 10TH DUE TO THE 11TH HOLIDAY.

Unless notification to the probate clerk has been given as provided above, the tentative rulings shall become the rulings of the court at 3:15 p.m. on the day of the hearing. 

To Join Department 63 “Zoom” Online

To Join Department 63 “Zoom” By Phone:

  • Call: +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose) and enter same meeting ID and password as listed above. 

Guide for Participating in Court Proceedings via Zoom for Dept 63:

  • After joining the meeting and checking in with the clerk, please mute your audio when not speaking. This helps keep background noise to a minimum.
  • Be mindful of background noise when your microphone is not muted. Avoid activities that could create additional noise, such as shuffling papers.
  • Position your camera properly if you choose to use a web camera. Be sure it is in a stable position and focused at eye level, if possible. Make sure everything visible in the frame is appropriate for an appearance in court.
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  • The recording function has been disabled. Remember, the prohibition against recording court proceedings, even remote ones, remains.
  • Be patient. Check in will take more time and the experience from those who have tried this before is that proceedings are a little slower generally.

Tentative Rulings

November 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m.  

  1. Matter of Toral L. Solberg Trust
    24PR01089
    Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: The motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED without prejudice in part.

The motion seeks an award of costs of suit, but the movant has not filed a memorandum of costs. The Judgment after Court Trial directs that to the extent the movant seeks to recover costs of suit, she must comply with the requirements of a memorandum of costs, subject to a motion to strike or tax. See Rule of Court, Rule 3.1700.  As no memorandum of costs has been filed, the motion, to the extent it seeks costs, is denied without prejudice for this reason.

As to the motion for attorney fees, the Court notes there is no proof of service of the reply, so the Court has no basis to determine that the opponent was properly served with the reply. The Court therefore disregards the reply in its entirety.

The motion for attorney fees is granted as stated below. 

When a trust beneficiary instigates an unfounded proceeding against the trust in bad faith, a probate court has the equitable power to charge the reasonable and necessary fees incurred by the trustee in opposing the proceeding against that beneficiary's share of the trust estate. Rudnick v. Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1335. Where the expense of litigation is caused by the unsuccessful attempt of one of the beneficiaries to obtain a greater share of the trust property, the expense may properly be chargeable to that beneficiary's share. Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 816–817.

Bad faith involves a subjective determination of the contesting party's state of mind—specifically, whether he or she acted with an improper purpose. Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 823. A subjective state of mind will rarely be susceptible of direct proof; usually the trial court will be required to infer it from circumstantial evidence. Id. Even if a trial court did not explicitly find bad faith, an implied finding could be inferred from the trial court's statement of decision following the trial, as well as its statements made on the record at the hearing on the attorney fees. Id.

The Court’s Statement of Decision indicates that Scott failed to produce evidence sufficient to support any of his claims. However, a lack of merit alone may not settle the question of bad faith.

“[A] showing that a party's action or tactic is totally and completely without merit does not settle the issue of whether that action or tactic was in bad faith. Such a showing is certainly evidence that the action is brought in bad faith (Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 649), because a trial court is entitled to infer from the utter lack of merit that the party knew that it lacked such merit, and yet continued to pursue the action for some ulterior motive. However, the trial court may not be willing to draw that inference if it is convinced that, despite the complete lack of merit, the party was acting in the good faith (albeit erroneous and even unreasonable) belief that the action was meritorious. Thus, the inference of bad faith is one which the trial court may make, but it is not mandatory that it do so.”
 

Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1073.  Here, the Court does draw the inference that Scott acted in bad faith. The Court does not find it necessary to restate its findings from the Statement of Decision.  Suffice it to say, the utter lack of evidence supporting his claims, combined with the evidence that Scott held an animosity towards his sister, and the evidence that he based his petition on his own unwillingness to believe that Toral would change the trust of his own free will, is a sufficient basis to find Scott acted in bad faith. Scott pursued the unfounded petition without any reasonable basis or meaningful evidence in support of his claims.

The authorities cited in the opposition are not applicable.  Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445 (Terry), Whittlesey v. Aiello (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227 (Whittlesey) and the more recent case of Zahnleuter v. Mueller (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1294 (Zahnleuter), stand for the notion that where beneficiaries are litigating over who will control the trust and who will benefit from the trust, neither side is entitled to reimbursment of attorney fees from the trust res. A trustee is not entitled to reimbursement of litigation expenses from the trust estate when the dispute was, and continues to be, over who will enjoy the benefits and who will control the trust. Zahnleuter v. Mueller (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1307. This is also true when a trustee advances interests of one beneficairy over another, thus failing to participate in the action as a neutral trustee. Id. More generally, the underlying principle which guides the court in allowing costs and attorney fees incidental to litigation out of a trust estate is that such litigation is a benefit and a service to the trust. Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 270. If litigation is necessary for the preservation of the trust, the trustee is entitled to reimbursement for his or her expenditures from the trust; however, if the litigation is specifically for the benefit of the trustee, the trustee must bear his or her own costs incurred, and is not entitled to reimbursement from the trust. Id.

Here, the amendment was beneficial to Karen and detrimental to Scott. Scott sought to invalidate the amendment and return to a version of the trust more beneficial to him. Karen’s defense of the amendment was as much a benefit to her as the trust. An unsophisticated analysis of the legal precendents might lead to the conclusion that Karen should not be able to recover attorney fees from the trust estate, much less from Scott’s share. However, the Court is not awarding attorney fees under this line of cases.  The Court is using its inherent equitable powers, in service of the intent of the testator, who was expressly worried about a challenge by Scott, in allowing fees to be paid from Scott’s distributive share of the trust because his petition was unfounded and because he acted in bad faith.  When such facts are present, a probate court does have the equitable power to surcharge a beneficiary’s share. Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 816–817.

While the Court has authority to direct the use of Scott’s share of the trust res to pay the attorney fees of Karen, the Court does not have equitable power over Scott’s personal assets. Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 816–817. Thus, only Scott’s share of the trust res can be reached to satisfy the equitable award of attorney fees, not Scott’s personal assets.  The Court finds sufficient evidentiary support for the amount of fees requested and finds that the rates charged and the time spent is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The amount of fees awarded is limited however to the amount specified in the motion, or the amount of Scott’s distributive share whichever is less.

The Court need not proceed to the alternate basis for requested fees, but notes that if it did, it would find that Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) §2033.420 does not support recovery of attorney fees because the admissions sought were of no substantial importance.  Likewise, CCP §998 does not independently create a statutory right to attorney fees. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hunsberger (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1532.

Moving party shall submit a proposed order after hearing consistent with the Court’s ruling.

 

  1. Estate of Jessica M. Testa
    26PR01279
    Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling: The petitioner was required to serve the order to show cause in the manner of a summons, because the mortgage company has not previously appeared in this matter. California Rule of Court Rule 3.1150(a). Service by fax, alone, is not sufficient service on an out-of-state person. California Code of Civil Procedure §415.40. Therefore, the Temporary Restraining Order is DISSOLVED and is not extended, the Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED, and the matter is DROPPED from calendar.

 

***End of Tentative Rulings***