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Family Law Tentative Rulings

DEPT. 21  LAW & MOTION CALENDAR

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

PLEASE NOTE: If argument is requested in this matter you may appear in person or remotely via Zoom. To appear via Zoom please see the Zoom information below. 

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D21 – Family Law – Law & Motion Calendar

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Tentative Rulings

Thursday, December 18, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.

/12/18/2025 Tentative Rulings 

TENTATIVE RULINGS

LAW & MOTION CALENDAR

Thursday, December 18, 2025 9:00 a.m.

Courtroom 21 –Hon. Kinna Patel Crocker

3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa CA 95403

TO JOIN “ZOOM” ONLINE:

Meeting ID: 160-223-6856

Passcode: 876992

https://sonomacourt-org.zoomgov.com/j/1602236856

TO JOIN “ZOOM” BY PHONE:

By Phone (same meeting ID and password as listed above):

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard.  If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the department’s Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521 - 6836 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties/counsel of their intent to appear.

  1. Bodrov v. Berry Davis 23FL00336

APPEARANCES REQUIRED.

  1. Powers v Powers 25FL01862

APPEARANCES REQUIRED.

  1. Petition of Timberlake SFL088355
    Motion to Deem Respondent to be a Vexatious Litigant DENIED.  Respondent’s request for sanctions is also DENIED.

Facts

            On May 4, 2021, Petitioner filed this action against Respondent on behalf of the parties’ minor child, to declare the minor child free from parental control of Respondent pursuant to Family Code section 7820, et seq.  On August 11, 2021, the court granted the petition and entered an order terminating Respondent’s parental rights (the “Termination Order”).  The Termination Order was filed on August 13, 2021.

            Previously, Petitioner had also filed an action for dissolution of marriage with minor child (the “Dissolution Action”) on August 17, 2016.  Judgment in the Dissolution Action was entered in February 2017 but the parties continued to litigate over issues including child support and visitation, with Petitioner ultimately receiving both legal and physical custody.  Litigation occurred up through August 3, 2021, when the court issued a domestic violence restraining order (“DVRO”) protecting Petitioner and the minor child from Respondent.  Following the DVRO, no further litigation activity occurred until May 2025, when Respondent filed a motion to change the orders regarding custody and visitation.  Respondent also filed a Request for Order and Motion to Set Aside in which she moved the court to set aside the Termination Order and to order joint physical custody of the minor child.  The court denied the motion after a hearing

Motion

            In the Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Deem Respondent to be a Vexatious Litigant, Petitioner moves the court to declare Respondent to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391 subject to a prefiling order and a requirement to post security before proceeding with further litigation.

            Respondent opposes the motion and seeks monetary sanctions under Family Code section 271. 

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

Pursuant to CCP section 391, et seq., a court may declare a party meeting certain criteria to be a “vexatious litigant” and accordingly impose certain specified restraints on that party’s ability to litigate when self-represented. 

CCP section 391.7 authorizes a court to find a party to be a vexatious litigant and enter a prefiling order upon either the motion of a party or the court’s own motion.  Subdivision (a) states, in full,

(a) In addition to any other relief provided in this title, the court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.  Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigant may be punished as a contempt of court.

CCP section 39 sets forth the applicable definitions for the title governing vexatious litigants, including the different definitions of “vexatious litigant.”  Subdivision (a) states that ‘ “Litigation” means any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in any state or federal court.’  Subdivision (b) sets forth the different circumstances under which one qualifies as a “vexatious litigant.”  It states, in pertinent part and with emphasis added,

(b) “Vexatious litigant” means a person who does any of the following:

(1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.

(3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

(5) After being restrained pursuant to a restraining order issued after a hearing pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6300) of Part 4 of Division 10 of the Family Code, and while the restraining order is still in place, they commenced, prosecuted, or maintained one or more litigations against a person protected by the restraining order in this or any other court or jurisdiction that are determined to be meritless and caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.

A self-represented litigant who repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in frivolous tactics to cause unnecessary delay may be determined as a vexatious litigant. CCP section 391(b)(3).  With respect to “repeatedly” filing unmeritorious motions, the statute does not define “repeatedly,” and the determination as to what constitutes “repeatedly” and “unmeritorious” is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court.  Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 971; Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505–1506.  As few as three motions can “form the basis for a vexatious litigant designation where perhaps they all seek the exact same relief which has already been denied or all relate to the same judgment or order or are filed in close succession.”  Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 972.  The ‘repeated motions must be so devoid of merit and be so frivolous that they can be described as a “ ‘flagrant abuse of the system,’ ” have “no reasonable probability of success,” lack “reasonable or probable cause or excuse” and [be] clearly meant to “ ‘abuse the processes of the courts and to harass the adverse party.’ ” [Citation.]’ Ibid.  Repeated unmeritorious filings in a child custody matter can support a vexatious litigant finding.  In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1344-1345.

A party may seek, among other things, a pre-filing order requiring the vexatious litigant to obtain leave from the presiding judge before filing any new case in any California court, or from filing “any petition, application, or motion other than a discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code, for any order” without such leave.  CCP section 391.7(a).  Thus, in finding a party in a family law proceeding to be a vexatious litigant, a court may impose a pre-filing order requiring permission of the presiding judge before filing any new motion or litigation on the family law proceeding.  See In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613; In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 76-77; see also In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App. 4th 1339, 1345-1346.  The presiding judge may condition the filing of such a pleading “upon the furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendants as provided in Section 391.3.”  CCP section 391.7(b).  CCP section 391.7(d) states, ‘For purposes of this section, “litigation” includes any petition, application, or motion other than a discovery motion, in a proceeding under the Family Code or Probate Code, for any order.’

            A party in a family law proceeding may be declared a vexatious litigant even if only the respondent.  In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 620-621; see also In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71. 

Analysis

            The Court finds insufficient basis for declaring Respondent to be a vexatious litigant. Although Respondent has recently repeatedly attempted to file motions or other pleadings, and failed due to procedural defects, these repeated attempts are insufficient to support the requested finding.  There is no indication that, defective though these may have been, they were substantively unmeritorious or frivolous. 

            Since entry of the Termination Order on August 13, 2021, Respondent filed only one motion in this action, her RFO and Motion to Set Aside, while in the related action for marital dissolution she filed one motion seeking a change in custody and visitation.  These two motions are not enough to support the requested order.  The filings are too few and, although the Court found them to be unmeritorious, they are also not egregious enough to support the order.                      

            There is also no indication that any of her activities otherwise may warrant a vexatious litigant finding.  The earlier litigation from 2021 and before appears to have been standard family law litigation and, until 2025, Respondent appears to have complied with the court’s orders and made no effort for several years to file any litigation.

            Finally, the record is insufficient for the court to find that Respondent has filed anything, or taken any action, in bad faith or with the intent to harass or intimidate, or for any other improper purpose.  At this time, the court finds insufficient basis for declaring Respondent to be a vexatious litigant. 

Sanctions

            Respondent seeks monetary sanctions under Fam.Code section 271. Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.”  The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

            Respondent’s request for sanctions is not persuasive.  Although this court finds insufficient basis for granting the motion, as regards Respondent’s conduct, the motion appears to have been based on a good faith and reasonable belief in its validity, not conduct frustrating the applicable policies, or otherwise for any improper purpose.  The Court also takes into account that Respondent was sanctioned in the related Dissolution Action on July 30, 2025 for filing a frivolous motion where there was no legal basis for the request.

            The court DENIES Respondent’s request for sanctions.

Conclusion

            The court DENIES the motion but also DENIES Respondent’s request for sanctions, as explained above.  The Petitioner shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.        

  1. SFL091853, Cuadras Segura v. Gallagher
    MOTION DROPPED. The moving party, Respondent, was provided an opportunity to file a proof of service per the ruling on October 2, 2025. There is no proof of service showing notice of this hearing or the motion.  The motion and hearing are hereby dropped. 

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