Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 21

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

PLEASE NOTE: If argument is requested in this matter you may appear in person or remotely via Zoom. To appear via Zoom please see the Zoom information below. 

To appear online via Zoom please use the following link:

• Join the Sonoma County Court Zoom hearing
• Passcode: 876992

To appear via Zoom by phone:

• Call: +1 669-254-5252
• Enter the Meeting ID: 160-223-6856
• Passcode: 876992

1.         25FL01154, Zeuschner Dissolution

Motion to Set Aside Support Order Under Family Code section 3691 GRANTED.

Facts

            Petitioner, originally self-represented, filed this action for dissolution of marriage with two minor children (the “Children”) on June 3, 2025.  Petitioner filed property declarations thereafter and he appeared at the first two hearing in this matter, on visitation, custody, and related issues regarding the children.  These hearings occurred on December 3, 2025, and March 11, 2026. 

            On February 3, 2026, Respondent filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) seeking orders regarding child custody, child support, spousal support, visitation, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  Respondent filed proofs of service for the RFO showing both electronic service by e-mail and service by mail to Petitioner on March 11, 2026.  These showed service on Petitioner’s address of record and e-mail.

            Only Respondent and one of her attorneys appeared at the hearing for the RFO on April 20, 2026 (the “April Hearing”).  Although Petitioner was not present, the court noted that he had filed an updated Income and Expense Declaration (“IED”).  The court issued an order (the “April Order”) granting many of the requests in the RFO, including orders that Petitioner pay Respondent spousal support, child support, and $25,000 in attorneys’ fees.  

Motion

            In his RFO and Motion to Set Aside Support Order Under Family Code section 3691, Petitioner moves the court to set aside the April Order.  He filed his original RFO for the matter on May 7, 2026, at which time he was still self-represented, but after he obtained counsel, he filed a new, amended, notice and RFO on July 29, 2026.  He contends that he never received notice of Respondent’s RFO and the hearing and he never received actual service of the RFO papers.  He notes that he was at the hearing on March 11, 2026, when the judge referred to confirmation of the April 20, 2026, hearing date, but that he did not know what the hearing was about since he had never received the RFO or any notice that there was a motion pending for that date.  He notes that the purported service of the documents supposedly took place at a time when he was in fact at the hearing on March 11, 2026.  He explains that at the end of the hearing, he then asked the court for a list of all the pending court dates, and he received a Setting Order referencing the custody/visitation hearing set for June 10, 2026, but he received no document showing the April 20, 2026, court date.  He also contends that there was fraud because Respondent presented incorrect information regarding the parties’ finances.   

            Respondent opposes the motion.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).          

            Relief from support orders, due to default or otherwise, in family-law cases may be based on the grounds generally applicable to motions to vacate under CCP section 473, or, after that deadline, only in accordance with the grounds in Fam. Code sections 2121, 2122, and 3691.  In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911; see also CRC 5.2(d) (provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided).  

            CCP section 473(b) allows parties to set aside dismissals or defaults, or the functional equivalent thereof, based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  CCP § 473(b).  “[D]iscretionary relief under the statute is not limited to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals, but is available from any judgment.”  English v. IKON Business Solutions, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 149; see also Las Vegas Land & Development Co., LLC v. Wilkie Way, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1086, at 1092-1093 (quoting and relying on English).  The motion “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed… otherwise the application shall not be granted….”  CCP section 473(b). 

An order setting aside the default is discretionary whereas based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  CCP § 473(b).

There is also a policy in favor of hearing cases on their merits and the motion to vacate should be granted if the moving party shows a credible, excusable explanation.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227.  The provision of this section authorizing court to relieve party from a judgment or order resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is remedial in its nature and is to be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their merits.  Ramsey Trucking Co. v. Mitchell (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d Supp. 862.

“Surprise” is “some condition or situation in which a party... is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”  Credit Managers Ass’n of So. Calif. v. National Independent Business Alliance  (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1173.

“Excusable neglect” comes down to whether the moving party has shown a reasonable excuse for the default.  Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 892, 905.  The moving party must show that the default would not have been avoided through ordinary care.  Elms v. Elms (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 508, 513.  The test ultimately is thus one of reasonable diligence.  Jackson v. Bank of America (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 55, 58.  A showing that the defendant was unable to understand what he was served with is sufficient to justify relief.  Kesselman v. Kesselman (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 196, 207-208.  Another valid basis is if the defendant mislaid or misfiled the papers and as a result failed to obtain an attorney in time.  Bernards v. Grey (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 679, 683-686.  Simply forgetting about the lawsuit or being too “busy” is not adequate.  Andrews v. Jacoby (1919) 39 Cal.App. 382, 383-384.  Excusable neglect by attorneys includes situations where, despite reasonable supervision, an attorney’s secretary misfiled papers or failed to enter an appearance date.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 234; Alderman v. Jacobs (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 273.

            In addition to relief based on CCP section 473, a court may set aside a judgment adjudicating support or the division of property in accord with Family code section 2120, et seq., and 3691.  Family Code sections 2120, 2121; see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (Fam. Code section 2122 governs relief from judgment while Fam. Code section 3691 governs relief from support orders other than judgment); see also In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620.  Fam. Code section 3690 provides the basis for relief under section 3691 after the expiration of the deadline in CCP section 473. 

Section 3691 allows a party to seek relief based on fraud, perjury, and lack of notice.  Regarding “fraud,” a motion based on section 3691 may seek to set aside an order based on any kind of fraud, extrinsic or otherwise.  In re Marriage of Zimmerman, supra.  A motion based on fraud or perjury must be brought within six months after the party discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the fraud or perjury.  Fam. Code section 3691(a), (b).  The Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Zimmerman explained that section 3691 supports applies to, and supports relief based on, to any type of “actual fraud,” extrinsic or otherwise.  Regarding lack of notice, subdivision (c) states, in full,

(1) When service of a summons has not resulted in notice to a party in time to defend the action for support and a default or default judgment has been entered against the party in the action, the party may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event later than six months after the party obtains or reasonably should have obtained notice (A) of the support order, or (B) that the party's income and assets are subject to attachment pursuant to the order.

(2) A notice of motion to set aside a support order pursuant to this subdivision shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing, under oath, that the party's lack of notice in time to defend the action was not caused by avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect. The party shall serve and file with the notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.

(3) The court may not set aside or otherwise relieve a party from a support order pursuant to this subdivision if service of the summons was accomplished in accordance with existing requirements of law regarding service of process.

Discussion

            When Petitioner originally filed this motion, he discussed relief only pursuant to Fam. Code section 3691 but in his amended motion papers, he also asserts that he is entitled to relief pursuant to CCP section 473.  He states that he intends to file a new motion based expressly on that provision, but he nonetheless cites and briefly discusses it in his amended motion papers.  Petitioner filed and served the amended motion papers on July 29, 2026, 16 court days before the hearing.   Moving papers must be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing, unless otherwise allowed.  CCP section 1005(b).  This is timely for the court to consider it.  Moreover, the relief and grounds raised are inherently within the ambit of CCP section 473.  Respondent also prepared, filed, and served her opposition after that, and her opposition expressly discusses the bases for relief pursuant to CCP section 473.  Accordingly, the court considers the motion to seek relief pursuant to both CCP section 473 and Fam. Code section 3691. 

            Petitioner explains that he had no actual notice of the April Hearing or Respondent’s RFO, since he never actually received the motion papers.   He provides a detailed discussion.  He acknowledges that he was at the hearing on March 11, 2026, when the judge referred to confirmation of the April 20, 2026 hearing date as well as other dates, but he contends that he did not know what the hearing was about since he had never received the RFO or any notice that there was a motion pending for that date.  He notes that the purported service of the documents supposedly took place at a time when he was in fact at the hearing on March 11, 2026.  The record of his presence at the hearing and the proofs of service essentially supports this.  After the court discussed the hearing dates, he explains, at the end of the hearing he asked the court for a list of all the pending court dates and he received a Setting Order referencing the custody/visitation hearing set for June 10, 2026, but he received no document showing the April 20, 2026 court date.  He also asserts that he had not previously been served by mail or FedEx with documents and that prior service had been per an agreement for electronic service.  He adds that he did not notice the e-mail from Respondent’s new attorney at the time, and that he was having trouble keeping up with the new e-mails at the time.  He also notes that he had been actively involved in the litigation throughout before the April Hearing and had appeared at both of the prior hearings. 

            Respondent’s opposition essentially relies on the facially valid service and argues that Petitioner is merely seeking leniency because he was self-represented.  Respondent makes valid points but ultimately, in light of the fact of this case, the court record showing Petitioner’s active involvement with this one exception, Petitioner’s facially valid explanation which is consistent with the general court record, Petitioner’s very prompt effort to vacate the April Order, and the policies favoring relief, the motion is persuasive.  Petitioner at all times before and after the April Hearing appears to have been acting diligently, rendering the April Hearing a clear anomaly, which strongly supports Petitioner and adds greatly to the credibility of his explanation.   The court GRANTS the motion on this basis.

            Petitioner is not persuasive in his other contention, that there was fraud because Respondent presented incorrect information regarding the parties’ finances.  On this point, he merely shows that he disputes the information and calculations which Respondent presented.  He does not show that the April Order resulted from fraud or perjury.   

Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.  

2.         25FL01944, Carranza Dissolution  

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Petitioner’s RFP Set one GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part.  The court DENIES the motion with respect to RFPs 14-18 and 28 but GRANTS the motion as to all others at issue.  It DENIES the request for sanctions. 

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with no minor children on September 12, 2025.  In her petition, she asserts that there are no separate or community or quasi-community assets or debts to determine.  Her petition also states that she requests the court terminate the ability to award spousal support to both parties.  However, on November 13, 2025, she filed an amended petitioner seeking future determination of an award of spousal support to her and she seeks determinations regarding separate and community or quasi-community assets or debts.  Since then, litigation has involved her request for spousal support, request for domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”), and issues regarding separate property  The court issues a domestic violence temporary restraining order (“DVTRO”) but the court in July 2026 issued an order ending the DVTRO and Petitioner’s DVRO request was dismissed. 

Discovery

            On February 9, 2026, Petitioner served Respondent with a Request for Production of Documents or Things, Set One (the “RFPs”).  Declaration of Ashlyn Henderson in Support of Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents and Things, Set one and Request for Sanctions (“Petitioner Dec.”).  Respondent’s limited-scope attorney at that time, Beki Berrey (“Berrey”), sent e-mails regarding the discovery and deadline for responding before Respondent served responses on March 26, 2026, asserting objections and providing answers which Petitioner considered incomplete.  Ibid.  Petitioner sent a written notice of deficiencies to Berrey with follow-up messages on April 13 and April 17, 2026.  However, Berrey substituted out of the action, leaving Respondent’s other attorney of record, Joel Fleck (“Fleck”) as his sole attorney.  On April 21, 2026, Petitioner received from Fleck a request for an extension of time to serve further responses in which Fleck stated that Berrey was withdrawing from the action, and he needed additional time to prepare amended responses.  Ibid.  

Motion

            Petitioner moves the court to compel Respondent to provide further responses to the RFPs. 

            There is no opposition.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), and specifically proceedings pursuant to the Civil Discovery Act set forth at CCP section 2016.010, et seq.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

When a propounding party is dissatisfied with responses to interrogatories or requests for production or inspection (“RFP”), that party may move to compel further responses.  CCP sections 2030.300, 2031.310. The moving party must make adequate attempts to meet and confer.  Ibid.  Generally, once a timely, proper motion to compel further responses has been made, the responding party has the burden to justify objections or incomplete answers.  Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221. 

            A party moving to compel further responses to a production request must demonstrate “good cause" for seeking the items.  CCP section 2031.310(b)(1).  This requires a showing that the items are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and a showing of specific facts justifying discovery.  Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.  Whether there is an alternative source for the information is relevant though not dispositive.  Associated Brewers Distrib. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 588.  Once the moving party demonstrates good cause, the responding party must justify its objections.  Kirkland v. Sup.Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.

A party has a duty to provide “complete” responses and to make them as straightforward as possible.  CCP sections 2030.220; 2031.210-2031.230.  Requests must be answered to the extent possible and an answer that contains only part of the information requested or which evades a meaningful response is improper.  Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783. 

            A responding party has a duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to obtain the requested information and if it is unable to comply, it must state that it made a reasonable and diligent search.  CCP sections 2030.220 2031.230; Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 783. 

            CCP section 2031.220 governs a statement of compliance with a production request.  It states, in full,

A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.

            CCP section 2031.230 governs responses containing a statement of inability to comply.  It states, in pertinent part,

A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand… shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.

The discovery methods of serving a request for production and a deposition notice requiring production are separate and a party may seek information via both depositions and written discovery, even if arguably duplicative.  See Carter v. Sup.Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.  For example, where a party seeks to obtain documents via both deposition and requests for production, using one method “does not prescribe a waiver of the party’s right to use other discovery methods for obtaining the same documents or information.”  Carter, 997.

Discussion

            Except for those RFPs discussed separately below, in all of the RFPs at issue, Petitioner seeks a range of financial records, including tax records, income records, financial statements, and loan applications.  In general, this information is directly relevant to the issues of support and property interests in this litigation and is discoverable.  The objections to these, except as discussed separately below, are also invalid.  This includes the primary objection raised, that the discovery is duplicative of other discovery.  A party has the right, as noted above, to seek information or documents through different discovery methods, even if there is duplication or overlap.  Except for those discussed below, the court GRANTS the motion as to compelling further responses. 

            In RFP 27, she seeks copies of court orders or agreements on child support or other court-ordered financial obligations.  Respondent objected that no such documents exist but has not provided the full statement of inability to comply as required.  Petitioner is entitled to a full and complete statement of inability to comply, or another response.  The court GRANTS the motion as to this.

One of these, however, RFP 28, seeks all “documentation” of monthly living expenses.  Respondent objected that this is vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, and requires a compilation, among other grounds.  Overall, these objections are valid.  This request is extremely broad, open-ended, and unclear.  It is impossible to determine what all forms of “documentation” of expenses might be.  Petitioner is entitled to the basic core of this information, but she must request it in a more specific manner seeking identifiable types or categories of documents.  Petitioner also may not require Respondent to create a compilation or new documents in order to respond.  She may only ask Respondent to provide existing documents.  The court DENIES the motion as to this item, without prejudice to Petitioner seeking documents containing similar types of information in a manner which is appropriate for discovery requests.  

In addition, Petitioner seeks a range of non-financial records.  In RFP 14, she seeks all electronic messages between her and Respondent from April 30, 2025, through September 6, 2025.  In RFPs 15-16, she seeks all videos taken of her at certain addresses between April 1, 2025, and November 2, 2025.  In RFPs 17-18, she seeks all text messages which Respondent sent and received, respectively, from April 30, 2025, through September 6, 2025. 

Petitioner has no good cause for the discovery sought in these requests.  They are on their face unrelated to the outstanding issues in this litigation, specifically financial issues related to support and property or debts.  These appear solely geared toward the DVRO claim and as noted above, that claim has been dismissed, rendering the documents and information sought in these to be wholly irrelevant.  Moreover, Fam. Code section 6309 imposes limitations on discovery related to proceedings under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”).  It requires prior court approval, based on a showing of good cause, before conducting discovery related to domestic violence and this applies to all parties.  Petitioner has not sought, much less obtained, such approval and she has not demonstrated the basis for such approval.  The court DENIES the motion as to these.

The court DENIES the motion, as detailed above, with respect to RFPs 14-18 and 28.  It GRANTS the motion as to all others at issue.

Sanctions

            For compelling further responses, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust.  CCP sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2031.310.  In order to obtain sanctions, the moving party must state in the notice of motion that the party is seeking sanctions, identify against whom the party seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions.  CCP section 2023.040.  Sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion.  Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.

The sanctions which pro-per, or self-represented, litigants may recover are limited to out-of-pocket costs such as paying for legal research, copies, transportation, and the like.  Argaman v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4^th 1173, 1179.

In this instance, the notice of motion, or request for order, does not mention sanctions or a request for attorney’s fees or costs in any manner.  The form request for order contains a section specifically for requesting  attorney’s fees and costs and yet Petitioner left this blank.  The title for the motion also does not mention sanctions or fees or costs in any manner.  She merely mentions the request in the attached declaration and memorandum of points and authorities, which is insufficient to provide the required notice.  The court understands that Petitioner is self-represented, but this requirement is not merely technical; it is necessary to ensure proper notice to the other party and to clarify exactly what issues are before the court.  She also does not indicate the amount of sanctions sought or provide any explanation or evidence in support of the sanctions.  Petitioner is therefore not entitled to an award of sanctions.

Moreover, Petitioner is self-represented.  Her request is based on the discovery provisions, specifically CCP section 2031.310.  As explained above, a self-represented litigant may not recover sanctions beyond actual out-of-pocket expenses such as the filing fee for the motion.  Even if Petitioner had properly sought, and provided a basis for, the sanctions, she would not be entitled to recover anything more than the filing fee for the motion, absent evidence of other reasonable, actual out-of-pocket expenses. 

The court DENIES the request for sanctions.

Conclusion

As explained above, the court DENIES the motion with respect to RFPs 14-18 and 28 but GRANTS the motion as to all others at issue.  It DENIES the request for sanctions.  Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

           

**This is the end of the Tentative Rulings.***