Family Law Tentative Rulings

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

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TENTATIVE RULINGS

LAW & MOTION CALENDAR

Thursday, January 16, 2025 9:00 a.m.

Courtroom 21 –Hon. Kinna Patel Crocker

3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa CA 95403

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521 - 6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties/counsel of their intent to appear.

1. 24FL00749 Starling v. Starling

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED BY COUNSEL MIGACHYOV GRANTED.
 

2. 24FL00845 Robles v. Pertez Robles

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED BY COUNSEL VIGARINO DROPPED AS MOOT. A substitution of attorney was filed on January 13, 2025 and Counsel Vigarino is no longer attorney of record.
 

3. 24FL01836 Costa v. Caldwell
   MOTION TO QUASH PROCEEDINGS GRANTED.

Facts

            Petitioner filed his Petition to Determine Parental Relationship on September 9, 2024, seeking to establish a parental relationship to the minor child (the “Child”).  He alleges that the Child was the result of sexual intercourse in this state and lives or is found in this county.  He seeks joint legal custody.

            On September 9, 2024, Petitioner filed a Declaration Under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) stating that the Child was born in Palo Alto, California on February 3, 2022 and currently lives with Petitioner in Santa Rosa, California, having lived with Respondent in Minneapolis, Minnesota immediately prior to September 8, 2024. 

            Respondent filed her UCCJEA declaration on October 17, 2024.  In it, she also states that the Child was born in Palo Alto, California, and that the Child has lived with Petitioner in Santa Rosa since September 8, 2024, having lived with Respondent in Minneapolis immediately prior to September 8, 2024. 

Motion

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Quash Proceedings, Respondent moves the court to quash the petition on the grounds that California lacks jurisdiction.  She bases this argument on the assertion that, although the Child was born in California and first lived in California, the Child lived in Minnesota the majority of her life and only recently has been living in California since September 8, 2024.

            There is no opposition.

Applicable Authority

            Family Code section 3421 provides that a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if certain facts are present. In relevant part, section 3421(a)(1) provides jurisdiction if California is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding. Family Code section 3402(c) defines the home state as the state in which a child lived with a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.

Further, Family Code section 3424(a) provides California with temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state, and it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child. Family Code section 3424(d) provides that if California has been asked to make a child custody determination and a child custody proceeding has commenced in a state having jurisdiction, the California court is required to communicate with the other court immediately to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.

Service and Notice

            The court previously continued this motion because Respondent did not file a complete proof of service. However, the parties appeared at a hearing on January 13, 2025, resulting from Petitioner’s Request for Order filed on November 1, 2024 wherein he requested child custody and visitation orders.  The court inquired of Petitioner and determined that he had in fact been properly served with this motion. Petitioner then waived any defects in service.

Motion to Quash

            At the commencement of the California proceeding filed by Petitioner on September 9, 2024, the UCCJEA forms filed by both parties indicate the Child lived in Minneapolis, Minnesota for the 6 months prior to September 8, 2024. Thus, Minnesota is the home state of the Child. Further, the parties testified at the hearing on January 13, 2025 that the Child was visiting Petitioner for an agreed upon 3 weeks. Respondent testified that Petitioner refused to return the Child to Minnesota and kept the Child for over 3 months. The court then declared it had emergency jurisdiction due to Petitioner’s withholding of the Child. The court ordered the Child to be returned to Respondent in Minnesota no later than January 16, 2025 at 10pm and share the cost equally for the Child’s travel. The court also, under Family Code section 3424(d) had a conversation with Judge Lucas in Hennepin County, Minneapolis, Minnesota regarding the jurisdictional question. Judge Lucas confirmed that proceedings were active in Minnesota regarding child custody and visitation. Judge Lucas also agreed that Minnesota is the home state of the Child and as such jurisdiction is proper there.

Conclusion

            The court GRANTS the motion and California’s emergency jurisdiction shall terminate upon the court adopting this tentative ruling.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

4. SFL64926 Reyes v. Reyes

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED BY COUNSEL BERREY CONTINUED TO APRIL 17, 2025 AT 9AM IN DEPARTMENT 21.
 

5. SFL087736  Ibarra v. Ibarra
   MOTION TO SET ASIDE DENIED.

Facts  

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage without minor children on February 4, 2021.  The matter eventually went to a contested trial on December 28, 2023, after which the court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) on February 6, 2024. 

            The Judgment made a division of property and a determination as to attorneys’ fees and costs as set forth in the attachment to the Judgment (the “Judgment Attachment”).  The court reserved spousal support for future determination.  Amongst other property issues, as specified in the Judgment Attachment, the court at sections 4.1 through 4.9 determined that Respondent would buy out Petitioner’s interest in the family residence at 8819 Cellar Way, Windsor, California (the “House”) by paying her $242,600 (the “Buyout Amount”) once he obtained the necessary funding.  The court also ordered Respondent to pay Petitioner the Buyout Amount no later than January 8, 2024.  The court ordered that Respondent would at that point receive the House as his sole and separate property.  It ordered Petitioner to vacate the House by ninety days from the date of the payment or April 7, 2024.  The court ordered that Petitioner would not be liable for rent for that 90-day period from the payment of the Buyout Amount.  Section 7.5 of the Judgment Attachment also states, in full, “Attorney Fees and Action to Enforce or Modify Judgment.  The prevailing party in any action or proceeding to enforce or modify any provision of this Judgment, or any corresponding provision of a subsequent judgment into which the provision is merged, will be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.”  Section 9.7 of the Judgment Attachment states, “Retention of Jurisdiction.  The court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter to enforce the provisions of this Judgment as well as the issue of division of property, reimbursements and other debts, and spousal support for both parties.”  The Judgment form also states, “Jurisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment.”  Section 9.14 of the Judgment Attachment states “Breach.  If any provision of this Judgment is breached, the non-breaching party has a right to remedy the breach. If the breach involves money that is due, the nonbreaching party has the right to collect money as well as the legal interest on it. Should an action for breach be brought and proved, the breaching party will pay all reasonable attorney fees and other expenses that the non-breaching party has incurred in bringing the action.”

            In addition to other hearings, Petitioner filed a motion for change of spousal support on June 25, 2024.  At the hearing on that motion, the court denied the motion because it found no change in circumstances.

            Respondent filed a Request for Order and Motion for Reimbursement of Rent/Expenses, Request for Sanctions, and Enforcement of Attorneys and Costs under Judgment filed on 2/6/2024 (the “Reimbursement Motion”).  However, at the original hearing on September 6, 2024, the court continued the motion to October 18, 2024 due to a lack of briefing and failure of the moving party to provide points and authorities, or to explain the legal basis for the motion and relief requested.  At the later hearing, the court granted the Reimbursement Motion and entered the Findings and Order After Hearing to that effect on October 29, 2024 (the “Reimbursement Order”).  Petitioner had filed written opposition to the motion but no party requested a hearing to contest the tentative ruling, which the court adopted when granting the motion. 

            Amongst other things, in the proceedings on the Reimbursement Motion, this court found that the parties agreed to electronic service.  
 

Motion

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside, Petitioner moves the court to set aside the Reimbursement Order.  She bases the motion in part on assertions regarding the underlying merits of the Reimbursement Motion, including factual claims and arguments which she had already made in opposition the motion.  She also contends that she did not know that she was required to call the court to contest the tentative ruling or appear at the hearing.  

            Respondent opposes the motion.  He argues that Petitioner in part is bringing a defective motion for reconsideration without providing any required new facts, law or circumstances, and that there is no basis for Petitioner’s claim that she was unaware of the procedural requirements for challenging the tentative ruling.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically motions to vacate pursuant to CCP section 473.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

Reconsideration

            Respondent correctly argues in part that Petitioner is bringing a defective motion for reconsideration, despite the name of the motion and her failure to cite any supporting authority.  Most of her argument is devoted to relitigating the facts underlying the Reimbursement Motion, and even factual issues and the history of the proceedings in this case prior to that motion, and this is largely just a repetition of arguments and issues raised in the underlying motion and the prior proceedings. 

The motion for reconsideration must be brought within 10 days of the service of notice of the entry of order.  Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1008.   The deadline is extended under the provisions of CCP section 1013.  Forrest v. State of California Dept. of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 203.  CCP section 1013 extends the deadline by 5 calendar days where service is by mail or 2 calendar days where service is by express mail. 

A party seeking reconsideration must first demonstrate new facts, law, or circumstances that were not previously considered.  CCP section 1008(a); Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 692.  The moving party must also provide an adequate explanation why the new information was not provided earlier.  Garcia, supra; Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.  The need for an explanation is a requirement for due diligence.  Gilberd, supra.  Mere lack of a chance to make oral argument is not a valid basis for a motion for reconsideration.  Garcia, 691; Gilberd, 1500.  In addition, decisions such as Film Packages, Inc. v. Brandywine Film Productions, Ltd. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 824, at 829, and Pender v. Radin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1807, at 1811-1812, ruled that evidence was “new” since it was since obtained through discovery and could not reasonably have been provided earlier.

Timeliness

As a motion for reconsideration, this motion is untimely.  The record shows that the court entered the Reimbursement Order on October 29, 2024 and Respondent served Petitioner with the notice of entry of that order on November 5, 2024.  Petitioner filed this motion on December 2, 2024, long after the 10-day deadline had expired.

New Facts, Law, or Circumstances

Petitioner also presents no new facts, law, or circumstances as required for reconsideration.  She repeats issues, facts, and arguments made previously in the litigation, including in her opposition to the Reimbursement Motion.  As far as the court can discern, she already presented these facts and arguments, at least in their basic import, even if some minor details may vary.  She offers no explanation as to what “new” facts, law or circumstances she could demonstrate.  To the extent that she does present anything which is different from that presented already, she does not demonstrate how it is “new” for the purposes of reconsideration since on its face everything appears to be information which she already possessed and which she in fact earlier could have presented to the court.  She also does not explain why she could not have presented anything else to the court in her opposition.

Merits of Reconsideration

Even if the court were to find that Petitioner has satisfied the requirements for reconsideration, or if the court were to consider acting on its own inherent powers, the court also finds that Petitioner presents no information which would warrant reconsidering the Reimbursement Motion, much less altering the decision.  Again, the information and arguments she presents are fundamentally a repetition of matters already litigated and at most only minor and immaterial details that may vary from what Petitioner has already presented to the court. 
 

Vacating the Reimbursement Order Pursuant to CCP section 473

That said, Petitioner also presents a request to vacate the order based on her failure to appear at the hearing, which arguably is an imperfect request to vacate pursuant to CCP section 473.  CCP section 473(b) allows plaintiffs and defendants to set aside dismissals or defaults.  This motion must normally be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed 6 months from the date the order was entered.  CCP section 473(b). 

An order setting aside the default is discretionary where based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  Id.  There is also a policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits and the motion to vacate should be granted if the moving party shows a credible, excusable explanation.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227.  The provision should be liberally construed in order to afford relief.   See, e.g., Goodson v. Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32;  Hansen v. Hansen (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 327;  Reed v. Williamson (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 244.

The provision of this section authorizing court to relieve party from a judgment or order resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is remedial in its nature and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their merits.  Ramsey Trucking Co. v. Mitchell (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862.

“Surprise” is “some condition or situation in which a party... is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”  Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Calif. v. National Independent Business Alliance  (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173.

“Excusable neglect” comes down to whether the moving party has shown a reasonable excuse for the default.  Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.  The moving party must show that the default would not have been avoided through ordinary care.  Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513.  The test ultimately is thus one of reasonable diligence.  Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58.  A showing that the defendant was unable to understand what he was served with is sufficient to justify relief.  Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208.  Another valid basis is if the defendant mislaid or misfiled the papers and as a result failed to obtain an attorney in time.  Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686.  Simply forgetting about the lawsuit or being too “busy” is not adequate.  Andrews v. Jacoby (1919) 39 Cal.App. 382, 383-384.  Excusable neglect by attorneys includes situations where, despite reasonable supervision, an attorney’s secretary misfiled papers or failed to enter an appearance date.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234; Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273.

Significant health problems or family tragedies may be sufficient to support a showing of  mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4^th 1128 (death of a son is sufficient excuse); Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208; Fink & Schindler Co. v. Gavros (1925) 72 Cal.App.688 (illness sufficient excuse where party had tried to hire attorney before falling ill).

In this instance, Petitioner claims that the court must vacate the Reimbursement Order because she was not allowed to present argument at the hearing.   She asserts that this resulted from the fact that she did not fully understand the requirement that she call in and notify both the court and Respondent of the intent to appear at the hearing.

The argument is not persuasive.  She simply relies on the fact that she did not have an attorney and was self represented.  However, she has been involved in this litigation for some time and has already acted without an attorney.  Moreover, the court’s requirements for notice to the court and to the opposing party are clearly set forth and evident to anyone acting with sufficient diligence.  They are also clearly understandable and logical, particularly to anyone who has already been active in litigation.  Petitioner offers no explanation as to why she did not understand the requirements, much less why this failure was reasonable as opposed to a result of her lack of diligence.  

Finally, as explained above with respect to reconsideration, Petitioner offers nothing which would alter the decision.  Accordingly, vacating the Reimbursement Order would be a futile act, even if Petitioner had demonstrated sufficient basis for vacating it, which she has failed to do. 
 

Conclusion

The court DENIES the motion in full.  The court also, however, denies Respondent’s requests for sanctions as the court does not find Petitioner’s motion to qualify for such sanctions.

The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
 

6. SFL089930 Zeng v. Wang
   MOTION TO CLASSIFY RESPONDENT AS VEXATIOUS LITIGANT GRANTED.

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor child on December 23, 2011 and she filed an amended petition on January 27, 2012.  The parties’ child (the “Child”), born September 19, 2010, is currently still a minor.  Petitioner currently has sole legal and physical custody of the Child.  The parties have engaged in extensive litigation, including at the appellate level, and particularly since this court issued a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) against Respondent.

 

Motion           

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion for an Order to Classify Respondent as a Vexatious Litigant, Petitioner moves the court to declare Respondent a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 391 and issue a pre-filing order pursuant to CCP section 391.7 requiring Respondent to obtain leave of the presiding judge before filing any new litigation while he is appearing in propria persona.  She contends that Respondent has been repeatedly relitigating the same issues in the trial court and appellate court, filing six appeals in two months, and with the matters repeatedly being resolved against him except for those currently pending.  

            Respondent opposes the motion.  In his opposition, Respondent raises arguments and facts going to the fundamental merits of each party’s claims on issues such as child support and custody or the validity of prior motions and other litigation already decided in this case.  In effect, he is simply relitigating the underlying issues in this dispute and claiming that various decisions against him in this litigation were incorrectly decided.  For example, he contends that “[t]he real issue is whether Sonoma Court’s sole custody order… should be gradually modified.,” while claiming that Petitioner misled the court in Orange County when seeking change of venue, has been alienating the Child from him, and has failed to let the Child have a say in decisions regarding her.  See, e.g., Opposition 2-4.  He argues at length that orders which keep him physically separated from the Child violate his constitutional rights.  Opposition 5-13.  He also contends that he has taken steps to protect the Child’s privacy rights.  Opposition 13.  Respondent offers no counter to Petitioner’s factual assertions, does not dispute her recitation of the litigation history, and makes no effort to explain his litigation conduct or the bases for it.  Nothing which he raises goes to the merits of this motion. 

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022.

Vexatious Litigants

Pursuant to CCP section 391, et seq., a court may declare a party meeting certain criteria to be a “vexatious litigant” and accordingly impose certain specified restraints on that party’s ability to litigate when self-represented.  CCP section 391 sets forth the applicable definitions for the title governing vexatious litigants, including the different definitions of “vexatious litigant.”  Subdivision (a) states that ‘“Litigation” means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court.’  Subdivision (d) sets forth the different circumstances under which one qualifies as a “vexatious litigant.”  It states, in pertinent part and with emphasis added,

(b) “Vexatious litigant” means a person who does any of the following:

(1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.

(3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

(5) After being restrained pursuant to a restraining order issued after a hearing pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6300) of Part 4 of Division 10 of the Family Code, and while the restraining order is still in place, they commenced, prosecuted, or maintained one or more litigations against a person protected by the restraining order in this or any other court or jurisdiction that are determined to be meritless and caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.

A person in propria persona who repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in frivolous tactics to cause unnecessary delay may be determined as a vexatious litigant. CCP § 391(b)(3).

With respect to “repeatedly” filing unmeritorious motions, the statute does not define “repeatedly,” and the determination as to what constitutes “repeatedly” and “unmeritorious” is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 971; Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505–1506.  As few as three motions can “form the basis for a vexatious litigant designation where perhaps they all seek the exact same relief which has already been denied or all relate to the same judgment or order or are filed in close succession.”  Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 972.  The ‘repeated motions must be so devoid of merit and be so frivolous that they can be described as a “ ‘flagrant abuse of the system,’ ” have “no reasonable probability of success,” lack “reasonable or probable cause or excuse” and [be] clearly meant to “ ‘abuse the processes of the courts and to harass the adverse party.’ ” [Citation.]’ Ibid.  Repeated unmeritorious filings in a child custody matter can support a vexatious litigant finding.  In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1344-1345.

A party may seek, among other things, a pre-filing order requiring the vexatious litigant to obtain leave from the presiding judge before filing any new case in any California court, or from filing “any petition, application, or motion other than a discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code, for any order” without such leave.  CCP section 391.7(a).  Thus, in finding a party in a family law proceeding to be a vexatious litigant, a court may impose a pre-filing order requiring permission of the presiding judge before filing any new motion or litigation on the family law proceeding.  See In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613; In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 76-77; see also In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App. 4th 1339, 1345-1346. 

The presiding judge may condition the filing of such a pleading “upon the furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendants as provided in Section 391.3.”  CCP § 391.7(b).  CCP section 391.7(d) states, ‘For purposes of this section, “litigation” includes any petition, application, or motion other than a discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code, for any order.’

A party in a family law proceeding may be declared a vexatious litigant even if only the respondent.  In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 620-621; see also In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71. 

Discussion

Petitioner details the salient facts regarding the litigation history in her moving papers, facts which are also apparent from the court records.  These demonstrate that Respondent not only qualifies as a vexatious litigant under any of the definitions set forth in section 391, but in fact qualifies as such under three of the different definitions. With respect to section 391(b)(1), Respondent has filed and lost at least five unmeritorious motions in this litigation in the past seven years, appealed each one of those decisions, and lost each appeal. These fall within the definition of “litigation” for the purpose of this motion.  For section 391(b)(3), Respondent has repeatedly filed, in the last three years, motions which the court has denied, including repeated motions raising the same issues and requests.  See, e.g., Orders of November 9, 2022;  April 22, 2024; September 24, 2024.  Respondent also qualifies as a vexatious litigant under section 391(b)(5) because he is restrained by a restraining order issued pursuant to Fam.Code section 6300, et seq., and, with the restraining order in place, “commenced, prosecuted, or maintained one or more litigations against” Petitioner, “a person protected by the restraining order,” and which have been “determined to be meritless and caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.”

            Amongst others, this court had denied Respondent’s requests regarding minor’s counsel, custody, custody evaluation, and attorney’s fees, on August 22, 2022. On October 31, 2023, this court denied Respondent’s motion for child custody evaluation and minor’s counsel.  Petitioner filed on March 5, 2024 a new motion seeking the same basic requests which this court had denied regarding minor’s counsel, child custody evaluation, and attorney’s fees.  The court denied that motion in full at the hearing of April 22, 2024.  Respondent again raised the requests, which the court heard on August 19, 2024, and the court again denied them in its order of September 24, 2024.

            On August 22, 2022, this court also denied Respondent’s requests regarding attorney’s fees and compliance with an order of the court in Orange County.  In 2022 and 2024, Respondent also filed motions regarding issues such as finding Petitioner’s counsel to be in contempt, referral to the California State Bar, sealing of records, and request for settlement conference.  The court denied these motions in December 2022, May 2024, and July 2024.  The court also notes that these motions include collateral issues addressing Petitioners ability to litigate and appear to have been efforts to impede Petitioner’s conduct in this action, such as the proceedings against Petitioner’s counsel. 

            This court, in its orders, has also repeatedly admonished Respondent for his litigation conduct.  In the order of September 24, 2024, the court noted that Respondent’s litigation conduct has “been non-cooperative, meritless, and frivolous,” warranting sanctions and on this basis the court order Respondent to pay sanctions of $50,000 pursuant to Fam. Code section 271.  It added that Respondent came to court with unclean hands and had failed to comply with the court order to pay attorney’s fees related to the DVRO proceedings.  It adopted Petitioner’s list and description of Respondent’s litigation conduct, which it attached to the order.  That recitation is also part of the evidence on which Petitioner bases this motion. 

            Respondent also filed several appeals of decisions in 2022 and 2023, all of which resulted in decisions against him or dismissal.  He has most recently filed five appeals in October and December 2024, all of which are pending.  This includes Respondent filing an appeal on October 28, 2024 and then asking the trial court to stay the trial pending the appeal when trial had already commenced.  On March 25, 2024, the court of appeal denied two of Respondent’s appeals, describing the appeals as meritless, unpersuasive, and incorrect. 

            Once more, the court finds it notable that Respondent has not actually directly responded to or disputed any of Petitioner’s factual assertions or analyses.  Despite the opportunity to provide a meaningful opposition to the actual issues and analysis presented in this motion, he has instead simply attempted in his opposition once more to relitigate issues already decided against him.

            Petitioner correctly argues that the factors set forth in Safir v. United States Lines, Inc. (1986) 792 F.2d 19, at 24, also support finding Respondent to be a vexatious litigant, but this specific authority is of little import here.  The analysis in Safir is generally consistent with California’s law regarding vexatious litigants, but that decision does not address California authority.  While it may be informative and while Respondent may also qualify under the factors discussed in that action, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to base the outcome of this motion specifically on that analysis.  That said, the Safir court explained that a federal district court, when considering whether to find one to be subject to restrictions as a vexatious litigant,

should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.

This court finds that Respondent’s history in this litigation demonstrates 1) a history of harassing and duplicative litigation; 2) a motive which appears to involve delay and harassment without a good-faith belief of prevailing; 3) engaging in such conduct without counsel; 4) resulting in needless cost and litigation; and 5) other sanctions, specifically imposition of substantial awards for attorney’s fees, have proven ineffective.  The court finds that such an analysis merely highlights the fact that the history of Respondent’s litigation qualifies him as a vexatious litigant pursuant to the requirements of CCP section 391, et seq. 

            As noted above, a prefiling order is an appropriate measure to impose on vexatious litigants under CCP section 391.7.

Conclusion

            The court GRANTS the motion.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

END OF TENTATIVE RULINGS