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1.         24CV06528, Novograd v. Bogetti Construction, Inc

Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to compel responses to form interrogatories from Defendant Wine Country Estate Development, LLC is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $877.50 to be paid by Defendant and Defendant’s counsel jointly.

Defendant shall provide code-compliant, objection-free responses to Plaintiffs’ form interrogatories within 20 days of notice of entry of an order on this motion. Defendant shall pay the monetary sanctions within the same time.

Plaintiffs’ counsel shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling. Due to the lack of opposition, compliance with Rule 3.1312 is excused. 

Analysis:

Plaintiffs propounded Form Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Wine Country Estate Development, LLC on February 7, 2025, and has not received responses. Defendant failed to respond to any of Plaintiffs’ meet and confer efforts.

By failing to respond to these discovery requests, Defendant has waived all objections to them. (CCP §§ 2030.290.) As such, Defendant is ordered to provide code-compliant, objection-free responses.

Sanctions are warranted pursuant to CCP §§ 2030.290(c). Plaintiffs request $877.50 to be imposed against both Defendant and Defendant’s counsel. The Court finds the amount of sanctions requested to be reasonable. The Court also finds it warranted to impose these sanctions against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel jointly pursuant to CCP § 2023.030 because Defendant’s counsel failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ multiple meet and confer efforts. 

 

2.         MCV-258381, Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Broner

Defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment is DENIED.

The Court’s minute order shall constitute the order of the Court.

Analysis:

Defendant seeks to vacate the default judgment entered against her because she did not receive actual notice of the summons and compliant in time to defend the action. As argued, the proof of service of process indicates Defendant was personally served at an address where she no longer resided and contained a physical description that did not match her. Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion stating that it has no opposition to the default judgment being vacated.

Though Defendant has presented a sufficient basis for vacating the default judgment and though the motion is unopposed, the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the request. Pursuant to CCP § 473(b) an application to vacate default judgment shall be made no later than 6 months after the judgment was taken. Judgment was entered in this matter on March 24, 2023, more than three years ago. “This six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; the court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time has lapsed.” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.)

 

3.         25CV08161, Little Woods Mobile Villa, LLC v. City of Petaluma

Defendant City of Petaluma (“Defendant” or “the City”)’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit an order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312.

Analysis:

Plaintiff, Little Woods Mobile Villa LLC, owns Little Woods Mobile Villa, a mobilehome park in the City of Petaluma. In 2024, Plaintiff decided to cease operations and close the Park. A park owner wanting to cease operations must first follow certain notice procedures, prepare a “relocation impact report” detailing the effect of closure on tenants, and attend a hearing on that report where the City decides whether to allow closure. (Municipal Code (“PMC”) § 8.34.010, et seq.)

By letter dated June 21, 2024, Plaintiff gave notice to the City that it was ceasing operations as a mobile home park. By letter dated November 8, 2024, the City outlined the requirements and charges that Plaintiff would need to satisfy to apply for permission to close. This letter instructed Plaintiff to deposit $198,880 (which was the estimated cost to prepare the relocation impact report), plus a $1,000 application fee, for a total of $199,880 in order to start the application process. Plaintiff paid the deposit under objection and filed this action for declaratory relief.

Plaintiff raises a single cause of action for declaratory relief seeking declaration that the $199,880 paid in charges are, in whole or in part, unlawful. Plaintiff alleges that the charges are unlawful because they (1) are an unconstitutional exaction and taking under the Fifth Amendment; (2) burden Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition; (3) are unlawful “taxes” under articles XIII A and XIII C of the California Constitution; and (4) are “unreasonable” under section 65863.7, subdivision (g).

Defendant demurrers to the complaint arguing (1) Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe; (2) Plaintiff cannot plead a regulatory taking; (3) Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred; (4) the application processing fee is not an unlawful tax; (5) the City satisfied Gov. Code § 65863.7(g); and (6) the fees do not violate the First Amendment right to petition. Each of these arguments is addressed below.

This matter previously came on for hearing on May 29, 2026. The Court issued a tentative ruling beforehand indicating an intent to overrule the demurrer. At the hearing, Counsel for Defendant cited several new cases not included in the briefing. The Court took the matter under submission and issued an order after hearing requiring supplemental briefing of these new authorities. The supplemental arguments are addressed below.

I.                    Ripeness

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s takings claim is not ripe because the deposit and application processing fees are not “final decisions” of the City. However, as alleged, Plaintiff was required to deposit almost $200,000 in order to initiate the application proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that the amount of fees required to initiate the proceedings was unreasonable and unlawful.

In its supplemental brief, Defendant cites three district court cases as being applicable on the ripeness issue: Little Woods Mobile Villa LLC v. City of Petaluma (2024) 736 F.Supp.3d 757, 765–766 (“Little Woods”), Lustig v. City of Laguna Beach (Aug. 10, 2023) 2023 WL 6370231 at *4, and DiVittorio v. County of Santa Clara (Feb. 10, 2022) 2022 WL 409699 at *7. Notwithstanding the fact that each of these cases is merely persuasive authority, each of them is distinguished.

In Little Woods, the plaintiffs had not applied to the City for any relief, claiming that doing so would have been futile. The Court found the ripeness requirement could not be satisfied where a plaintiff takes no action at all. In Lustig, the plaintiff challenged the City’s determination that her application for construction of a single family residence on her property was incomplete. The letter stated that once the application was complete, the plaintiff may need to provide further information or a redesign in order for it to be rendered feasible. The Court found that the letter did not constitute a final decision by the City because it was not a final determination that the project was infeasible, only a preliminary determination that the application was incomplete. The DiVittorio case also involved an application that was deemed by the City to be incomplete. 

While Lustig and DiVittorio are similar to this case in that the City or County had not yet rendered a final decision regarding the approval or denial of the application as a whole, what is missing from any of the cases cited by Defendant is a determination by the government agency that the plaintiff must pay a significant sum in order for the plaintiff’s application even to be processed. That difference is significant.

The Court finds the decision of the City to predicate the processing of Plaintiff’s application upon the payment of nearly $200,000 to have been a final decision because it leaves no question about how the challenged regulation applies to Plaintiff’s land. (Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco, CA (2021) 594 U.S. 474.)

Moreover, Plaintiff has alleged both takings and non-taking theories supporting its cause of action for declaratory relief. The above cases involve the standard regarding ripeness of regulatory takings actions. Defendant has not argued, nor established that the declaratory relief claim is not ripe insofar as non-takings theories are asserted.

II.                 Regulatory Taking

“Under Nollan and Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.” (Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist. (2013) 570 U.S. 595, 606, citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n (1987) 483 U. S. 825, 837 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U. S. 374, 391.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the charges “bear no nexus or rough proportionality to any identifiable adverse impacts caused by Little Woods by virtue of its application to the City for approval to exercise its right to cease operations.” (Complaint ⁋ 36.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot plead a regulatory taking because a reasonable user fee is not a taking if it is imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of government services, citing Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District, # 93 (9th Cir. 2024) 114 F.4th 1129, 1147 and U.S. v. Sperry Corp. (1989) 493 U.S. 52, 63.

Regardless of how the charges are categorized, Plaintiff alleged that the charges are unreasonable and that they bear no nexus or rough proportionality to any identifiable adverse impacts. So, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a taking. Any inquiry into the reasonableness of the charges or the nexus/proportionality of the charges would be improper on demurrer.

III.              Time Bar

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was required to challenge the August 5, 2024 Fee Resolution adopted by the city within 120 days of its effective date. Therefore, Plaintiff must have filed its challenge by December 3, 2024.

Government Code § 66022 provides,

(a)   Any judicial action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul an ordinance, resolution, or motion adopting a new fee or service charge, or modifying or amending an existing fee or service charge, adopted by a local agency, as defined in Section 66000, shall be commenced within 120 days of the effective date of the ordinance, resolution, or motion.

(Italics added.) It further provides, “(c) This section shall apply only to fees, capacity charges, and service charges described in and subject to Sections 66013, 66014, and 66016.”

Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. Plaintiff does not challenge the Fee Resolution as being unlawful. Plaintiff challenges the charges imposed by the City as being unlawful. The City is not alleged to have enacted the challenged fee by resolution pursuant to the procedures required by section 66016, including public dissemination of data concerning the cost of the fee. Accordingly, the time limits of Government Code § 66022 are not applicable here.

IV.              Unlawful Tax

Plaintiff alleges that the charges were unlawful taxes under the California Constitution, and that Defendant cannot meet its burden to show that “the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity,” or that “the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to [Little Woods] burdens on, or benefits received” from the City. If the exaction is a tax, then it required voter approval, which did not occur here.

Defendant argues that the alleged exaction is not a tax because it was “‘imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of conferring the benefit or granting the privilege.” Defendant also argues that the exaction is not a tax because it was “imposed for a specific government service or product provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service or product.”

As the Court previously explained in its prior tentative ruling, any inquiry into the reasonableness of the charges or the purposes for which they were imposed would require factual determinations to be made, which is not appropriate on demurrer.

Defendant argues in its supplemental brief that whether a government imposition is a tax or a fee is a question of law, which can be resolved based on the record before the Court at this time, including the legislation, the pleadings, and the judicially noticeable materials. The Court does not agree that such a determination can be made at this juncture. “‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.’…While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

None of the cases cited by Defendant to this point involved making such a determination on demurrer, nor did they involve the Court making such a determination without reviewing evidence. Each of them reviewed the trial court’s decision on either a petition for writ of mandate, judgment following trial, or a motion for summary judgment.

V.                Government Code § 65863.7(g)

Plaintiff alleges that the exaction violates Government Code § 65863.7(g) 65863.7(g). That provision requires the City to “establish reasonable fees” associated with park closure. To be “reasonable,” the City’s fees cannot “exceed[] the estimated amount required to provide the service for which the fee or service charge is levied.” (Gov. Code, § 66016(a).) Plaintiff alleges that the $199,880 exaction is unreasonable, because it “far exceed[s] reasonable estimates that Little Woods was able to obtain.”

Defendant argues that Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that the charges will exceed the actual cost for the City’s consultant to prepare the Impact Report or for the City to process Plaintiff’s application. Defendant has cited no authority requiring such factual allegations to be made in order to adequately state the cause of action. The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations to be sufficient. Finally, whether fees are reasonable under Government Code § 65863.7(g) is a factual question that is not appropriate for determination on demurrer.

VI.              Right to Petition

Plaintiff contends that the $199,880 exaction unconstitutionally burdens Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the City for an approval that would allow Plaintiff to exercise its right to close. As argued, requiring Plaintiff to pay a substantial fee as the precondition of securing approval chills Plaintiff’s petition rights.

Defendant argues that “courts routinely uphold reasonable permit, filing, and processing fees even where the permitting process includes public hearings, quasi-adjudicative procedures, and public opposition.” (Italics added.) However, Plaintiff alleges that the charges imposed here were unreasonable and disproportionate. Considering the standard on demurrer, Defendant’s argument is not persuasive.

In its supplemental brief, Defendant cites Cox v. State of New Hampshire (1941) 312 U.S. 569 and Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 312 to argue that these decisions recognize that permit fees tied to the government’s actual costs are constitutional. However, again, the cases cited by Defendant do not involve the Court’s inquiry on demurrer. Rather, the decisions were rendered after consideration of the evidence supporting government’s position. Any such evidence cannot be considered by the Court on this motion. Defendant’s citation to Chorn v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1370, to argue that the First Amendment does not require that hearings be cost-free at City Hall or at the courthouse is not persuasive. Plaintiff is not raising such an allegation.

 

4.         25CV04448, Perez v. Ford Motor Company

Defendant Hansel Ford of Petaluma’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Defendant’s request for stay is DENIED.

Defendant’s counsel shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312.

Analysis:

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company (manufacturer) and Hansel Ford of Petaluma (dealer) arising out of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 17, 2021, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant Ford Motor Co. regarding a 2021 Ford Bronco Sport. Plaintiff’s allegations against Ford Motor Co. arise out of this warranty and alleged fraudulent inducement-concealment.

Plaintiff alleges one cause of action against Hansel Ford of Petaluma for negligent repair, alleging that Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to Hansel Ford for substantial repair on at least one occasion, that Hansel owed a duty to Plaintiff to use ordinary care and skill to repair the vehicle, that Hansel breached this duty by failing to do so, and that such breach was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages.

Defendant Hansel Ford of Petaluma seeks to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims based on the arbitration provision included in the Retail Installment Sales Contract entered into between the parties when Plaintiff purchased the same vehicle from Defendant. The arbitration provision provides, in part,

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.

(Decl. of Trina M. Clayton, Ex. A, p. 5.)

I.                    Defendant Has Shown the Existence of an Arbitration Agreement that Applies to this Dispute

“The party seeking to compel arbitration has the initial burden to plead and prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement that applies to the dispute. Once that burden is satisfied, the party opposing arbitration must prove any defense to the agreement’s enforcement, such as unconscionability.” (Dennison v. Rosland Cap. LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 204, 209.) “Because arbitration is a matter of contract, the general rule is that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to invoke or be bound by its terms.” (Enmark v. KF Community Care, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463, 471.)

Defendant argues that based upon the terms of the arbitration provision of the sales contract, Hansel Ford can elect to arbitrate any claim brought by Plaintiff relating to the vehicle, including the tort claim raised by Plaintiff which directly relates to the condition of the vehicle. The Court agrees. The terms of the arbitration clause are broad and apply to any claims regarding the “condition of the vehicle.”

Plaintiff raises two arguments in opposition to this motion. First, that Defendant has failed to properly authenticate the sales contract and, second, that Plaintiff’s claim against this defendant is outside the scope of the arbitration provision under Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122.

Regarding Plaintiff’s first argument, “The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial [prima facie] burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–544.) Defendant has done so. Defendant has met its prima facie burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties. To the extent Plaintiff challenges the authenticity of his signature on the document, it is his burden to submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute. He has not done so. “A party opposing arbitration by challenging the authenticity of his or her signature ‘need not prove that his or her purported signature is not authentic, but must submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent.’” (Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at 52.) “[A] denial of signing an arbitration agreement is sufficient to shift the burden.” (Ibid.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s second argument, that the claim is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122 (“Ochoa”) is inapplicable here. In Ochoa, the plaintiffs alleged defects in cars they purchased, but they did not sue the dealerships, they only sued the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company. (Id. at 1125-1126.) Then Ford, a non-signatory to the sales contracts, claimed it was entitled to compel arbitration by relying on the arbitration provisions in the sales contracts between the buyers and the seller dealerships. The Court rejected this argument finding that since the plaintiffs’ claims were not intimately founded in or intertwined with the sale contracts, the plaintiffs should not be estopped from pursuing remedies against Ford in court.

That is not the case here. Here, unlike in Ochoa, Plaintiff sues the seller dealership in tort. Hansel Ford is a signatory to the contract and seeks to compel arbitration based on the agreement entered into by Hansel Ford and Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff argues that the critical holding in Ochoa is not limited to the question of who may enforce the arbitration clause, but extends to the foundational question of what disputes the clause covers. As argued by Plaintiff, the court made clear that warranty-related disputes are not arbitrable through the sales contract simply because a vehicle was purchased pursuant to that contract. The Court does not agree that the holding of Ochoa can or should be extended so broadly. However, even if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s interpretation of Ochoa, Plaintiff has not alleged that the repair negligently conducted by Hansel Ford was a warranty repair. The complaint alleges only that Plaintiff delivered the vehicle to Hansel Ford “for substantial repair on at least one occasion.” Nevertheless, even if such allegation were made, the Court would not agree with Plaintiff’s position. The Ochoa Court did not speak whatsoever on the viability of arbitrating warranty claims between two signatories to an arbitration agreement nor on whether an agreement to arbitration claims based on the “condition of the vehicle” extends only to those claims performed outside of warranty. This Court does not find that the language of the arbitration agreement lends itself to such an interpretation. Plaintiff has not presented a compelling defense to enforcement of the arbitration agreement.

II.                 Stay of Claims Against Ford Motor Co.

Defendant argues that since the parties expressly agreed that the FAA shall govern, and since the FAA procedural rules require the state action to be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration, the remaining claims against Ford Motor Co. must be stayed pending the arbitration of the claims against Hansel Ford.

The arbitration provision provides, in pertinent part, “Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” The arbitration provision does not contain express language stating that the FAA procedural rules shall apply.

The CAA arbitration rules apply by default to cases brought in California. (Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582.) The FAA procedural rules may apply if the parties expressly agree that they do or if the FAA’s procedural rules are preempted. (Ibid.) Absent an express designation, the FAA’s procedural provisions do not apply in state court. (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 174.) An agreement to arbitrate that does not specify whether the intent to follow the FAA applies to “substantive, procedural, or both types of the FAA’s provisions” is “fatal” to claims that the procedural provisions of the FAA apply. (Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove, LLC (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 267, 280.)

Here, the arbitration provision does not specify whether the intent for the FAA to “govern” applies to the substantive, procedural, or both types of the FAA provisions. Without such an express designation, the FAA procedural rules do not apply. Therefore, 9 U.S.C. § 3, which requires a stay pending the arbitration does not apply here.

The Court is not otherwise persuaded to stay the action against Ford Motor Co. pending the arbitration against Hansel Ford. The claims against the two parties are different. The claims against Ford Motor Co. involve the warranty and alleged fraudulent inducement-concealment while the claim against Hansel Ford involves a tort that does not reference the warranty whatsoever. Accordingly, the request for stay is denied.

 

5.         SCV-269767, Ravioli LLC v. Master Bango

Petitioner/Cross-Complainant Master Bango’s petition to vacate arbitration award is DENIED.

Counsel for Respondents/Cross-Defendants shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312.

Analysis:

On December 1, 2021, Plaintiffs, Ravioli LLC, Spaghetti LLC, and Tortellini LLC, initiated this action against Defendants Master Bango and Ronald Ferraro alleging several causes of action arising out of Defendants’ alleged breach of the parties’ contract, labeled “Bulk Flower Purchase Agreement” (hereafter, “Purchase Agreement”) The Purchase Agreement provides that seller agrees to sell and buyer agrees to buy bulk cannabis flower of the types, prices, and quantities specified in Section E. Section E provides a list of the products, quantities, and prices to be purchased from which entities. The entities listed as providers of these products include Fettuccine LLC, Farfalle LLC, Gnocchi LLC, Rigatoni LLC, Linguini LLC, Spaghetti LLC, Tortellini LLC, Penne LLC, and Ravioli LLC. The Purchase Agreement also contains an arbitration clause. The Purchase Agreement is signed by Ronald Ferrero on behalf of Defendant, Master Bongo Inc., and by Peter Simon, CEO of “Seller,” which is identified as “Pasta Farm.”

On October 11, 2022, Defendant Master Bango Inc. (“Master Bango”) filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiffs alleging several causes of action arising out of Plaintiffs’ alleged breaches of the same Purchase Agreement, which was attached to the Cross-Complaint.

On February 16, 2024, Master Bango filed arbitration demands against four other entities listed in the Purchase Agreement: Rigatoni LLC, Linguini LLC, Farfalle LLC, and Gnocchi LLC, alleging breaches by them of the same Purchase Agreement.

On November 6, 2024, this Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs (Ravioli LLC, Spaghetti LLC, and Tortellini LLC)’s motion to compel arbitration. The Court found that Plaintiffs had shown an enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties. However, since Plaintiffs had litigated their case against Master Bango for years before bringing the motion, the Court found that the right to compel arbitration had been waived by them.

On September 24, 2025, Master Bango filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint adding as cross-defendants Pasta Farm (several “Pasta Farm” entities alleged), Fettucine LLC, Penne LLC, Farfalle LLC, Gnocchi LLC, Rigatoni LLC, Linguini LLC, and Ziti LLC.

After being added into this litigation, Cross-Defendants Farfalle LLC, Gnocchi LLC, Fettuccine LLC, Linguine LLC, Rigatoni LLC, Penne LLC, Ziti LLC, and Pasta Farm moved the Court for an order compelling Master Bango’s claims against them into arbitration. The Court granted this motion.

After having initiated arbitration against the above-noted parties, on June 10, 2025, Master Bango withdrew its claims against them. However, Linguini LLC, Rigatoni LLC, Gnocchi LLC, Farfalle LLC, Penne LLC and Fettuccini LLC (“Respondents”) moved the Arbitrator for summary disposition of a claim pursuant to Rule 18 of the JAMS rules. Respondents sought declaratory relief to establish that since Petitioner abandoned its affirmative claims under the Purchase Agreement, there remained no liability as to contractual claims that it might otherwise have under the Purchase Agreement pertaining to the claims asserted in the consolidated Arbitration proceedings. The Arbitrator awarded Respondents with the declaratory relief requested, as well as attorney’s fees and costs after determining them to be the prevailing party.

Petitioner now seeks to vacate the Arbitrator’s award, arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded the powers afforded to the Arbitrator under the parties’ arbitration agreement. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the Arbitrator did not exceed his powers.

I.                    Review of an Arbitration Award is Strictly Limited

“As the courts of this state have repeatedly emphasized, the merits of a controversy that has been submitted to arbitration are not subject to judicial review. This means that we may not review the validity of the arbitrator's reasoning, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award, or any errors of fact or law that may be included in the award. [Citation.] Judicial review is severely limited because that result ‘vindicates the intentions of the parties that the award be final, and because an arbitrator is not ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law....’ (Ibid.)” [Citation.] The exclusive grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards are those found in the statutes governing arbitration. [Citations.] Otherwise, arbitration awards are immune from judicial review in proceedings to confirm or challenge the award.”

(Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 825.) CCP § 1286.2 provides that subject to Section 1286.4 (setting forth procedural requirements), the court shall vacate an arbitration award if it determines any of the following:

(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.

(2) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators.

(3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.

(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.

(5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.

(6) An arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision. However, this subdivision does not apply to arbitration proceedings conducted under a collective bargaining agreement between employers and employees or between their respective representatives.

“Every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of an arbitration award.” (Frantz v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Auto. Club (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 269, 273.) “A party seeking to set aside an arbitration award on account of error has the burden to affirmatively establish the existence of such error and the fact that it was prejudicial.” (Id. at 274.)

II.                 The Arbitrator Did Not Exceed His Powers

“An exception to the general rule assigning broad powers to the arbitrators arises when the parties have, in either the contract or an agreed submission to arbitration, explicitly and unambiguously limited those powers…‘The powers of an arbitrator derive from, and are limited by, the agreement to arbitrate. [Citation.] Awards in excess of those powers may, under sections 1286.2 and 1286.6, be corrected or vacated by the court.’

(San Francisco Housing Authority v. Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 790 (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 933, 943.)

Absent more specific restrictions in the arbitration agreement or the party's submission, the question on the trial court’s review of whether a remedy exceeds the arbitrator's powers (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)) is whether…the remedy imposed by the arbitrator was “even arguably based on the contract” (ibid) or, stated otherwise, whether the award “‘conflicts with express terms of the arbitrated contract.’”

(Id. at 943-945.)

“[T]he fact that an arbitrator arguably misinterpreted a contract does not mean that he did not engage in the act of interpreting it. As bears repeating, ‘so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.’

(Id. at 944-945.) The parties’ arbitration agreement provides as follows:

8. Disputes; Binding Arbitration. ALL DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO JAMS FOR ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO ITS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES, INCLUDING ITS EXPEDITED ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, WHICH ARE HEREBY ELECTED. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, AND ALL OF THE FEES AND COSTS OF THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE SHARED EQUALLY BY THE PARTIES. ATTORNEYS FEES MAY BE AWARDED TO THE PREVAILING PARTY AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ARBITRATOR, BUT THE ARBITRATOR SHALL HAVE NO POWER TO ALTER OR AMEND THIS AGREEMENT OR TO AWARD ANY RELIEF INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS HEREIN OR UNAVAILABLE IN A COURT OF LAW.

Petitioner herein argues that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when granting Respondents’ request for declaration that they have no remaining liability to Master Bango because historically such a declaration would not have been available in a court of law. Petitioner argues that the arbitration provision expressly limits the arbitrator’s power to award relief that is available in “a court of law” and not relief that is available in a court of equity.

To support this argument, Petitioner cites law that describes the history of separate law and equity courts to argue that declaratory relief actions did not exist at common law and declaratory relief developed as an equitable remedy. As such, Petitioner argues that declaratory relief actions are not available in a court of law; therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his authority in granting it.

This argument is unpersuasive. Petitioner has not established that this contract was entered into during the historical time frame when there exited separate courts of law and equity. Accordingly, without more to indicate as such, the Court will not assume that the parties intended for the contract to be interpreted under historical contexts. Moreover, declaratory relief actions are not per se equitable in nature, as Petitioner argues. Rather, they “may raise either legal or equitable issues.” (Entin v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 770, 777.)

Regardless of whether Respondent’s declaratory relief claim was in fact equitable in nature, this Court does not agree that the Arbitrator did not have the power to adjudicate it. Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the language of the arbitration provision did not “expressly forbid” the Arbitrator from deciding issues grounded in equity. The most reasonable interpretation of the arbitration provision is the simplest one: that the Arbitrator lacked the authority to award any relief unavailable in a modern court of law, which in California is of general jurisdiction having the power to decide issues of law and equity. (Jo Redland Trust, U.A.D. 4-6-05 v. CIT Bank, N.A. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 142, 165.) Declaratory relief would have been available in a California court; therefore, the Arbitrator did not exceed his authority in granting it.

Petitioner cites O’Flaherty v. Belgum (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1044 as being on point. There, in a partnership dispute where the arbitration provision expressly prohibited the arbitrator from granting any remedy prohibited by the agreement or “not available in a court of law,” the Court found the Arbitrator to have exceeded his authority by declaring a forfeiture of the withdrawing partners’ capital accounts.  (Id. at 1047.) The Court found that a forfeiture is contrary to the provisions of the partnership agreement and contrary to partnership law and decisional law. It was for these reasons that the Court found the Arbitrator to have exceeded his authority. The O’Flaherty case is distinguished here because partnership law is not at dispute and because declaratory relief is a remedy available in a California court of law. 

In so far as Petitioner argues that the Arbitrator was erroneous in his determination that assuming jurisdiction over the declaratory relief claim was appropriate because the claim did not only involve past wrongs, but involved facts that could affect future conduct, this Court will not address the merit of that determination. Such a determination was within the power of the Arbitrator according to the terms of the arbitration agreement. Whether such determination was made in error is not a question that can be answered by this Court.

Finally, Petitioner argues that if Master Bango’s contract claims against Respondents were time-barred, then Respondents’ request for a declaration that Master Bango’s claims were time-barred was also time-barred. This argument is unpersuasive. The case cited by Petitioner in support of this argument, Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. (1944) 23 Cal2d 719, is not applicable here as it does not involve same or even similar facts.

III.              The Court Declines to Address the Validity of the Arbitrator’s Decisions on Contested Issues of Law or Fact

Petitioner argues that Respondents were not the prevailing party simply because they were granted declaratory relief; that the final award improperly granted Respondents fees incurred by different parties in the litigation; that Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was inconsistent with the Agreement; and that Respondent’s request for costs was contrary to the Agreement.

Inherent in the broad powers of the arbitrator “is the possibility the arbitrator may err in deciding some aspect of the case. Arbitrators do not ordinarily exceed their contractually created powers simply by reaching an erroneous conclusion on a contested issue of law or fact, and arbitral awards may not ordinarily be vacated because of such error, for ‘ “[t]he arbitrator's resolution of these issues is what the parties bargained for in the agreement.” ’

(San Francisco Housing Authority v. Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 790 (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 933, 943.)

Petitioner has not established that any of the conditions of CCP § 1286.2(a) exist here. This Court may not review the validity of the arbitrator's reasoning, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award, or any errors of fact or law that may be included in the award.  (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at 825.) It was within the Arbitrator’s powers to make such determinations. This Court declines to speak on whether such determinations were made in error.

 

6.         25CV01337, Bushman v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.

Defendant Volkswagen Group of America (“VGA”)’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s deposition is GRANTED. Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,488.50 to be paid by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel jointly. Plaintiff’s deposition shall take place no later than August 18, 2026.

Defendants’ counsel shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312. 

Analysis:

On February 18, 2026, Defendant Volkswagen Group of America (“VGA”) served its Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Ethan P. Bushman, setting Plaintiff's deposition for March 5, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. On February 20, 2026, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel and asked counsel to confirm whether Plaintiff was available on the noticed date and, if not, to provide Plaintiff’s deposition availability within the next month.

On February 27, 2026, Plaintiff served objections to VGA’s February 18, 2026 deposition notice. Those objections asserted that the deposition had been unilaterally noticed on a date and time on which Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel was unavailable, that Plaintiff would not be produced on the noticed date, and that Plaintiff would meet and confer to reschedule. Plaintiff did not appear for deposition on March 5th. On March 10, 2026, Defendant’s counsel sent a meet-and-confer letter regarding Plaintiff's nonappearance and the need to proceed promptly with Plaintiff’s deposition. Also on March 10, 2026, VGA served a second deposition notice. On March 17, 2026, Plaintiff served objections to the March 10, 2026 deposition notice on the same grounds as before. Also on March 17, 2026, Gabriella Nurhapy of Plaintiff’s counsel's office emailed me and stated: “We are currently working to obtain dates for Plaintiff’s deposition and will circle back shortly.”

No dates were provided after that March 17, 2026 email. On March 25, 2026, Defendant’s counsel sent a further meet-and-confer letter to Plaintiff’s counsel requesting that Plaintiff provide dates no later than March 30, 2026, in light of the approaching April 29, 2026 discovery cutoff, and advised that VGA would move to compel if no dates were provided. Plaintiff did not respond to that letter.

On April 15, 2026, after still receiving no response to the March 25, 2026 letter, Defendant’s counsel telephoned Plaintiff’s counsel’s office at the number listed on counsel’s papers and left a voicemail requesting dates for Plaintiff's deposition. He did not receive a return call or any other response. This motion to compel the deposition followed.

Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing that it is moot because the parties have now agreed to a date for Plaintiff’s deposition, August 18, 2026. However, since Plaintiff’s deposition has still not occurred, the motion is not moot. It is clear from the fact that Plaintiff did not respond with an available date until after this motion was filed that this motion was necessary to obtain Plaintiff’s compliance with normal discovery procedure. Over a year passed between the first notice of deposition and the time when Plaintiff finally provided an available date.

Sanctions are warranted pursuant to CCP § 2025.450(g)(1). Plaintiff’s argument that the delay was the result of scheduling logistics in a high-volume practice is not compelling. Rather, it indicates to the Court that the delay was caused by Plaintiff’s counsel’s failures and, thus, the monetary sanctions should be imposed jointly against counsel.

Defendant requests $2,488.50 in monetary sanctions. The Court finds the amount of sanctions requested to be reasonable. The Court also finds it warranted to impose these sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel jointly pursuant to CCP § 2023.030(a) for the reasons stated above.

 

7-8.      24CV00705, Anthony v. Whitmire

Plaintiff’s motion for correction of misnomer concerning Diane Whitmire, amending record to Rebecca Whitmire, and for judgment by default is DENIED.

Counsel for Defendant shall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with Rule 3.1312.

The Court previously issued a tentative ruling denying this motion for the same reasons stated below. However, the Court did not adopt the tentative ruling after Plaintiff appeared at oral argument and requested an opportunity to cure the defects. The Court continued the hearing date a number of times to accommodate Plaintiff’s requested continuances. The motion has now been pending for more than a year and the defects have not been cured.

Plaintiff filed a “Continuation Motion for Misnomer” on July 1, 2026, which appears to be a supplemental brief in support of the motion. The brief contains 17 pages of additional factual allegations and argument. The Court did not grant Plaintiff leave to file an oversized brief. Nevertheless, the brief does not address or cure any of the defects previously outlined by the Court. Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Plaintiff’s Motion is Procedurally Deficient

California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1112(a) provides, “Unless otherwise provided by the rules in this division, the papers filed in support of a motion must consist of at least the following:

(1) A notice of hearing on the motion;

(2) The motion itself; and

(3) A memorandum in support of the motion or demurrer.”

Rule 3.1112(d) provides, “A motion must:

(1) Identify the party or parties bringing the motion;

(2) Name the parties to whom it is addressed;

(3) Briefly state the basis for the motion and the relief sought; and

(4) If a pleading is challenged, state the specific portion challenged.”

Plaintiff failed to include a notice of hearing on the motion. Plaintiff also failed to comply with the requirements of subdivision (d). These procedural deficiencies are grounds alone for denial of the motion.

Moreover, Plaintiff seeks permission to correct a “misnomer.” Plaintiff alleges that his identification of Diane Whitmire as a defendant was a “misnomer” because the name of the individual he meant to sue is Rebecca Whitmire. This request is in essence a request to amend the complaint to substitute the name Rebecca Whitmire for Diane Whitmire. However, Plaintiff has failed to comply with any of the procedural requirements for a motion to amend a pleading.

According to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, a motion for leave to amend a pleading before trial must,

(1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

The motion must also be accompanied by a separate declaration that must specify,

(1) The effect of the amendment;

(2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.

Plaintiff has failed to comply with either of these requirements.

Plaintiff’s Motion Also Fails on the Merits

Plaintiff first seeks to replace the named defendant Diane Whitmire with Rebecca Whitmire. As explained above, while not titled as such, this request is essentially a motion for leave to amend the complaint to change the name of a party. For the reasons explained above, this request is denied. Insofar as Plaintiff argues that this motion is not a motion for leave to amend the complaint, Plaintiff has failed to cite any authority that would allow this Court to simply replace the name of a party within the record without an amended pleading being filed. Such would be impractical. Plaintiff has cited the case of Davies v. Elsby Bros. Ltd. (1960) 3 All E.R. 672 without providing any quotations. This case is an English Court of Appeals case. Therefore, it is neither controlling nor persuasive authority.

Plaintiff also seeks for this court to enter default judgment against Rebecca Whitmire. Rebecca Whitmire is neither named in the original complaint nor the First Amended Complaint. Where a party is never named as a proper party, the trial court has no jurisdiction over it, including entering judgment against it. (Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311.) This request is denied.

I.                   Status Hearing Regarding Compliance with Discovery Orders

On March 4, 2026, the Court set this matter for a status hearing regarding compliance with discovery orders. The appearances of the parties are REQUIRED in order to update the Court.

***This is the end of the Tentative Rulings***