Skip to main content

Family Law Tentative Rulings - Courtroom 21

Judge Kinna Patel Crocker 

Law & Motion Calendar

The following Tentative Rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, it will be necessary for you to contact the Judicial Assistant by telephone at (707) 521-6729 by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing. Any party requesting an appearance must notify all other opposing parties of their intent to appear.

PLEASE NOTE: If argument is requested in this matter you may appear in person or remotely via Zoom. To appear via Zoom please see the Zoom information below. 

To appear online via Zoom please use the following link:

To appear via Zoom by phone:

  • Call: +1 669-254-5252
  • Enter the Meeting ID: 160-223-6856
  • Passcode: 876992

Law & Motion Tentative Rulings

Thursday, November 19, 2026
9:00am 

1. SFL63835, Palmini v. Palmini

MOTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS DENIED, as explained below.  However, Petitioner is entitled to her share of the retirement plan, and the court REQUIRES APPEARANCES OR WILL SET A HEARING in order to address the methods of resolving the amounts owed and methods of payment.  

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor Children on July 26, 2013.  She filed a request for joinder of Respondent’s employee retirement plan (the Plan”) with California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”).
 

            The court entered a judgment of dissolution (the “Judgment”) on April 24, 2018, pursuant to a stipulated Marital Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), incorporated into the Judgment.  This gives Petitioner a 45% interest in Respondent’s CalPERS Plan, states that the parties “agree that they shall retain a joint expert to prepare a QDRO [Qualified Domestic Relations Order] dividing this pension,” directs CalPERS to comply, and reserves court jurisdiction to issue an order regarding it.  Section 6.2.1 governs the division of the plan and states, in full,
 

Suzanne is entitled to, and awarded as her separate property, 45% of

the community interest in Will's benefits with the California Public Employees'

Retirement System ("CalPERS" or the "System"). Will is awarded the balance of the benefits as his separate property. Except as otherwise specified in this subsection, Suzanne's portion of each benefit shall be calculated based upon th value of the community interest as of the date that each component of benefit commences to Suzanne. Suzanne's community interest shall not be compute upon nor include amounts that may be payable on account of Will's disability, except to the extent that a portion of or all of such benefits would have been payable for Will's retirement based on longevity. The Parties agree that they shall retain a joint expert to prepare a QDRO dividing this pension. The Parties may elect for Will to make a cash payment to Suzanne to settle this issue.
 

Section 6.2.2 adds, in full,

CalPERS is ordered to follow this Agreement or any future written agreement of the Parties designed to modify or implement these provisions, which subsequent agreement does not violate the provisions of Fam. Code §2610. The court shall reserve jurisdiction to  issue an order if same is needed to clarify CalPERS's obligations in that regard. Until a further order or written agreement of the Parties is provided to CalPERS, Will shall not make any election, or take any action, nor shall the System accept any elections, that might adversely affect Suzanne's community interest in these benefits. So that the Parties may insure that this Agreement can be implemented by CalPERS (for example, to provide directions with reference to the distribution of benefits to Suzanne), Will shall provide ninety (90) days' notice to Suzanne of his intended retirement (which notice may be shortened by the court upon a showing of good cause); and CalPERS shall make no distributions until the matters between the Parties have been resolved.

Motion

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Enforcement of Orders, Petitioner moves the court to enforce the Judgment regarding the Plan.  Specifically, she seeks an order that Respondent breached the MSA by retiring without providing the required notice, thereby breach his fiduciary duties and committing fraud.  She claims that she discovered that Respondent had already retired, without her knowledge, when she started the process for finalizing the QDRO.  As a result, she asks the court to award her the entire benefit of the Plan.  She also seeks monetary sanctions.

            Respondent opposes the motion, arguing that he did not intentionally or knowingly omit Petitioner from his Plan or try to take his Plan payments without giving Petitioner her share.  He notes that the parties agreed that Petitioner would join the Plan and handle the preparation of the QDRO.  He also asserts that stresses of his job as a police officer plus work-related injuries and a subsequent cancer diagnosis resulted in significant pain and stress requiring time off and light duties.  This forced him, he claims, to retire earlier than he had expected and with minimal notice.  He adds that he had generally talked to Petitioner and her new husband about his circumstances and retirement.  He also contends that when he completed the retirement paperwork his condition resulted in him making mistakes on it, so that he checked the box stating that he is divorced but missed the part specifically stating that Petitioner was entitled to a share.  That said, he acknowledges Petitioner’s right to 45% of the Plan, adding that he is willing to pay Petitioner any amounts owed to her from the Plan, including arrears, and that he has engaged a firm (“MSM”) to calculate the amount owed.  He provides information, with documentation from MSM for different calculations of the amount owed.  Due to the payment option made under the Plan, based on payment limited to his lifetime, and Petitioner’s desire for payment based on her lifetime, he provides a calculation based on the alleged lost survivor benefit.  He states that he is willing to pay to Petitioner the full amount of any unpaid share of the Plan so far, plus the amount which MSM has calculated for the lost survivor benefit.  Because he lacks sufficient funds to pay all immediately, he proposes a payment plan consisting of a payment from the Plan funds currently being held pending resolution of this issue, then a lump sum of $15,000, and then additional monthly payments of $1,000 until the balance is paid in full. 

            Petitioner replies to the opposition.  She asserts that Respondent’s claims of confusion over the paperwork lack credibility because in the past he showed an ability to fill out forms correctly.  She also objects to any payments from Respondent himself and seeks payment through CalPERS.

Applicable Authority

According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam. Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery); In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911 (discussing the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 when a party seeks relief from orders in family proceedings).

If a marital settlement agreement (“MSA”) was “merged” or “incorporated” into the judgment, it no longer operates as an independent legal instrument so enforcement remedies instead are based exclusively on the judgment.  See Marriage of Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App. 3d 647, 656.  It is well established, therefore, that an MSA incorporated into a judgment provides the terms of that judgment and is thus enforceable as a judgment.  Courts construe the terms of an MSA with the goal of giving effect to the mutual intent of the parties so that the terms of the MSA control as long as they are clear and unambiguous.  Hibberd, supra, 1013. 

Fam. Code section 290 expressly authorizes the court to enforce judgments or orders by methods which the court in its discretion finds to be necessary.  It states, in full, “A judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be enforced by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary.”

            Spouses have fiduciary obligations to each other which remain following separation until a final distribution of assets.  Fam. Code section2 721, 1101; Marriage of Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App. 4th 1252, 1270 (the fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until the final distribution of assets).  Fam. Code section 1100 imposes duties on spouses to manage community assets and liabilities in accordance with the rules governing fiduciary relationships.  As Fam. Code section 721 states, “spouses are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” 

            Family Code section 1101 gives each spouse a “claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate….”  Subdivision (g) provides non-exclusive remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty not amounting to fraud pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.  This includes an award of half of the asset at issue.  It states, in full, 

Remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty by one spouse, including those set out in Sections 721 and 1100, shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs. The value of the asset shall be determined to be its highest value at the date of the breach of the fiduciary duty, the date of the sale or disposition of the asset, or the date of the award by the court.

Subdivision (h) provides non-exclusive remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty not amounting to fraud pursuant to Civil Code (“CC”) section 3294.  This includes an award of the entirety of the asset at issue.  It states, in full,

Remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duty by one spouse, as set forth in Sections 721 and 1100, when the breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 100 percent, or an amount equal to 100 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty.

CC section 3294 describes the requirements for punitive damages in civil cases where “clear and convincing evidence” demonstrates oppression, fraud, or malice.  According to section 3294(c)(3), “fraud” is the intentional misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact with the intent to injure the other or deprive the other of property or legal rights. Section 3294(c)(1) defines “malice” as conduct intended “to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  “Oppression” is “despicable conduct” subjecting one “to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”  CC section 3294(c)(2). 
 

The party making a claim under section 3294 must show intent to injure or a conscious disregard of another’s safety or rights and despicable conduct.  College Hospital, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704 (discussing the standards for showing a conscious disregard and “despicable” conduct in contrast to showing intent); Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 317 (discussing intent).
 

Recklessness is insufficient to meet the standard under CC section 3294.  G.D. Searle & Co. v. Sup.Ct. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 30, 31.  The showing must include some sort of “evil motive.”  G.D. Searle, supra.  “Reckless disobedience of traffic laws” or the like thus will not support a claim of malice normally.  In other words, a party must demonstrate that the defendant acted with ill will and intent to injure or take or destroy property.  See Smith v. Sup.Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042; Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643.
 

            Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.”  The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

Discussion
 

            Petitioner’s motion is ultimately not persuasive with respect to demonstrating breach of fiduciary duty or “fraudulent” conduct as set forth in the statutes.  She clearly has a right to payment of her share of the Plan, including any arrears, but she is not persuasive that she is entitled to the full Plan payments or sanctions.   

            The law is clear, as set forth above, and does authorize an award of the entirety of an asset where the other party is found guilty of actual, intentional fraud as defined in CC section 3294.  The terms of the MSA are also clear and not in dispute, Respondent acknowledging that Petitioner is entitled to her 45% of the Plan and that he failed to give the required 90 days’ notice before retiring.  The evidence is also clear, and not in dispute, regarding the basic events.  It is undisputed that Respondent retired, completed Plan paperwork, made his retirement election, and began receiving payments without giving Petitioner the required notice. 

            However, the evidence is insufficient to show that Respondent intentionally breached his fiduciary duties and attempted to prevent Petitioner from obtaining her share of the pension.  In the Court’s view, the evidence fails to support any finding of fraud under CC section 3294.  Respondent had already acknowledged that Petitioner is entitled to her share, expressly agreed to a court judgment awarding her this share, and knew that she was aware of it and taking steps to obtain payments from CalPERS.  It is also apparent from the evidence which both parties provide, that Petitioner was handling preparation of the QDRO and related paperwork to ensure that she received her share.  Respondent is also making efforts to remedy the situation by including options for ensuring she receives her share and the arrears. 

            For the same reasons, the court finds insufficient basis for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under Fam. Code section 271.  The conduct appears simply to have been erroneous, not intentional misconduct.

            The Court, at the same time, notes that the current situation requires a resolution in practical terms regarding the details of the amounts owed to Petitioner and the mechanics of getting those payments to her.  Respondent has, as noted, engaged a firm to make these calculations and has proposed several amounts and a payment plan.  He also proposes that the parties jointly work together with the firm, MSM, to resolve the issues.  This appears to be reasonable and a good-faith effort to resolve the matter, but Petitioner reasonably also has concerns over the methods of payment and may also reasonably wish to obtain her own accounting and calculations. 

Conclusion
 

            The court therefore DENIES the motion but REQUIRES APPEARANCES in order to address the methods of resolving the amounts owed and methods of payment. In the alternative, the Court can SET A HEARING in the future, to give the parties time to gather any information needed from MSM or other entity to determine options for resolution. If the parties prefer the latter, no appearances are required but both parties shall contact the judicial assistant and request a mutually agreeable hearing date. Respondent shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.
 

2. SFL088960, Botello v. Lopez

MATTER CONTINUED TO A SPECIAL SET EVIDENTIARY HEARING on December 15, 2026 at 10am in Department 21 for 2 hours regarding the Motion to Enforce Orders on Community Property, Spousal Support.   The parties must clarify what payments Petitioner has made directly or from his CalPERS pension, the amounts, what the payments were for, and the cause of any failure to make required payments. 

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with minor child on July 23, 2021. After trial, the Court entered a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage on October 5, 2023 (“Judgment”), including orders for joint legal and physical custody of the child, temporary support orders, findings of community and separate property, took other issues under submission, and retained jurisdiction over support and other issues.  The orders include:
 

The Court keeps in place the current child support and spousal support orders, as agreed upon by the parties in June 2023.

Father is to pay Mother the amount of $500 in temporary child support.

Father is to pay Mother the amount of $500 in temporary spousal support.

Father is to pay Mother half of the amount by the 15th of each month, and the second half by the last day of each month.

The Court retains jurisdiction as to child support and spousal support.

If there is a change in circumstances, a new Request for Order must be filed.

The Court took under submission the issues regarding the house and retirement accounts. The Judgment specifically orders child support to commence October 1, 2023; spousal support to commence October 1, 2023, plus $200 a month toward an arrearage of $1,500.  The Court made determinations as to the community and separate property portions of Petitioner’s pension, awarding Respondent $1,150 a month from the pension commencing October 1, 2023, with the parties to work with CalPERS for the latter to pay Respondent her portion directly.   The Court also ordered Petitioner to pay Respondent $16,100 for arrearages from the pension division which he should have been paying from September 1, 2022; to pay Respondent $17,500 for her share of Petitioner’s Nationwide IRA; and $4,000 for her share of his Oppenheimer IRA.  The Court also ordered Respondent to pay $17,500 as her share of community debt. The Court found the family home to be Petitioner’s separate property, with Respondent entitled to $70,000 as community property appreciation during the marriage.  Accordingly, it concluded,
 

HUSBAND’S PAYMENT TO WIFE:

CalPERS - $1,150.00 a month

Nationwide - $17,500.00

Invesco - $4,000.00

Family Home - $70,000.00

Unpaid CalPERS - $16,100.00 (14 months)

Total: $107,600 + $1,150 per month CalPERS

WIFE’S PAYMENT TO HUSBAND:

Credit Card Debt $17,500.00

BALANCE: Husband owes Wife $90,100 + $1,150 a month CalPERS.

Husband to pay wife the total sum of $90,100 no later than February 1, 2024. In the alternative Husband will sign a promissory note which pays Wife $1,000 a month beginning November 1, 2023, interest free. If Husband misses more than two payments, the remaining balance becomes due and interest accrues at 10% from November 1, 2023, and is added to the balance. Wife to prepare the promissory note.

            On March 6, 2024, the Court entered a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) regarding Respondent’s interest in Petitioner’s pension.  It awarded to Respondent benefits of $1,150 a month, plus a payment of arrearages from October 1, 2023.

            The parties continue to litigate over issues regarding the minor child and financial matters, including spousal support for Respondent.  In November 2024, the court held a hearing regarding spousal support and another hearing on Respondent’s Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Change Spousal Support Order and to Enforce Previous Court Orders on Petitioner’s Community-Property Debts.  In that motion, Respondent moved the court to change the prior order on spousal support and to enforce court orders regarding spousal support, interest, and her share of the family house and the retirement plans.  The Court granted Respondent’s motion, finding that Petitioner was obligated to pay spousal support and funds for her share of the family residence at 840 Bond Place, Windsor CA (the “Property”) and retirement plans.  It found that Petitioner had violated his payment obligations and therefore owed $90,100 plus interest from November 1, 2023.  Regarding Petitioner’s request to reduce the spousal support obligation, the court reduced that obligation from $500 to $300 per month. 

            Litigation since then has focused on custody and visitation.  In November 2025, the court ordered Respondent to have specific supervised visitation with the parties’ child.  By that time, Petitioner had temporary physical custody of the child pending a determination of his request for full legal and physical custody based on his claims of Respondent’s issues regarding her alleged abandonment of the child, mental health, and criminal proceedings against her.  At a hearing on custody and visitation on June 1, 2026, the court awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child to Petitioner.  It granted Respondent professionally supervised visitation.  Respondent is currently obligated to pay child support to Petitioner, the sole custodial parent.  On October 5, 2026, the Sonoma County Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS”) issued a notice of that it was substituting in as payee to receive the payments from Respondent since it was providing the support to Petitioner. 

Motion
 

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Enforce Orders on Community Property, Spousal Support, Respondent moves the court to compel Petitioner to comply with orders regarding community property and spousal support made in the Judgment entered on October 13, 2023.  She claims that Petitioner still owes her the community-property payment of $90,100 plus interest so far amounting to $27,029.88, resulting in a total of $117,129.88.  She seeks an order that the CalPERS pension pay $1,200 a month towards this and to use equity in the house to secure the principal.  She contends that Petitioner stopped paying spousal support in May 2025 and has paid nothing since then, resulting in arrears of $5,400, based on $300 a month for 18 months.  She specifically seeks an order that Petitioner’s monthly spousal support of $300 plus a monthly payment of $900 for interest due be paid directly from his CalPERS pension and that the unpaid principal total of $122,529.88 plus accumulating interest be secured by a lien on the Property.

            Petitioner has filed two opposition documents to the motion, one before the original hearing and a new one prior to this hearing.  He disputes Respondent’s description of the adoption of the QDRO and the events regarding Respondent’s absence from their child, whom she left in his care when she went to Mexico.  He also claims that on October 18, 2025, Respondent entered his house without permission, causing him to call the police, and that she was later arrested for breaking into the residence of a domestic partner with whom she has been having a troubled relationship.  He asserts that he has attempted to obtain information from Respondent in order to make the deposits of the money which he owes but that she refused because she wanted to obtain a physical check in person, but he later could not locate her because she was in jail.  He adds that since March 1, 2024, CalPERS has been withholding $1,000 per month from his pension to pay for spousal support and child support plus another $147.06 per month to pay towards arrears of child support.  He also states that he has been sending payments of additional spousal support and arrears to Respondent at her post office box in Forestville. 

Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code (“Fam.Code”) section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022; In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2 Dist. 2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, at 910-911.

CCP §128 gives the court the power to control the proceedings before it, preserve and enforce order, compel obedience to judgments, orders, etc.; and make orders and process “conform to law and justice.”  The court in Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Ass'n v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, at 679, explained,
 

The inherent power of the trial court to exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued is well established [Citations]; the court may make discretionary orders with reasonable conditions; and even make subsequent limitations and modifications of prior orders in order to achieve justice [Citation]….” 

Courts therefore have inherent power to control judicial proceedings in order to ensure orderly administration of justice and to see to it that all persons indulge in no act or conduct calculated to obstruct administration of justice.  People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 897.

            The rules regarding the period of enforceability and renewal of judgments in the Enforcement of Judgments Law (“EJL”) at CCP § 683.010 et seq. do not limit the court’s discretion when enforcing Family Code judgments and orders.  Fam.Code § 291.  Accordingly, a money judgment or judgment for possession or sale of property made or entered under the Family Code, including a judgment for child, family or spousal support, is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied.  Fam.Code § 291(a); Schelb v. Stein (2010) 190 Cal.App. 4th 1440, 1447. 

Discussion

            Respondent sets forth the court’s orders of October 2023 and November 2024 regarding payment to her of spousal support, payment from his pension, payments for her share of his IRA plans, and payment for her share of the increased value of the house.  These orders are all set forth above. Respondent states that Petitioner has paid nothing towards his obligation under those orders.  As noted above, the Court originally gave Petitioner two alternatives for payment: he could either pay the full amount by February 1, 2024 or he could pay Respondent $1,000 a month, interest-free, but 10% interest would accrue if he missed two payments.  Petitioner paid nothing by November 2024, thus violating both options and incurring the accrual of interest.  The court then, on November 5, 2024, ordered payment of that principal plus interest as set forth in the order.

           

Petitioner claims that since March 1, 2024, CalPERS has been withholding $1,000 per month from his pension to pay for spousal support and child support plus another $147.06 per month to pay towards arrears of child support.  He also states that he has been sending payments of additional spousal support and arrears to Respondent at her post office box in Forestville. 

These amounts are for the amounts ordered to cover those support payments but they do not go to the obligation to pay the unpaid principal set forth above.  However, as noted above, the spousal support was since reduced to $300 per month and, since Petitioner now has full legal and physical custody of the child, he no longer has the obligation to make payments for child support and instead Respondent owes child support.  It is not clear what other payments he has been making in addition to the payments from CalPERS, or whether the CalPERS payments have been continuing.  

It is also not clear whether Petitioner has been attempting to make payments regarding the principal which this Court already ordered him to pay or whether a failure to do so is his fault.  Petitioner claims that he has been making payments but does not clarify what these payments are.  He also states that he has attempted to make other payments but has been unable to do so because of Respondent’s refusal to cooperate or accept direct payments, and because at times he could not contact her because she was in jail and he was unaware of the fact.  Respondent herself provides no information about any of this and instead simply states that Petitioner has not paid her the money owed.  Again, her claims of owed money do not appear to take into account the fact that Petitioner no longer owes her child support and he may possibly have been making payments, directly or from CalPERS, which included amounts for such support which he may not owe.  She also states that Petitioner stopped making payments in May 2025 but it is unclear if this means that she also stopped receiving payments from CalPERS on his behalf.

The Court is unable to determine what payments Petitioner has actually made or the reasons for any non-payment.  The parties fail to provide clear evidence sufficient to support any conclusion at this time.  The parties present what appear to be largely mutually inconsistent statements regarding Petitioner’s payment and neither provides supporting or corroborating evidence and neither appears to be particularly credible.  At the same time, making the situation much more unclear, neither side provides meaningful detail or explanation.  Both present largely general, conclusory statements.  Both also ignore certain factual problems.  For example, Respondent appears to claim that CalPERS has stopped making payments to her, a statement which ignores the court order for CalPERS to make the payments and the fact that Petitioner is not in control of those payments.  Petitioner, meanwhile, does not clearly address his payment of the outstanding principal owed while he appears to claim that he has still been making payments for child support.

The court therefore is unable to determine the amount which Petitioner currently owes or whether a failure to pay is his fault, which will affect the interest which he owes as well.

Conclusion

            The court therefore specially sets the matter for an evidentiary hearing on December 15, 2026 at 10am for 2 hours. The parties are required to exchange any and all documentation supporting their positions at least 5 days prior to the hearing. The parties shall provide such documentation to the Court on the day of the hearing. The documents shall include but not be limited to: how much money CalPERS directly paid Respondent since October 1, 2023; how much money Petitioner paid Respondent since October 1, 2023, including details as to what the payment was for, the date it was paid and the method paid, whether by cash, check or direct deposit; whether Petitioner paid in full the spousal support arrears of $1,500 owed per the October 13, 2023 Judgment; and, whether Respondent is owed any further payments of $1,150 per month related to the CalPERS award and in the Judgment.
 

3. SFL089176, Gatlin v. Gatlin

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY RESPONSES/PRODUCTION; SANCTIONS GRANTED, as explained below, with respect to compelling responses but not compelling production.  The court AWARDS to Respondent, against Petitioner, monetary sanctions of $2,397.29 in attorney’s fees and costs of $66.74. 

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action for dissolution of marriage with two minor children (the “Children”) on August 26, 2021.  Petitioner requested and obtained a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (“DVRO”) after hearing.  The court entered a judgment of dissolution (the “Judgment”) on March 25, 2024, pursuant to an incorporated stipulation.  The Judgment addressed property division, support, custody, visitation, and other issues, but otherwise retaining court jurisdiction.   

            The parties are continuing to litigate over child custody, visitation, child support, and DVRO issues.  As part of the litigation over modification of child support, as set forth in the declaration attached to his Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Compel Discovery Responses/Production; Sanctions filed on June 22, 2026, Respondent served Petitioner on January 13, 2026 with a demand for production of documents (the “Discovery”), requiring responses by February 17, 2026.  Petitioner failed to provide any responses or documents by the deadline.  After Respondent’s attorney contacted Petitioner to resolve the issue informally, Respondent eventually, on April 13, 2026, indicated that she would produce requested documents but she failed to do so and, despite further resolution efforts by Respondent, has provided no formal written discovery responses or requested documents.

Motion

            In his RFO and Motion to Compel Discovery Responses/Production; Sanctions, Respondent moves the court to compel Petitioner to provide responses to the Discovery as well as requested documents.  He also seeks monetary sanctions for the cost of this motion and efforts to obtain the requested responses and documents. 

            Petitioner opposes the motion.  She contends that she is suffering financial hardship, disability issues, lack of employment, and that she has not understood the nature of the requirement for responding to the Discovery.

Applicable Authority

            According to the Family Law Rules of the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) 5.2(d), and Family Code section 210, provisions applicable to civil actions generally apply to proceedings under the Family Code unless otherwise provided.  This includes the rules applicable to civil actions in the California Rules of Court (“CRC”) and the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223 Cal.App. 4th 1004, at 1022 (discovery).

Where a party seeks to compel responses to requests for production under CCP section 2031.300, the moving party need only demonstrate that the discovery was served, the time has expired, and the responding party failed to provide a timely response.  See Leach v. Sup.Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906. Failure to provide a timely response waives objections, “including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product….”    CCP section 2031.300.  There is no meet-and-confer requirement or a deadline for a motion to compel response where none has been made. CCP section 2031.300.  Where a party has failed to respond on time to a request for production, the first step is not to compel production but to compel a response.  CCP section 2031.300.

            The responding party must verify substantive responses.  CCP section 2031.250.    Where a response is unverified, the response is ineffective and is the equivalent of no response at all.  See Appleton v Sup.Ct.  (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.  

Service of Opposition
 

            Petitioner filed a proof of service for her opposition, or responsive declaration.  However, this shows service on Respondent himself at his residence, instead of showing service on his attorney of record.  This is improper.  When a party is represented by an attorney, service should be to the party’s attorney, not to the party directly.  In this instance, the court will not find this to be a material defect unless Respondent claims lack of proper service and notice for the opposition, in which case the court will be required to disregard the opposition and potentially continue the motion to allow sufficient notice in order to consider the opposition.   

Discussion
 

            Respondent demonstrates that he served the Discovery, the time for responding has expired, and Petitioner has served neither responses nor requested documents.  He also shows that this is despite several months of his efforts to resolve the matter informally and Petitioner’s statement that she would comply.  Respondent therefore has met his burden for obtaining an order compelling Petitioner to provide formal, written, verified responses without objections.  Petitioner’s assertions primarily go to underlying issues regarding child support, not Respondent’s right to obtain the Discovery responses.  The court GRANTS the motion as to compelling responses without objection.  
 

            However, as explained above, Respondent at this time has no basis for an order compelling production of requested documents.  Respondent may not seek such an order until he has received a formal response agreeing to produce the documents.  The court DENIES the motion as to compelling production, without prejudice to Respondent seeking such an order later should the circumstances warrant it. 

Sanctions
 

For compelling responses to production requests, the court shall impose monetary sanctions on the losing party unless that party acted with substantial justification, or other circumstances make sanctions unjust.  CCP sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2031.300.    A party may seek relief from sanctions due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect if it has served responses.  CCP section 2031.300(a).   

           

In order to obtain sanctions, the moving party must request sanctions in the notice of motion, identify against whom the party seeks the sanctions, and specify the kind of sanctions.  CCP section 2023.040.  The sanctions are limited to the “reasonable expenses” related to the motion.  Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262 

            Fam. Code section 271 broadly authorizes the court to make an award of attorney’s fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” and “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this code,” based on “the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.”  The party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs on this basis is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

            Respondent requests sanctions of $3,665 based on the above provisions.  According to the declaration of his attorney filed with the motion, with attached billing records, this consists of attorney’s fees of $2,397.29 at $300 an hour, roughly 8 hours of work, as well as the filing costs of $66.74.  The requested sum includes an additional anticipated amount of $1,200 for any reply and the hearing.  The amount claimed for the time spent is reasonable, given the lengthy efforts to resolve the matter informally in addition to the time for the motion itself.  However, the court cannot include in the award any amount for time anticipated since the award may include only fees both actually and reasonably incurred. 

            The court AWARDS to Respondent, against Petitioner, monetary sanctions of  $2,397.29 in attorney’s fees and costs of $66.74.  The court may add any additional amount which the court finds to be actually and reasonably incurred according to proof. 

Conclusion
 

            The motion is GRANTED as explained above.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.
 

4. 25FL01284, Freeman v. Campbell
 

Motion to Set Aside Default DENIED.

Facts

            Petitioner filed this action on June 18, 2025, seeking nullity of his marriage to Respondent.  Petitioner obtained entry of default against Respondent on August 5, 2025.

            However, after obtaining Respondent’s default and before entry of judgment, Petitioner died without issue on November 4, 2025, with the nullity action still pending.  Petitioner has a niece, Tracy Marie Brockey (“Tracy”) and two nephews Ryan Freeman (“Ryan”) and Michael Freeman (“Michael”). 
 

            A probate proceeding for administration of Petitioner’s estate is pending in this court, case 25PR01503 (the “Probate Action”), and the court in that action appointed Tracy and Ryan as general administrators with full authority for Petitioner’s estate.   
 

            In two separate motions, Michael, nephew of Petitioner, moved to be joined pursuant to Family Code section 2021 and California Rule of Court 5.24, determine that the nullity proceeding survives Petitioner’s death, and to be substituted in as successor in interest.  After the hearing, on September 3, 2026, the court granted the motions.
 

            On October 15, 2026, the court granted the motion of Respondent’s attorneys to be relieved as counsel; Respondent is self-represented.

Motion
 

            In her Request for Order (“RFO”) and Motion to Set Aside Default, filed before her attorneys withdrew from the proceedings, Respondent moves the court to set aside the default.  She relies solely on the grounds for equitable relief based on extrinsic fraud or mistake, asserting that she may seek relief on this basis even though no statutory grounds for relief are available.  She argues that the default resulted from extrinsic fraud or mistake because after Petitioner had obtained entry of the default against her, he abandoned the proceedings, indicated that he did not want to proceed with a nullity judgment, and acted toward Respondent as though they were still married.  She also contends that the “post-default notice” pursuant to CCP section 587 was sent to an incorrect address which she no longer used, so she did not properly receive it. 

            Michael opposes the motion.  He objects to evidence and argues that Respondent has presented no legal or factual basis for setting aside the default.
 

Requests for Judicial Notice
 

Respondent’s Request

            Respondent requests judicial notice of several documents from the court record, filed in the Probate Action.  Respondent made this request for both this motion and her opposition to Michael’s prior motions. 

The documents, their contents, that they make the statements set forth in them, and their purported legal effect, are judicially noticeable but the truth of factual assertions made in the documents is not.  Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-755. 

            Michael raises several objections.  The objections include one based on the assertion that Respondent had defaulted and had not appeared and lacks standing. Although such objection could be persuasive for the prior motions, it is not proper in the context of this motion since Respondent is seeking to set aside the default and may seek such relief pursuant to the authority set forth above.  Michael also objects that the court only judicially noticed the existence of the documents themselves and not the contents but, as noted above, this is not entirely correct.  The court may not judicially notice the truth of the factual assertions in the contents of the documents, but, given the nature of the documents, it may judicially notice the contents ( i.e., that they say what they say). 

The court may judicially notice the documents, the contents, and the purported legal effect but it may not judicially notice the truth of factual assertions made therein.  Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-755.  With this limitation, the court grants the request. 

            The court notes, based on the substantive discussion below, that none of the rulings regarding judicial notice in any way alters the court’s analysis of the motion and the outcome, which would be the same regardless.   

Michael’s Request

            Michael also requests judicial notice of documents from the court record in several actions.  With the same limitation and caveat as set forth above, these and their contents, but not the truth of factual assertions therein, are judicially noticeable.  Subject to the limitation set forth above, the court grants this request as well.

Evidentiary Objections
 

            Michael also objects to portions of the declaration of Respondent’s former attorney, Matthew Davis, purporting to authenticate two letters and the death certificate of Petitioner.  The objections to the two letters, Exhibits 1-2, on the grounds of lack of personal knowledge, are persuasive since nothing in the declarations demonstrates personal knowledge.  The court sustains those objections.  The other objections to those letters are not persuasive and are overruled, but in light of the sustained objections, this has no effect because the court cannot consider the letters.  The objection to the death certificate is actually an objection to, or argument against, any reliance on the document’s designation of Respondent as Petitioner’s spouse.  This is argument, not a valid evidentiary objection, and is overruled.  The court notes, based on the substantive discussion below, that none of the rulings on any of these objections in any way alters the court’s analysis of the motion and the outcome, which would be the same regardless.  
 

Discussion
 

            Respondent’s motion, substantively, is without merit.  As noted above, her motion admits that she presents no statutory basis for relief under the applicable statutes set forth above, and instead relies solely on extrinsic fraud or mistake.  More fundamentally, even considering the entirety of her evidence, as a matter of law she presents no basis for relief under any statutes or the equitable doctrine of extrinsic fraud or mistake because she presents no evidence or argument regarding the failure to appear or prevent the default.  She instead bases her argument entirely on facts and alleged events which occurred after Petitioner obtained her default.  She argues that after Petitioner obtained her default, he told his attorney that he did not want to proceed further and obtain a judgment, and she did not receive timely or proper notice following the default.  None of this demonstrates a basis for setting aside the default because it shows nothing affecting the entry of default or Respondent’s failure to appear and avoid the default.  Accordingly, it necessarily can demonstrate neither fraud nor mistake, nor any lack of notice or, indeed, anything else, resulting in the default.  She does not claim that she lacked notice in time to appear and prevent the default, only that she lacked timely or proper notice of proceedings after the entry of default.  The evidence she cites regarding Petitioner’s possible, if perhaps temporary, decision not to proceed to a judgment after a default does not demonstrate when she was aware of that possible decision and, since it all unequivocally occurred after the entry of default, cannot possibly have led Respondent to avoid appearing in reliance on the information.

            Any other arguments in support of the motion based on the evidence presented are outside the scope of a motion to vacate default and this court already addressed them in granting Michael’s motions, at which Respondent made the same factual assertions.  As this court already decided and explained in granting Michael’s motions, Respondent’s evidence of intent to abandon the action or affirm the marriage is equivocal and conflicts with the face of the court record in this proceeding.  Respondent’s evidence of communications between Petitioner and his attorney shows only that Petitioner at times indicated to his attorney that he intended to drop the proceeding, but it also shows back-and-forth communications regarding the issue without any final resolution.  The other evidence which Respondent cites only shows that Petitioner may have called himself “husband” and Respondent “wife” in communications, primarily with Respondent.  This is not material.  These are merely terms for referring to the two people and nothing shows that the mere use of them meant that he necessarily considered the marriage to be valid or was reaffirming the marriage.  Moreover, the messages show that Petitioner in fact was angry with Respondent for her conduct.  The nature of the communications is consistent with an intent to seek nullity.  Fundamentally, the face of the record does not support Respondent’s claims of an intent to reaffirm the marriage or drop the nullity proceeding.  Even if Petitioner had considered dismissing the nullity action, ultimately he did not do so.  Petitioner proceeded to obtaining entry of default against Respondent in this case and the record shows that he never sought to vacate that default, never stipulated to set that aside, and never actually made an effort to dismiss the action.    

Conclusion
 

            The motion is DENIED.  The prevailing party shall prepare and serve a proposed order consistent with this tentative ruling within five days of the date set for argument of this matter. Opposing party shall inform the preparing party of objections as to form, if any, or whether the form of order is approved, within five days of receipt of the proposed order. The preparing party shall submit the proposed order and any objections to the court in accordance with California Rules of Court, Rule 5.125.
 

5. 25FL01537, Ainsworth v. Ainsworth
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS CONTINUED to the law and motion calendar of March 18, 2027 in Department 21 at 9:00 a.m. due to lack of proper service.  There is a proof of service attached to the Request for Order filed June 12, 2026 indicating service of the Request for Order on that same date, before a hearing date was assigned. Respondent was required to serve Petitioner with the filed Request for Order that indicates the hearing date. Prior to the new hearing, Respondent must serve Petitioner with this tentative ruling and the filed Request for Order of June 12, 2026, and separately file a proof of service in accord with California Rule of Court 3.1300.
 

6. 25FL01636, Hall v. Hall

APPEARANCES REQUIRED.
 

7. 25FL02159, Gosar v. Gosar

MOTION DROPPED AS A SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY HAS BEEN FILED.

8. 26FL00084, Ferguson v. Ferguson
MOTION IS DROPPED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Per the ruling of the Court on October 1, 2026, Respondent was ordered to timely file a proof of service demonstrating service of notice of this hearing and the filed motion. Respondent did not file such proof of service and the motion is hereby dropped without prejudice.