Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 21

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

PLEASE NOTE: If argument is requested in this matter you may appear in person or remotely via Zoom. To appear via Zoom please see the Zoom information below. 

To appear online via Zoom please use the following link:

• Join the Sonoma County Court Zoom hearing
• Passcode: 876992

To appear via Zoom by phone:

• Call: +1 669-254-5252
• Enter the Meeting ID: 160-223-6856
• Passcode: 876992

1. 24FL01955, Buckner v. Buckner

APPEARANCES REQUIRED.
 

2. 26FL00142, Barrett v. Goodreau

Respondent’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Sanctions GRANTED for the full amount requested excluding the $10,855.50 for the separate civil case.

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) with minor children on January 27, 2026.  Respondent filed his response on February 18, 2026, arguing that the court should deny the DVRO request because it was an exact duplicate of a request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order (“CHRO”) 26CV00345 (the “CHRO Case”), which Petitioner previously filed and the court had denied.  In his response, Respondent requested an award of sanctions for attorney’s fees and costs of $15,000 on the ground that this proceeding is a duplicate of the CHRO proceeding and is a frivolous attempt to harass him. 

            At the hearing on February 19, 2026, the parties were present.  The court continued the matter to April 7, 2026 and issued no temporary orders, stating that if the parties had in fact litigated the issues in the CHRO proceeding, the matter would be discharged.  The court also allowed time for the parties to consider the opposing papers and file additional briefing.  Both parties filed additional briefing prior to the April hearing. 

            At the hearing of April 7, 2026, the court found insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s requested DVRO and dismissed the matter with prejudice.  The court also set the matter for a hearing on July 24, 2026 on Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.  It directed Petitioner to file an Income and Expense Declaration (“IED”) within 10 days.   Petitioner filed her IED on April 14, 2026 and an amended IED on April 17, 2026.

            Petitioner filed a new request for DVRO on June 1, 2026.  Respondent again filed a response, arguing that the CHRO matter was denied and the original DVRO request was dismissed with prejudice.  Petitioner also filed a request to continue the hearing due to her travel plans.  The court again denied Petitioner’s requested temporary orders and set a hearing for August 26, 2026.  The court also continued the hearing on fees and costs to August 6, 2026. 

            At the hearing of August 6, 2026, the court continued the hearing on fees and costs to November 5, 2026 and added that no further briefing would be allowed, since the parties already had fully briefed the issue.

            At the DVRO hearing of August 26, 2026, the court denied the new DVRO request without prejudice and issued no temporary orders.  Respondent reiterated his request for sanctions, which the court noted was to be heard at the hearing of November 5, 2026.  

Motion

            Respondent moves the court to award him attorney’s fees and costs on the ground that this DVRO proceeding is an exact duplicate of the CHRO proceeding, in which the court denied the CHRO. 

            Petitioner opposes the motion.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

Fam. Code section 6344 governs requests for attorney’s fees and costs on petitions for domestic violence protective orders or restraining orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”) at Fam. Code section 6200, et seq.  It states, in full,

(a) After notice and a hearing, a court, upon request, shall issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner.

(b) After notice and a hearing, the court, upon request, may issue an order for the payment of attorney's fees and costs for a prevailing respondent only if the respondent establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition or request is frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay.

(c) Before a court awards attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section, the court shall first determine pursuant to Section 270 that the party ordered to pay has, or is reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay.

A prevailing respondent in DVPA proceedings therefore may recover attorney’s fees and costs.  However, in contrast to a prevailing petitioner, who has an automatic right to recover attorney’s fees and costs subject to the other party’s ability to pay, a prevailing respondent only “may” recover them upon a showing that the request was frivolous or intended for the improper purposes listed.

Discussion

Grounds for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Respondent here persuasively demonstrates the DVRO requests were “frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay,” entitling him to an award of sanctions pursuant to Fam. Code section 6344 for the DVRO proceedings.  The court finds no basis for awarding him sanctions in this DVRO proceeding under Fam.Code section 271 or CCP sections 128.7 or 527.6, or for an award of sanctions related to the CHRO Case.

There is no dispute that Petitioner filed the CHRO Case on January 27, 2026, one day before filing her DVRO request in this action and that the court denied the CHRO request after a full hearing with live testimony on February 17, 2026.  There is also no dispute that the core facts, claims, grounds, requested orders, and evidentiary statements are identical in both the initial DVRO and CHRO requests.  The initial DVRO is based on an identical attachment from the CHRO request, containing the same factual allegations and requested orders in support of the CHRO request. 

            Respondent is correct that when he filed his response on February 18, 2026, the court in the CHRO Case had already denied that request after a full hearing, and he opposed the DVRO request in part on that basis, noting that Petitioner was already aware that her identical request had been denied.  The court then considered the matter the next day, at which Respondent again asserted that this DVRO request was groundless since it was identical to one which had already been denied.  The court at that hearing stated on the record that it would “discharge” this request if in fact it raised the same issues as had already been litigated in the CHRO Case, and it continued the matter to April in order to allow the parties, and expressly Petitioner, further time to consider the arguments and issues made and file any desired new papers.  Petitioner then filed new papers reiterating her request and, at the April hearing, persisted with her request.  This was despite knowing that the DVRO claim was identical to the CHRO claim.  The court subsequently denied the request and dismissed it with prejudice, setting the matter for a hearing on Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees and costs.      

            Petitioner then filed a new DVRO request on June 1, 2026, before the hearing on the fees and costs.  In that request, she made some new factual assertions of conduct which she alleged had occurred since the prior DVRO request, but otherwise presented the exact same types of alleged conduct and the same types of bases for the DVRO. She also again, in part, relied on evidence which had been presented in support of the CHRO and the original DVRO request, even admitting that some supporting evidence had been “presented as evidence at the February 17, 2026 civil hearing.”  She also sought basically the same types of restraining orders as she had sought in the prior two requests.  This court again denied that new DVRO request.

In her various documents which appear to be presented as opposition to this sanctions request, Petitioner presents no factual analysis or explanation as to why the DVRO requests were not “frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay.”   She instead repeats some of her allegations regarding surveillance and the like, now claiming that Respondent’s attorney and her legal staff are surveilling her.  She alleges that Respondent’s attorney’s “filing” of documents “confirms the surveillance,” and the purpose “is not a legitimate one,” but she provides no clear explanation in support of this conclusory claim.  Neither her meaning nor intent regarding these assertions is entirely clear. 

Petitioner claims that Respondent never served her with a safe-harbor notice pursuant to CCP section 128.7. While this is relevant to a claim based on CCP section 128.7, it is immaterial to a claim based on Fam. Code section 6344.  That requirement applies to sanctions pursuant to that provision and is not a part of Fam. Code section 6344.

The court finds that Respondent is entitled to a finding awarding him attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fam. Code section 6344 on the ground that Petitioner’s DVRO requests in this action were “frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause unnecessary delay.” The court GRANTS the motion on that issue with respect to the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this DVRO litigation pursuant to Fam. Code section 6344 only.  The court DENIES the motion as to sanctions incurred under other provisions and for the expenses specific to the CHRO Case.  

Ability to Pay and Amount of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

            The remining issues are the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to which Respondent is entitled and a determination of Petitioner’s ability to pay.  Respondent shows that he has incurred $26,832.38 in attorney’s fees and costs defending against the requests for restraining orders since January 29, 2026, up through the latest filings regarding this motion in July 2026.  Declaration of Jackie Martens filed July 13, 2026 (“July Martens Dec.”).  The declaration of his attorney notes that this includes $10,855.50 for the CHRO Case. 

            Petitioner claims in her IEDs that she has cash, other savings, and real estate but zero income.  Her latest, amended, IED filed on April 17, 2026 shows that she has $28,471 in cash or the like and net real property value of $865,500.  She states that she has monthly expenses of $12,132.48.  She lists credit card balances of just over $90,000 and a “home equity investment” balance of $135,000.  Respondent also provides information from the IED which Petitioner filed in the parties’ related case in Napa County in about March 2024.  This states that she had $16,064 in monthly expenses but zero income.  It also states that she spent $350,881 constructing an accessory dwelling unit (“ADU”) on her property. In addition, Respondent provides evidence from a Zillow estimate for her property giving a value of $882,600 but this does not include the added value of the ADU.  This indicates that, after subtracting a reverse mortgage on the property, a net value of close to $1.1 million for the property.  

            Despite claiming zero income, Petitioner also admits in her IED that she is the “owner/sole proprietor” of her own real estate business which she has had for over 28 years, and that she owns two businesses, Up Valley Real Estate and Cessna AI Solutions (“Cessna AI”).  Her Cessna AI business provides artificial intelligence (“AI”) created documents and assistance in creating legal documents for family law court proceedings.  She sells legal “Battle Plan Kits” for $49 a piece and her own materials state she had sold over 200 at that time, showing an income of about $9,800 from this alone between October 23, 2025 and March 31, 2026, an average of about $1,960 a month from this business.  Concerns over unlicensed practice of law aside, her own statements demonstrate that this additional side business has generated almost $2,000 a month in income alone.  In her materials she also claims to have spent “over $600,000” in legal expenses on her own litigation. 

            Respondent also demonstrates that Petitioner stated in her Napa IED that she had no mortgage on her prior home and that she sold it for $1,900,000 on June 20, 2024, purchasing her current home outright for $868,000, paying cash.  As Respondent notes, this on its face also shows a surplus of over $1 million in excess cash from the transaction. 

            Finally, Petitioner’s own allegations demonstrate that she has household employees. In her own terminology as set forth in her CHRO and DVRO requests, Petitioner alleges that she maintains a “nanny” and additional “household staff” whom Respondent allegedly intimidated. 

            The court finds Petitioner’s claims regarding lack of income and assets to be devoid of credibility.  First, Petitioner’s own evidence in her IEDs on its face indicates substantial assets in both real estate and cash.  Second, Petitioner herself has presented that she has at least two businesses, one a real-estate business which she has operated for over 28 years and another new business seemingly generating close to $2,000 a month.  Finally, the court finds that substantial income or assets must exist for Petitioner to have a nanny and additional household staff.     

            Petitioner asserts that Respondent’s alleged legal bills include entries prior to the date when his attorney substituted in to represent him, but this is not significant.  This is only a small amount of the total billed and logically the attorney may reasonably have spent some time and expense becoming prepared for representing Respondent.  Nothing about this indicates impropriety. 

            Petitioner argues that Respondent has substantial income and assets which exceed hers but this is irrelevant. The sanctions award is based solely on Petitioner’s ability to pay, not Respondent’s need for the award. 

             The court finds that Petitioner has the ability to pay and that her claims to the contrary lack credibility.  The amount which Respondent seeks is facially reasonable based on the nature of the case, the work involved, and the billing information.  The court excludes only the $10,855.50 for the CHRO Case and otherwise GRANTS the motion for the amount Respondent requests. The amount of $15,976.88 is due from Petitioner to Respondent no later than 90 days from November 5, 2026.

Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED to the extent set forth above.  Respondent shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

3. 26FL00655, Avalos v. Castillo

Motion to Bifurcate Marital Status GRANTED.

                                                             Facts

            The parties’ dissolution of marriage proceedings commenced with the filing of the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on April 8, 2026. Petitioner filed a Request for Order (“RFO”) on July 29, 2026 requesting the bifurcation of marital status. There is no opposition.
                                                        Discussion

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of CCP section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).           

            Marital dissolution actions may be “bifurcated” for an early “status-only” judgment, reserving jurisdiction over all other issues.  Fam. Code section 2337.  Upon noticed motion, the court may sever, or bifurcate, the issue of marital status from other issues and grant an early and separate trial on the issue of dissolution of marriage status, i.e, a “status only” judgment, expressly reserving jurisdiction of all other pending issues for a later determination.  Fam.Code section 2337(a), (f); see Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 894; Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 Cal.App. 3d 742, 755.  According to Fam. Code section 2337(c), “The court may impose upon a party any of the …conditions on granting a severance of the issue of the dissolution of the status of the marriage,” which includes provisions regarding health and medical insurance, and retirement benefits, among other issues such that the party not requesting termination of status may preserve their claims to those issues.

            A party should request bifurcation on the FL-300 Request for Order form with attached mandatory FL-315 Request or Response to Request for Separate Trial form.  CRC 5.390(a).  The moving party must also serve a preliminary declaration of disclosure (“PDD”) with the motion unless the party has already done so.  Fam.Code section 2337(b).  Petitioner has complied with all the requirements associated with this request.

Conclusion

            The Court grants Respondent’s request to bifurcate the parties’ marital status. Respondent shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.

4. 26FL00740, Lee v. Lee
APPEARANCES REQUIRED.

5. SFL65683, Russell v. Russell

MATTER IS CONTINUED FOR FURTHER HEARING ON A DOMESTIC CALENDAR, February 10, 2027 at 1:30pm in Department 21. The parties are cooperating with one another regarding the loan assumption, which is not yet complete. The parties are ordered to provide updates to the court via declaration at least 10 calendar days prior to the hearing.

6. SFL092942, Newport v. Nix
APPEARANCES REQUIRED.